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The Place of Enterprise Liability in the
Control of Corporate Conduct
Christopher D. Stonet
One does not have to believe that corporations are to blame for
society's problems, or think ill of the persons who (in the popular
but overstated expression) "run them," to be concerned about cor-
porate accountability. Public focus is justified, if only by the increas-
ing importance of corporations in our lives. More and more, it is
they,' and perhaps an increasingly concentrated group of them,2 who
produce, pollute, distribute, invest, swindle, and farm. And to whom
else do we look to plumb-and market-the mysteries of the human
cell?3 In this setting, the success of the law as a social instrument-
deterring, rehabilitating, securing effective compensation for victims,
educating citizens between right and wrong4-turns upon its capacity
to deal with the corporation as a basic unit of communal activity.
t Roy P. Crocker Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center.
This article benefited from presentation at a U.S.C. Faculty Workshop, as well as from
untallied collegial contributions.
1. Between 1960 and 1976 the number of corporations increased from 10.2% to 14.4%
of all forms of business enterprise. The corporate share of business receipts rose from
77.5% to 87.1% in the same period. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 553, table 913 (1979).
2. It is not entirely clear whether the increasing prominence of corporations has been
accompanied by an increasing concentration. In 1978, firms comprising the first and sec-
ond highest quintiles of the top 500 industrial corporations captured 0.6% and 0.5% more,
respectively, of all sales accounted for by the top 500 than they had in 1960; the lower
three quintiles declined proportionately over the same period. See id. at 571, table 949.
However, this mild concentration may be less significant considering that over the same
period the second 500 largest industrial corporations increased their sales receipts at a
faster rate than did the top 500. See id.
3. See Bylinsky, DNA Can Build Companies, Too, FORTUNE, June 16, 1980, at 144;
Rifkin, DNA: Have the Corporations Already Grabbed Control of New Life Forms?
MOTHER JONES, Feb./Mar. 1977, at 23.
4. For a discussion of this last and perhaps most neglected function of law, see E.
ZIMRING & J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 77-83 (1973).
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Indeed, we do well to think of "corporation" today in something
akin to its original sense, as comprising not merely business corpora-
tions, but the whole range of giant corporate bureaucracies: that
have become the peoples of a modem society:B co-operatives,7 unions,
pension funds, university systems, hospitals, charities, and govern-
mental agencies. Such mischief as these nonbusiness institutions threat-
en is neither more confined, nor more controllable, because it is not
motivated by profit.8 A mismanaged pension fund can sadden as
many lives as a mismanaged assembly line. Government bureaus,
motivated by various "policy" reasons, have committed any number
of acts that were not nice,9 and some that were illegal. 10 And in the
5. Anthony Downs provides a useful definition of bureaucracies as organizations (I)
large enough that, in general, the highest ranking members know less than half of
all the other members; (2) a majority of whose members are employed by the organiza-
tion on a full-time basis; (3) whose personnel policies are based in some measure upon
employee performance in organizational roles, rather than upon, say, social class or fam-
ily connections; and (4) most of whose output "is not directly or indirectly evaluated in
any markets external to the organization by means of voluntary quid pro quo transac-
tions." A. DowNs, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 24-25 (1967). On the basis of the fourth criterion,
Downs excludes the for-profit corporation, such as General Motors, from the class of
bureaucracies that he studies. Id. at 25. By contrast, the present article inclines to regroup
them together. Although I grant Downs's view that the social function of an organization
exerts strong influence on its internal structure and behavior, id. at 2, which suggests
separate consideration, nonetheless many of the insights of bureaucratic theorists like
Downs seem apposite to for-profit enterprises.
6. See D. BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 301 (1973) (unit of social
decision is, increasingly, group not individual); P. DRUCKER, CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION
at ix (rev. ed. 1972) (American society is society of large institutions).
7. See The Billion-Dollar Farm Co-Ops Nobody Knows, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 7, 1977,
at 54 (in first half of 1970s, total revenues of farm co-ops ballooned from $25 billion to
$57 billion, giving them a third of total farm market).
8. On the contrary, whatever the shortcomings of the enterprise liability techniques
in achieving adequate discipline of for-profit corporations-defects that are examined
at pp. 14-16 infra-the availability of profit threats at least provides us with a handle
on them. There are special difficulties in controlling the agencies and not-for-profit cor-
porations, precisely because the profit threats are unavailable. See, e.g., Miller, Munici-
palities Trail Industry in Cleanup of Water Pollution, Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 1976, at I,
col. 6 (municipal corporations much slower than business corporations to abide by water
quality rules); cf. Wilson & Rachal, Can the Government Regulate Itself? 46 PUBLIC INTER-
EST 3 (1977) (suggesting that public agencies can regulate private organizations more easily
than they can regulate other public agencies).
9. Consider, for instance, the so-called Tuskegee Study, begun in the 1930s. Some 400
poor black men, diagnosed as having syphilis, were studied for about 30 years by the
United States Public Health Service. The subjects were examined periodically to deter-
mine the nature and course of their disease but were not treated, even after 1945 when
penicillin had become available as a safe and recognized cure. An estimated 107 subjects
died from the disease's effects. See G. ANNAS, L. GLANTZ, & B. KATZ, INFORMaED CONSENT
TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 259 (1977).
10. See FBI Counterintelligence Programs: Hearing Before the Civil Rights and Con-
stitutional Rights Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
25-26 (1975) (colloquy among Congressman Robert Drinan, Deputy Attorney General
Laurence Silberman, and Henry Petersen, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division)
(discussing alleged criminal acts by FBI against supposed black extremists).
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name of Science, things have been done that Greed would shrink
from."
What these considerations contend for, and what this article under-
takes to introduce, is a new "field" of law: the legal control of cor-
porate behavior. Such an undertaking involves two commitments. It
requires questioning the separate legal treatment that each of the
various classes of "corporate" organization, broadly understood, has
traditionally received, and it requires giving sustained attention to
the features that they possess in common and that may merit their
treatment as a class distinct from other classes of social actors-from
ordinary persons, in particular.
The fact that the control of corporate behavior has enjoyed so little
distinct attention, either in the legal literature or in the codes, has
roots in legal history. As early as the twelfth century, various types
of corporate bodies had been recognized, including guilds, trading
companies, hospitals, universities, and municipalities. 2 Yet, at least
as far as wrongdoing was concerned, the law was rarely pressed to
consider whether the rules being developed to deal with ordinary
human bodies might be inappropriate or ineffective to deal with those
that were corporate.' 3 Some of the reasons for disregarding the cor-
poration as a separate phenomenon were doctrinal. There were, for
example, conceptual misgivings about whether a persona ficta could
be liable for wrongdoing, particularly those requiring mental states
as an element.14 Other impediments were more practical. The size
and structure of the early corporations were so unprepossessing that
when a wrong was done, it was ordinarily not difficult to reach within
the corporation to locate a responsible member or agent-a "culprit"
11. See Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 21 A.D.2d 495, 497-98, 251 N.Y.S.2d
818, 820-21 (1964), rev'd, 15 N.Y.2d 317, 206 N.E.2d 338, 258 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1965) (project
financed by government and charity to inject foreign cancer cells into unknowing hu-
man patients).
12. For an authoritative survey of the development of early forms of corporations,
see J. DAvis, CORPORATIONS (1961).
13. See id. at 116 (King's tallages, fines, and amercements on municipal corporations
collected from townsmen directly); Cf. C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 8-18 (1975) (dis-
cussing slow emergence of corporate liability in early law).
14. See, e.g., Anonymous, 88 Eng. Rep. 1518, 1518 (K.B. 1701) ("[a] corporation is not
indictable, but the particular members of it are"); Sutton's Hospital Case, 77 Eng. Rep.
937, 973 (K.B. 1613) (dictum) (corporation cannot commit treason nor be outlawed). The
nonliability of the corporation itself was variously rested on doubts about the corpora-
tion's amenability to process, see F. HALLIS, CORPORATE PERSONALITY at xliv n.1 (1930);
on the fiction theory, under which the corporation, as a persona ficta, was metaphysically
incapable of wrongdoing, particularly if mens rea was required, see Mueller, Mens Rea
and the Corporation, 19 U. PITT. L. REv. 21, 22-23 (1957); and on questions of agency con-
cerning the authorizability of intentional wrongful acts, see F. HALLIS, supra, at xliv-xlvi.
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-and apply the sanctions of the law, quite sensibly, to him or her.1
The industrial revolution gave corporations a prominence, size, and
complexity that put an end to their low legal visibility. But only in
a few ways were corporations recognized as special sorts of actors de-
manding the attention of specially adapted laws. The exceptions were
almost entirely reserved for areas of "internal" corporate relationships,
such as those between shareholder and manager, guild and tradesman,
and citizen and borough.' 6 In those areas, the problems that arose
were by their very nature peculiarly corporate: How many directors
or trustees did a corporation need to have? How were they to be
selected and removed? To resolve issues of this sort, for which there
were no ready solutions, even by analogy from other areas of law, the
law was pressed to compose special bodies of corporate laws. But so
far as the corporation was performing acts that affected the outside
world-polluting the environment, producing harmful goods, commit-
ting ordinary crimes-there already existed general rules of torts,
crimes, and so on, designed for the control of "persons." The simplest
solution-although not necessarily the best-was to fit the various cor-
porations into those existing frameworks. Nothing was required except
to ignore, one by one, the earlier qualms about whether the corpora-
tion ("that invisible, intangible, and artificial being," Chief Justice
Marshall had called it z) could be regarded as a person, too-a wrong-
doer in its own right.
Basically, it is this twofold heritage that I am calling into question.
First, because the predominant response to corporations was to fit
them uncritically into the preexisting bodies of general law, the dis-
tinct features they may possess as a class have been denied the con-
centrated attention given to recognized "fields" such as partnership,
persons, and pleading. Even in contexts where the seriousness of cor-
porate-connected problems has been recognized, there has been an in-
clination to view them merely as problems of "big business," as though
their remedy might be of no different quality than we would reserve
for human beings who just happened to be especially powerful.' 8
15. Indeed, whatever strength the doctrines mentioned above, see note 14 supra, may
have had in theory, it is open to question whether the courts, if pressed, would have re-
garded them as real stumbling blocks. See C. STONE, supra note 13, at 2; Pollock, Has the
Common Law Received the Fiction Theory of Corporations? 27 LAW Q. REV. 219, 232-35
(1911).
16. The internal rules of early corporations were not wholly independent of public
law. See, e.g., J. DAVIS, supra note 12, at 177-81 (internal relations of trade guilds es-
tablished largely autonomously in earliest stages but were gradually affected by public
acts, such as Parliament's regulation of guild membership criteria in response to plague
conditions).
17. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86 (1809).
18. See C. STONE, supra note 12, at 27-29 (discussing historical failure of law to treat
distinct problems of corporations).
4
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Second, in those limited contexts where the various types of bu-
reaucratic organization have been singled out from the bodies of gen-
eral law for special treatment, each type is ordinarily treated separately.
The business organizations-stock, nonstock, utility, and so on-are
fitted into one or more frameworks, and each of the nonprofits-the
charities and the various categories of public agency-into others.
Some of the reasons for separate treatment seem valid; others are less
convincing.19 In fact, the differences among the different types of
bureaucratic organization are most obvious only at the surfaces be-
tween each institution and the outside world. The one takes a stance
for profits; the other assumes the dress of teaching or curing. The
one relies for nourishment upon voluntary exchanges in the market;
the other, upon the various devices that open the public's or a patron's
purse. Yet the deeper we probe the various organizations' bureau-
cratic innards, the more we are able to locate organic similarities that
are as striking as the surface contrasts.2 0 All are schooled in the tech-
niques of modem management and possess common structures to
divide and disseminate authority and information.21 Each is a vehicle
for livelihood, prestige, intrigue, self-fulfillment, aggression, and play.
22
These common elements suggest that much of the harm done by the
various types of organization may stem not so much from the goals
that they hold apart23 as from the bureaucratic features that they hold
19. For example, profit sanctions may seem more appropriate for controlling business
corporations, while various bureaucratic and procedural controls seem to be the inevitable
response to non-profit organizations. But neither connection is self-evident. Business cor-
porations are not animated strictly by profits, see p. 21 infra, and so may be susceptible
to the bureaucratic and procedural techniques associated with the regulation of public
agencies. Conversely, even though not-for-profit institutions possess no "profit stream,"
they are not, of course, insensitive to financial penalties, such as the cutting off of pub-
lic funds.
20. Dissimilarities remain, of course: "[e]very organization's social functions strongly
influence its internal structure." A. DOWNS, supra note 5, at 2. The classic treatment of
this theme appears in A. CHANDLER, STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE (1962).
21. See generally A. ETZiONI, MODERN ORGANIZATIONS (1964) (reviewing common ele-
ments of diverse organizations); J. THOMwPSON, ORGANIZATIONS IN AcTION (1967) (same).
22. Daniel Bell, in particular, has emphasized the extent to which large occupational
organizations-business corporations, universities, government agencies, and hospitals-have
been gaining preeminence not only as employers and producers, but also as arenas for the
fulfillment of personal and group needs no longer adequately satisfied by the weakening
traditional institutions of society-the small town, the church, and the family. See D.
BELL, supra note 6, at 287-89.
23. The notion of an organizational goal is thoughtfully examined in A. ETZIONI, supra
note 21, at 6-19. Other commentators prefer to replace the concept of a goal, in the
sense of a value that influences an organization's decisionmaking, with that of a mix of
several constraints that the organization would like to satisfy, such as good reputation,
high profits, and law abidance. The optimization of such a set of conditions might be
viewed as a complex goal. See R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRAI
26-34, 43 (1963); Simon, On the Concept of Organizational Goal, 9 An. Sci. Q. 1, 2-9 (1964).
5
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in common, features that we would do well, in designing legal control
measures, to take into account.
It is to account for this possible link between bureaucratic structure
and bureaucratic harm that we must be prepared to group the various
organizations together and to examine their delicts, not as mere inci-
dents of tort or crime, but as primarily and distinctly organizational
phenomena. By considering the control of bureaucratic organizations
as the focus of interest, and the existing rules and principles as vari-
ables subject to amendment, we can identify and deal with a signifi-
cant set of questions that might otherwise lie obscure. Are our present
institutional arrangements appropriate for the regulation of corporate
conduct, or are we dealing with a new breed of social actor that re-
quires specially adapted techniques of discipline beyond those pres-
ently provided? What alternative control devices are available? And
which alternatives may be most appropriate to which sort of bureau-
cratic organization, and at what social and economic costs? Can we
identify the sorts of social undertaking that are most safely entrusted
to a particular form of organization? And so far as society possesses
some discretion over the total population and the "mix" of bureau-
cratic organizations-by manipulation of the tax laws, for example-
what population profile should be fostered if our aim is a cost-effective
reduction in the incidence of delicts?
2 4
In the space of a single article, we can attempt no expedition so
heroic as to map this entire region. With this in mind, I plan to
retain a principal focus on the business corporation and on the spe-
cial set of rules that have evolved for its constraint. Thus, when we
come to the question of agent liability, for example, I will trust the
reader to know that, as the law now stands, civil servants enjoy im-
munities from suit that their counterparts in business organizations
can well envy. Similarly, I assume an awareness that special liability
rules prevail for charities, governmental agencies, and cooperatives,
and that the role played by the shareholder's derivative suit in the
large business corporation is entrusted to the attorney general in the
case of charities.
This restriction of focus is not inconsistent with my broader inten-
tion to seek a method of analysis for questioning the prevailing dis-
tinctions among types of institution and bodies of rule. The first step
towards the larger goal is to ferret out the basic sets of variables, both
24. Of course, the decision as to what sorts of bureaucratic organizations to foster de-
pends upon estimates of their relative abilities to realize positive social goals such as
legitimacy and efficiency, as well as upon our ability to keep them within minimally
acceptable standards of behavior.
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of organization and of control technique, many of which can be
reached as well from one angle as from another. The aim throughout
is to identify the many possible variations, their implications, and
their legitimating warrants, particularly those that may be generaliz-
able from one context to the other.
I. The "Black Box" vs. Interventionism
The law has not been blind to the increased corporate presence and
to its significance. Many of the most important reforms of the past cen-
tury have been, at least in part, attempts to make some accounting. I
have already referred to the conceptual misgivings in early law about
whether a corporation itself could bear liability for wrongdoing, 5
misgivings that have virtually disappeared.26 In a similar evolution,
the rules of agency, which once impeded any shift in liabilities "up-
wards" onto the corporate master, have made it increasingly possible
to pass the burden along.27 The withering of assorted doctrines that
traditionally shielded enterprises from liability, such as the fellow
servant rule28 and privity,2 9 has accompanied the growth of strict
liability rules.30 New bodies of law have taken shape, and new in-
25. See note 14 supra. The practical significance of these doctrines could not have
been great, however, in view of the limited social role the early corporations played and
the relative ease with which individual culprits could ordinarily be located.
26. Vestiges that still crop up from time to time include, in some jurisdictions, the
immunity of a corporation itself from indictment for manslaughter. See State v. Pacific
Powder Co., 226 Or. 502, 505-08, 360 P.2d 530, 531-32 (1961); Commonwealth v. Peoples
Natural Gas Co., 102 Pitt. Legal J. 348, 350 (Allegheny County Ct. 1954).
27. There remains, however, the "universally accepted" limitation on vicarious lia-
bility that requires that the employee have "act[ed] in behalf of the corporation within
the scope of his office or employment." IV. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL
LAW 234 (1972); see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(l)(2) (1962). Nonetheless, a corporation
may be liable even if the delinquent employee acts contrary to express corporate direc-
tions. See Note, Corporate Criminal Liability for Acts in Violation of Company Policy,
50 GEo. LJ. 547, 554-58 (1962) (vicarious liability for statutory crimes). As a precondition
of non-strict corporate criminal liability, some jurisdictions require that the employee's
acts have been "authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, or recklessly tolerated by
the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of his
employment and in behalf of the corporation." N.Y. Penal Law § 20.20 (McKinney 1967);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (1962).
As to punitive damages, the state courts remain divided on whether they are allowable
against corporations at all, and often limit recovery to circumstances in which managerial
participation can be proved. See C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES
283-84 (1935). This limitation is apparently the federal rule as well. See Lake Shore &
Mich. S. Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893).
28. See L. FIEDMAN, A HIsToRY OF AMERICAN LAW 422 (1973).
29. See, e.g., Bohlen, Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other Than 'Their Im-
mediate Vendees, 45 LAW Q. REv. 343 (1929) (examining exceptions to privity requirement).
30. Of course, strict liability was not born of industrialization; in fact, it emerged
prior to negligence. See Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARV.
L. REv. 315 (1894). On the other hand, early strict liability rested on "the essentially
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stitutions, preeminently the regulatory agencies, have emerged to ad-
minister them.31
That one can identify so many developments connected with the
bridling of corporate conduct testifies to the richness of the law's
devices. But running through the whole control system are, at bottom,
only two fundamental techniques. The first is "enterprise liability";
the second, its rival, is what I shall call "interventionism." The frame-
work of this article is built around the clarification and comparison
of the two approaches, with recommendations that would revise the
present balance struck between them.
Both enterprise liability and the various interventionist techniques
assume as their starting point a societal decision to shift the burdens
of certain activities towards an enterprise and away from hazarded
"outsiders." Their modes of implementation, however, diverge. To
adopt "enterprise liability" is to combine rules of liability and agency
in such a way that accountability is sought by threatening corporate
profits. In circumstances of ordinary civil liability, the exaction equals
the damage. In other circumstances, we assess, on top of the damages,
a punitive surcharge in the form of a fine or exemplary damage award.
But in either case, the liability generated is enterprise liability because
the outside world remains indifferent to how the enterprise partici-
pants-its investors and managers, in particular-adapt to the law's
threats and distribute among themselves the law-driven losses that
occur. As far as the outside world is concerned, the enterprise's in-
terior relationships remain a "black box."
The distinguishing mark of the interventionist techniques is that
the enforcement agencies disdain the "black box" prerogatives of the
enterprise's interior. Where the enterprise-liability measures threaten
to dun the company for a money judgment at its doorstep, the inter-
ventionist measures breach the threshold to impose direct and selective
constraints on how the investors and managers work out various in-
ternal relationships.
To put enterprise liability and its interventionist alternatives into
a finer perspective, it serves to consider the business enterprise not
superstitious and irrational spirit which pervaded the jural doings of primitive society."
Id. at 316. It is the movement toward strict liability at the turn of this century that
reflects the influence of industrialization and a society peopled with corporate actors,
see L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 28, at 417-27, although the full range of considerations that
support it are too extensive and rich to reduce to any single historical or social "cause."
See generally Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973) (examining
justifications for strict liability); Shavell, Strict Liability and Negligence Compared, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980) (discussing various aspects of strict liability and negligence).
31. See M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 16-19 (1955).
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as an indivisible unit, but as an equilibrium of relationships estab-
lished among the suppliers of capital (the investors), the suppliers of
labor (the agents), and "the corporation," the latter of which I shall
consider, for these purposes, a separate party-the jural entity that
holds the contracts, can be sued, and so forth.32 Moreover, for pur-
poses of this article, I shall assume that the outcome of the relation-
ships established among the parties is optimal from their own perspec-
tive.33 This enables us to disregard the traditional questions of share-
holders' rights and focus more sharply on a less well explored inquiry,
which concerns the external effects of the internal arrangements. In
what ways can the outcome of the equilibria established by the parties
32. Obviously, the separateness is somewhat artificial, inasmuch as the agents' and
investors' welfares are functions of the corporation's. On the other hand, deeming the
corporation an independent entity has a certain analytic value, because managers, through
the force both of fiduciary rules and of psychological factors, see Rohrlich & Rohrlich,
Psychological Foundations for the Fiduciary Concept in Corporation Law, 38 COLUM. L.
R v. 432, 444-47 (1938), may be impelled to maximize "the corporation's" welfare even at
sacrifice of their own and of any particular investor group's welfare. Moreover, the com-
plexity of the legal system makes it unlikely that statements about "the corporation" can
be reduced to a set of statements about its agents and investors without losing meaning.
See Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 LAw Q. REv. 37, 38-39, 49-56 (1954).
33. This view of optimal relationships is far from unanimous. A strong indictment
of the current legal system's ability to protect investors appears in Cary, Corporate Law
and Federalism: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). In Professor Cary's
view, the states, left free to design their own corporations laws, have engaged in "a race
for the bottom." Each jurisdiction hopes, by dangling before corporate management an
increasingly lax set of rules, to lure as many companies as possible into its own cor-
porate homesite. For the winning states, the returns are measured perhaps in prestige
and certainly in added tax revenues and an increase in corporate-related professional
business. In Cary's view, a sort of "Gresham's Law" has taken control, the bad corpora-
tions codes driving out the good. Id. at 672. The only way to correct the situation (federal
chartering being politically unacceptable) is for the federal government to legislate
"minimum standards"-legal floors on how low the states can go in determining various
features of internal corporate governance-at least for the largest companies with the
greatest national impact. Id. at 671-72, 705.
Ralph Winter takes the opposing position and emphasizes that state corporations codes
are only one of the constraints on managers either becoming inefficient or benefiting
at shareholders' expense. See Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory
of the Corporation 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 262-73 (1977). Managers must enable the firm's
products and services to compete in the market; at some point, "misconduct" will render
them uncompetitive. Id. at 264. Perhaps most important, the suppliers of capital (the
sophisticated institutional buyers who establish investment trends, if not the small indi-
vidual investors) are aware that some states give managers a freer hand than others do.
Their scrutiny alone must constitute a significant guard against management simply
shuttling the company about with impunity, dragging capital from one state that is lax to
another that is more so. Id. at 257. Accordingly, Winter argues that the gradual liberali-
zation in state law is a reflection, not of the fact that one side-management-has domi-
nated the other, but of the fact that private parties have been optimizing private ar-
rangements. Id. at 256-58. There is much to be said on both sides of this debate; I believe
that Winter is largely correct, but in any event, proceeding with Winter's model will put
shareholder issues aside and give us a cleaner set of premises to work with in concen-
trating on the externalities effects.
The Yale Law Journal
have adverse impacts upon, or be less than ideal for, third parties-the
corporation's neighbors, suppliers, customers, and the public-at-large?
To understand the implications of enterprise liability for the answer
to this question, and to comprehend the character and justification of
its interventionist alternatives, we have to keep clear which of several
closely related clusters of relationships that the parties establish is
under review.
Cluster 1 involves the variables associated with the functioning core
of the enterprise, the basic bureaucratic and production variables.
Here, enterprise liability means that once the outside world has es-
tablished the price that the enterprise must pay for its liabilities, the
investors and agents are free, subject only to market constraints, to
devise and implement the most cost-effective organizational responses.
They may alter production factors, intensify monitoring and discipline
of subordinates, create a new corporate office, or do nothing at all.
Cluster 2 concerns some of the compensation variables negotiated
between the corporation and its agents, notably the provisions that
they make for indemnification. Here, enterprise liability means al-
lowing the corporation and its agents freedom to reallocate among
themselves the ultimate risks of judgments that the law may impose
on one or the other of them.
Cluster 3 involves the relationships between the corporation and
its investors. The most significant of these for our purposes is the
investors' ability, through limited liability, to insulate their own
wealth from exposure to judgments secured against the corporation
should the firm lack the wherewithal to satisfy them.
The question of enterprise liability and its interventionist alterna-
tives can now be stated more exactly. The issue in designing strategies
for the control of unwanted corporate conduct is whether, and in
what ways, the state-meaning the federal government, if necessary- 34
should intervene in any of these three clusters to override the reso-
lutions that the enterprise's participants will arrive at in the absence
of that intervention.
In Cluster 1, interventions will consist of the government's usurp-
ing the enterprise's autonomy over traditional "managerial" features.
The usurpations may range from requiring particular bureaucratic
arrangements, such as the institution of internal information-gathering
and reporting procedures, to holding individual agents directly an-
34. If it is desirable to alter the course of corporation code development in favor of
third parties, then, for the reasons set forth by Cary, supra note 33, federal action pre-
sumably would be required.
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swerable to the state for some range of their performance. Cluster 1
interventions thus displace the enterprise from full authority to de-
fine its servants' tasks and to monitor and discipline their conduct.3 5
In Cluster 2, interventions will consist of altering the indemnification
equilibrium: the state will restrict employee indemnification in some
circumstances in which the enterprise participants would prefer it, and
facilitate employer indemnification in some circumstances in which
the enterprise participants, left to their own, would preclude it. In
Cluster 3, interventions will consist of altering the rules regarding
limited liability, particularly when the judgment that the firm has
been unable to satisfy arises from a criminal fine or punitive damage
award.
II. Cluster 1: Constraints on Autonomy over
"Managerial" Variables
Any organization's performance, including how much disfavored
conduct it causes, is affected by its selection of bureaucratic structure 6
and various input and output variables. The dominant question in
this section concerns the circumstances under which the state should
influence those choices only indirectly, intimidating the enterprise
participants by means of a contingent charge against enterprise profits,
and when it should intervene with a hand that is more active and
direct.37
To survey and understand the options, it is necessary to introduce
at this point, with apologies, some special terminology. The central
concept is what I shall call Harm-Based Liability Rules (HBLRs).38
35. In terms of historical development, individual agents were held answerable to the
state before corporations were. Cf. note 14 supra (early immunity of corporations due
to law's unwillingness to apply doctrines of individual liability to them). Cluster I inter-
ventions in a sense reverse that historical movement, re-emphasizing the notion of indi-
vidual agent liability.
36. For example, those threatened by toxic wastes discharge are affected by the offices
that the corporation establishes to monitor emissions, the credentials of persons selected
to fill those posts, the place of the office in the formal and informal corporate structure,
the resources made available to the office, and the powers with which the office is
endowed. CI. P. DRUCKRER, supra note 6, at 209-29 (discussing society's interest in corpora-
tion's organization); A. CHANDLER, supra note 20, at 14-16 (internal structure of firm re-
flects external strategies). More recent studies that seek to use bureaucratic variables to
inform microeconomic theory include H. LEIBENSTEIN, BEYOND ECONOMnC MAN (1976), and
0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975).
37. Ordinarily, where the law has required certain bureaucratic structures-predomi-
nantly in the corporation codes and in the securities laws-the concern has been almost
exclusively with defining and protecting the interests of investors, rather than those of
third parties. See note 141 infra.
38. Outside of the injunction literature, the role of harm as a prerequisite for liability
for civil wrongs has commanded little attention. Recent work on this question appears
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 90: 1, 1980
HBLRs are "based" on harm in two senses. First, the operation of
the rule is triggered by harm; that is, the law stays its hand until the
harm is done. Second, the harm done is the measure of the injurer's
liability. HBLRs can select as their target either the enterprise it-
self-a technique I shall denote Enterprise HBLRs-or, in some cir-
cumstances, an agent in the first instance 39-Agent HBLRs.
It is a fair, if rough, summary of the law to state that with respect
to ordinary harm-causing activity, where society seeks principally
to compensate victims 40 and to bring the incidence of harm into line
with the activity's market-measured costs and benefits, 41 the Enter-
prise HBLR has come to prevail.42 Such rules represent liability in
my "black box" sense. Indeed, even when the liability rule makes
possible the targeting of an agent in the first instance, the laws of
agency, such as respondeat superior 43 and indemnification, 44 have
evolved in such a way that the corporate treasury tends ultimately to
bear the brunt of the judgment. In practice, then, Agent HBLRs
ordinarily collapse into Enterprise HBLRs.45
to have been done only in Wittman, Prior Regulation versus Post Liability: The Choice
Between Input and Output Monitoring, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 193 (1977) and S. Shavell, Harm
as a Prerequisite for Liability (1979) (unpublished manuscript, Harvard University). The
attention is more traditional in the criminal law literature. See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAw 238-40, 277-78, 402-05, 476 (1978); Robinson, A Theory of Justification:
Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 266, 266-71
(1975).
39. I use "first instance" in the sense that plaintiff expects to receive compensation
from the agent. In some circumstances, of course, the employee may pass the loss onto
the employer through indemnification. See pp. 47-56 infra.
40. The shifting of losses from the victim to others, ordinarily justified on intuitive
moral bases, can be defended independently on economically informed social welfare
grounds. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 39-40 (1970) (concentration of
losses on few may involve larger net welfare decline). Under this approach, the distinction
suggested in the text between compensation and the maximization of welfare through
behavior modification becomes less clear.
41. At least where "accidents" are concerned (itself a complex determination), there
is support for making the price of an activity reflect all the costs of its performance, in-
cluding the costs of harms that the activity causes. The consumers' willingness to pay
this price will set the appropriate output level. Passing on the costs will also create
incentives to discover less harmful ways of providing the same goods or services. See
generally G. CALABRESI, supra note 40, at 68-94.
42. See Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. CoLo. L. REv. 153,
175 & nn.74-76 (1973).
43. In its earliest appearance, the doctrine of respondeat superior created "a merely
subsidiary liability of the superior, which can only be enforced against him when it is
proved or patent that the inferior can not pay for his own misdeed." 2 F. POLLOCK &
F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 533 (2d ed. 1905). The doctrine has evolved
to subject corporate masters to considerably further-reaching liability today. See W.
SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF AGENCY § 89, at 155 (1964) (in nineteenth century,
respondeat superior limited to negligent acts of servants; doctrine now includes trespass,
assault, and other non-negligent torts).
44. See p. 46 infra.
45. See Klemme, supra note 42, at 184. Strictly speaking, where employee indemnifi-
Enterprise Liability
The widespread emergence of "enterprise liability" in these circum-
stances is relatively uncontroversial. From a moral perspective, it may
seem fairer to make the enterprise bear the burden in preference
either to the outsider who has been harmed 46 or to the particular
agents47 whose acts were most closely linked with the injury, but which
were performed under the direction, and for the benefit, of the corpo-
ration.48 To the extent that compensation is the law's goal, the enter-
prise ordinarily provides a superior fund and instrument of risk spread-
ing.49 To the extent that the goal is "general deterrence"-seeking not
to eliminate a particular activity or outcome altogether, but to con-
strict it consonant with market-valued benefits and burdens-entrust-
ing the investors and managers to put their own house in order finds
support in familiar arguments for market superiority. Those tied to
the enterprise's economic well-being are presumed to have the moti-
vation and expertise to devise and implement the most cost-effective
arrangements for avoiding legal penalties, just as they are presumed
most capable of avoiding market penalties. Firms that fail to shape
up will suffer competitive disadvantage and, rightly, decline.50
Reliance on Enterprise HBLRs, whether driven by the tort system
cation exists and judgment is given against the agent, the plaintiff will recover only
what it can extract from the defendant. The enterprise would indemnify the agent only
the amount that the agent had been able to pay out. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 439, Comment g, at 332-33 (1957). For this reason a plaintiff would ordinarily prefer
to press his claim against the enterprise initially. Cf. Civil Liability of Government Of-
ficials, LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. Winter 1978, at 1, 108-09 (remarks of Richard Epstein)
(similar problem in indemnifying municipal corporate employees).
46. Often, in circumstances where the enterprise has harmed B, the "cause" can be
traced to both actors' conduct, particularly so the less either party seeks or permits the
harm. It is evident that in many cases, the judgment as to which party "caused" the harm
tracks-and even obscures-judgments about what risks may fairly be borne and about
how expectations should be satisfied. See Klemme, supra note 42, at 215-27.
47. There is likely to be considerable support for having the enterprise alone bear
the brunt of liability, both because of the pressures of organizational life under which
the employee operates, see W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, supra note 27, at 232; R. PERKINS,
CRIMINAL LAW 641 (2d ed. 1969), and because of the appearances that the wrong will have
been done for the benefit of, and perhaps under the direction of, the (wealthy) corpora-
tion, not the (poor) agents. An instance of the use of this logic in a somewhat different
context is Assistant United States Attorney General Henry Petersen's explanation of the
decision not to prosecute any agents in the FBI "COINTELPRO" program for activities
that might well have been illegal. See FBI Counterintelligence Programs: Hearing Before
the Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1975).
48. The agent, of course, is also likely to participate, through compensation, in the
gains from wrongdoing. Cf. Geis, White Collar Crime: The Heavy Electrical Equipment
Antitrust Cases of 1961, in CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR SySTEmsS 139, 146 (IM. Clinard & R. Quinney
eds. 1967) (benefits to agents one factor considered in sentencing defendant executives
in heavy electrical equipment industry price-fixing cases).
49. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 40, at 46-47 (discussing many diverse and possibly
conflicting notions involved in concept of "risk spreading").
50. See id. at 69-70.
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or by some surrogate such as a "tax" on pollution emissions that is
scaled to the damages, 51 is called into question when we fear they will
fail to modify enterprise behavior stringently enough to satisfy col-
lective preferences. Such a concern may arise for a number of reasons.
Some detriments are not judicially cognizable, 52 whereas other losses,
such as loss of life or vision, probably are not satisfactorily compen-
sable.53 Some behavior, such as murder, is viewed as so objectionable5
4
that we do not wish to provide an actor the option of doing it merely
on the condition that he purchase the damages. 55 There may be a
collective aversion to certain events, such as the explosion of a nuclear
plant, that make us willing to expend more to avert them than we
would suffer in damages were they to occur.56
51. See Rose-Ackerman, Effluent Charges: A Critique, 6 CANADIAN J. ECON. 512 (1973)
(criticizing effluent charges, which constitute "tax" system, as method of controlling pol-
lution).
52. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Perez, 66 Cal. App. 3d 163, 136 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1977) (no re-
covery for emotional distress absent physical injury and without intentional and un-
reasonable infliction of distress). But see Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 27 Cal.
3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980) (enlarging concept of judicially cognizable
distress damages beyond rule of Fuentes).
53. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 40, at 97-100.
54. Some activities-price-fixing, for example-are probably not "highly immoral" in
ordinary parlance. Yet such activities so lack redeeming social value and can be restrained
with so little reduction in beneficial activities that the impact of the penalties we are
prepared to attach to them exceeds the judicially cognizable "damages" that they are
likely to cause. As to these activities, as with conduct deemed immoral, we are likely
to be relatively insensitive to efficiency constraints in setting penalty levels. See p. 25
infra.
55. For example, it is unlikely that we wish to confer upon a company the choice of
engaging in "oppressive child labor" under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §
212(c) (1976), depending upon its wealth and willingness to pay the $1,000 civil penalty,
id. § 216(e).
Calabresi and Melamed argue that the thief (who "could have" negotiated with his vic-
tim) not only causes harm equivalent to the value of the items stolen but also "undermines
rules and distinctions of significance beyond the specific case." Therefore, "we must add
to each case [of theft) an undefinable kicker which represents society's need to keep all
property rules from being changed at will into liability rules." Calabresi & Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv.
L. REv. 1089, 1126-27 (1972).
56. Under conditions of uncertainty, individuals may forego a mathematically ex-
pected return to accept a lesser sum as a certainty: a certain bird in the hand for an
expected but uncertain two in the bush. This aversion to risk is measured by the risk
premium-what the risk averter will give up-defined as the difference between the out-
come that is expected mathematically and the certain offer he accepts instead. If we trans-
fer these concepts into the model of collective choice (putting the entire society in the
position of the gambler), I am suggesting that there are some highly distasteful out-
comes towards which society is collectively risk averse. In these cases society is willing to
forego a certain amount of mathematically expected social product-to expend in this
sense a certain "collective risk premium"-to avoid them. I cannot verify that such cal-
culations are consciously expressed in the political process, but one can find suggestions
of them through an ex post inspection of social choices. For example, Britain declined
in 1971 to spend an estimated £1,000 per life to make drug containers safe for children;
yet British building codes have been changed at a cost of £20,000 per life, and protections
Enterprise Liability
Even when the threatened assessments are adequate expressions of
society's preferences that the disfavored events not occur, additional
measures may be required if it appears that the enterprise may fail to
modify its behavior appropriately. Such a failure may stem from the
enterprise being economically "irrational": it may subjectively under-
appreciate the risks,57 it may be a risk preferrer, 8 it may employ too
high a discount rate,o or the managers may be maximizing something
other than share value.60 On the other hand, the enterprise may under-
restrict its objectionable behavior for reasons that are quite consistent
in Britain against nuclear hazards imply a cost per life saved of some £40,000. Nuclear
Safety: Pricing a Life, THE EcoNoMIsT, Mar. 22, 1980, at 92, cols. 1-3. Differing risk aver-
sions to catastrophes of various sorts, not irrationality or inconsistency, may explain these
discrepancies.
By themselves, the high aversions to risks of catastrophe do not compel abandonment
of the Enterprise HBLRs, if we are prepared to define "damages" comprehensively enough.
For example, we might include in the harm-based liability of the operator of a nuclear
facility not only the injuries that the facility may cause, as ordinarily measured, but also
an additional element designed to account for people's desires not to be injured in that
way. This solution, however, entails the difficulties of quantifying the aversions ex post.
Moreover, the aversion to nuclear catastrophe is felt as a generalized demoralization
throughout society; it might be inappropriate to give the parties who were actually in-
jured the right to collect on top of their own damages-as a windfall-the measure of
the entire society's aversion.
57. Cf. Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of
Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 490-91 (1980) (some accidents occur because injurer's subjective
estimate of probability of accident, used in making its decisions, may be less than prob-
ability society would assign to accident).
58. Of course, the term risk preference is a crude characterization, since the firm will
probably respond differently to the same mathematical risk, depending upon other ele-
ments of the risk's character. See Friedman & Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices In-
volving Risk, 56 J. POL. EcoN. 279 (1948).
59. The question of possible deviance between public and private rates of discount,
and its implications, ordinarily arises in the context of financing major social under-
takings. The text, however, raises the question in a setting in which it has not been
examined, where our concern is not with general investment policies, but extends to
the control of aberrant firms. See p. 23 infra. Such firms may employ a relatively high
discount rate (underialue long-term gains) not only because the managers miscalcu-
late, but also because the managers may design strategies to realize short-term gains
that they plan to capture from the company for their personal benefit. A theory of
corporate control must account for the firm that, biased to prefer short-term over long-
term gains, employs a discount rate higher than the public rate, thereby understating the
social preference for making present expenditures to avoid future liability claims. The
significance of this phenomenon can be illustrated by a simple example. Consider a
metal smelter engaged in a cost-benefit analysis of its liability for blood poisoning. If
the firm installs no safety device, it can expect to suffer a damage award of S10,000,000
ten years from the present; the liability can be eliminated, however, by present expendi-
tures of $2,000,000. If the enterprise is operating subject to an 18% discount rate, the
present value of the expected liability is only $1,900,000, less than the cost of the device;
the firm would not, rationally, avoid the damages. But if the society, by contrast, deems
itself subject to a 7% discount rate, then the present value of the $10,000,000 damages
is over q5,000,000, and the installation of the ;2,000,000 device clearly warranted by col-
lective preferences. Hence, under these conditions, the HBLR techniques, uncorrected,
would fail to yield the socially preferred outcome.
60. See p. 21 infra.
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with economic rationality. It may simply calculate that it does not
really face the theoretically correct price that the HBLR signal is
transmitting, whether because of various legal doctrines6' and costs
of proof6 2 that impede the imposition of liabilities, or because of bars
to judgment such as limited liability and bankruptcy.
Because the HBLR signal may, for these and similar reasons, 63 fail
to produce the collectively desirable response, society may wish to
"correct" the HBLR signal, if not so strongly as to eliminate all the
undesirable outcomes that the HBLR techniques will allow, then at
least to restrict their occurrence.6 4 It is when the law undertakes to
make these corrections that its posture towards "black box" enterprise
liability becomes ambivalent, and the theoretical bases for choice,
uncertain.
On the one hand, society's correction can take the form of enacting
liability rules that are harm-based in the first sense outlined above, in
that harm triggers their imposition, but are detached from harm in
the second sense, in that harm is removed as the measure of liability.
61. Such doctrines include, for example, proximate cause, see New York Cent. R.R.
v. Grimstad, 264 F. 334 (2d Cir. 1920), consent to harm, see Mink v. University of Chicago,
460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978), and intervening cause, see Henderson v. Dade Coal Co.,
100 Ga. 568, 28 S.E. 251 (1897).
62. See Blum, Jury System is Found Guilty of Shortcomings in Some Complex Cases,
Wall St. J., June 9, 1980, at 1, col. 1; Separate Jury Trial Claim Poses 200-fold Nightmare,
Wash. Legal Times, June 2, 1980, at 1, col. 2.
63. Generally, these reasons stem from characteristics of the legal system, including
the inability of the system of damages to restrict wrongdoing to the collectively desirable
extent, see p. 14 supra, and characteristics of firm reaction in the face of legal threats,
see pp. 15-16 supra.
64. The direct and perhaps ideal solution in these cases would be to alter other rules
and retain the HBLR approach. For instance, my criticisms of the HBLR framework are
based, in part, on the availability of limited liability as a bar to judgment. Yet, as I
myself propose, see pp. 74-76 infra, these rules could be changed. The courts could ex-
pand the concept of compensable injury to include certain instances of mental distress
for which no recovery may presently be had. Cf. note 52 supra (citing cases that approach
mental distress damages differently). Elements of a cause of action could be made easier
to prove. But while such changes in the rules, retaining the HBLR framework, might
be optimal, some of the ideal reforms are practically foreclosed by problems of proving
what one ideally wants to know, by legislative inertia, and even by constitutional bars,
see pp. 44-45 infra. Hence, the justification for the corrective penalties and various "inter-
ventions" proposed in the text may have to rest, ultimately, on a "second best" basis.
See Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 EcoN. STUD. 11 (1956)
(explicating theory). Under the theory of the second best, when certain elements that
comprise the ideal solution are practically foreclosed, there is no reason to suppose that
the ideal solution is yielded by fulfilling the remaining nonforeclosed elements. Here,
some ideal reforms of the HBLR framework being unrealizable, a "second-best" solution
-special corrections such as the bureaucratic intervention proposed below, see pp. 36-38
infra-may be preferred. See Markovits, A Basic Structure for Microeconomic Policy Analy-
sis in our Worse-than-Second-Best World: A Proposal and Related Critique of the Chi-
cago Approach to the Study of Law and Economics, 1975 Wis. L. Rlv. 950, 968-76 (dis-
cussing how failure of one condition forces consideration of second-best possibilities).
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In other words, the law retains harm as a prerequisite of liability, but
threatens, should it occur, to impose a money burden in excess of the
damage that the actor has caused. I will designate this technique as
penalty liability in the HBLR mode, or HBLR(P).65 In circumstances
in which the enterprise is the target of the rule-Enterprise HBLR(P)
-it is clear that enterprise liability in our sense has not been aban-
doned. Society's distaste for certain outcomes, inadequately accounted
for by the basic HBLRs, is expressed by superimposing a new, punitive
set of liability rules that leave the underlying strategy unchanged. The
law still threatens to levy a charge against corporate funds and is in-
different to how the enterprise participants avoid and distribute it.
The actual substitution of strategies-interventionism for enterprise
liability-begins with the employment of penalties aimed at the agent.
Because this second type of corrective action makes agents directly
answerable to the state, the law displaces the enterprise from some
of the autonomy it enjoyed under the Enterprise HBLR regimes-
the power to direct, monitor, and "penalize" its agents itself.
A third set of corrective strategies operates by detaching the law from
harm as the trigger of liability. I shall call such rules "Standards."
Instead of giving the actor the option of causing the harm and then,
if caught, paying the damages or the penalty, Standards are employed
to prevent some harms from occurring in the first place.60 Standards
-whether they are embodied in general legislation or specially tailored
in injunctions-are always interventionist in our sense, inasmuch as
they substitute collective judgments for market-guided managerial
judgments, not only as to the "supply" of the harm (in common with
65. I am employing "penalty" in a broad sense to include any charge over and above
the legally cognizable market-measured damages that the liability bearer would incur.
These damages may be imposed not only through a civil judgment but also through a
tax or criminal fine set to reflect the injury caused. Thus, in some cases "penalty," as I
use it, retains its connotation of moral distaste, as when a traditional criminal fine is
employed. In other cases, however, such as the fines imposed for overweight trucks, the
penalty expresses a desire to correct the supply of harm and to see that it is compen-
sated, without making any strong moral judgment about the act. That is, we sometimes
want the actor to be particularly sober before he performs a certain act, but not neces-
sarily to abandon doing it if, for example, the market warrants its completion. Indeed,
at one time, the Internal Revenue Service recognized this distinction. Motor carriers
could deduct fines levied for violation of state weight and length requirements as ordi-
nary and necessary business expenses. [1950] 5 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) ff 6134. The
Service subsequently changed its mind, finding that the fines were in the nature of
penalties, not, as it had supposed, in the nature of tolls. 1951-1 C.B. 15-16. The Supreme
Court supported this decision, see Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S.
303 (1958), and it was eventually codified, see Tax Reform Act of 1969 § 902(a), I.R.C.
§ 162(f).
66. For a discussion of ex ante regulations as opposed to ex post liability, see Wittman,
suPra note 38, at 205-09.
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the penalty-mode HBLRs), but also as to the means most appropriate
to restrict the harm. Building code standards, for example, often dic-
tate the installation of fire sprinkler systems rather than allow the
owners to balance the costs of alternative fire prevention measures
against the risks of fire, including the risks of all the various harm-
based recovery modes.
67
As with HBLRs, violation of a Standard may in some circumstances
trigger liability against the enterprise or against an agent. 6  But in
other circumstances, Standards are designed to operate outside con-
tingent liability altogether, functioning as conditions of doing busi-
ness-of shipping goods in commerce, 9 or of receiving a government
license70 or contract. 71 The distinction between these two uses of
Standards-as penalty or as precondition-although blurred in par-
ticular application,7 2 has practical effects on the range of responses
available to the corporation and is therefore significant in theory.
Where Standards are attached to penalties, the law retains some de-
gree of sensitivity to market-measured costs and benefits; the target
can risk violating the Standard and paying the penalty if the market
warrant for doing so is strong. Where standards are more or less ab-
67. Those recovery modes include liability aimed at either the enterprise or the officer,
and from either a general deterrence or penalty posture.
68. For a survey of federal law authorizing criminal penalties against both agents and
enterprises for violations of Standards promulgated by any one of a number of federal
agencies, see SUBCOMM. ON CRIME OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 96TH CONG.,
2D SESS., CORPORATE CRIME 45-52 (Comm. Print 1980).
69. See, e.g., Establishment Registration and Device Listing for Manufacturers of
Devices, 21 C.F.R. §§ 807.3-.97 (1980) (FDA regulations).
70. See, e.g., Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance, 10 C.F.R. §§ 21.1-.61 (1980)
(Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations concerning nuclear power plants); 21 C.F.R.
§§ 601.10(a), .20(a) (1980) (FDA licensing requirements).
71. See 4 GoV'T CONT. REP. (CCH) f" 34,847 (specifying standard quality control tech-
niques required of firms contracting with Defense Department). There are situations, too,
in which Standards are employed to reinforce HBLRs. For example, violation of a statutory
duty is sometimes evidence of negligence per se. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS 190-95 (4th ed. 1971). Conceivably, violation of a Standard could be used to
raise the penalty otherwise applicable to an HBLR(P). Section 2201 of the proposed
federal criminal code represents a related approach, providing that where a misdemeanor
(often violation of a Standard) results in loss of life, the maximum permissible penalty
rises from $100,000 to S1,000,000. See Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings on
S. 1722 and S. 1723 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 11,090,
11,250 (1979).
72. The distinction between Standards attached to liability rules and those that func-
tion as conditions can be viewed as one merely of style and degree insofar as an actor is
free to disregard the "condition" and gamble on nondetection. Yet there is some range
of cases in which the character of the Standard and the high level and likelihood of
penalty-particularly if exacted on a per-day-of-violation basis and backed up by the
prospect of injunction, see, e.g., N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAw §§ 210.2(g), 211 (McKinney 1973)
(per-day fines for and injunctions against strikes by public employees); N.Y. JUD. LAvw
§ 751.2(a) (McKinney Supp. 1979) (per diem fines against public employee organizations
for strikes in violation of court order)-make the requirements, realistically, something
more than contingent liabilities.
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solute conditions, 73 this option is removed, rendering errors in soci-
etal judgment less remediable.74 The important point is that in either
case, the burden that the Standard imposes on the actor may, like an
HBLR in the penalty mode, impose costs on the enterprise that are
in excess of the expected damages. Hence, Standards should be viewed
as an alternative way of keeping the supply of disfavored outcomes be-
neath the level that the nonpenalty HBLR measures would permit.
A metal smelter whose air emissions threaten those who live in its
vicinity with blood poisoning will serve to illustrate these various con-
trol alternatives. The Enterprise HBLR would threaten the enterprise
with all judicially cognizable damages traceable to its activities. 75 An
Enterprise HBLR(P) would confront the enterprise with an additional
"penalty" over and above the legally cognizable damages. Agent liabil-
ity would operate by singling out some key employee for liability, the
plant manager, for example; the amount of the liability would be
measured by the cognizable damages in the case of an Agent HBLR,
and would be subject to a punitive overlay in the case of an Agent
HBLR(P). A Standard in these circumstances might mandate the in-
stallation of a certain grade of air emission control device, or require
the hiring of a health officer. Failure to install or maintain the de-
vice, or hire the officer, could trigger liability either against the en-
terprise or against a selected agent, or could result, for example, in
disqualification from government contracts.
The question that began this section can now be further refined.
Suppose that we are collectively unwilling to accept the supply of
certain outcomes that nonpenalty HBLRs will permit. Within the
expenditures we are prepared to make to achieve further reduction,
what considerations make one or the other of these devices the most
effective technique? I will begin by examining the enterprise liability
approach-Enterprise HBLR(P)-and then proceed to consider its in-
terventionist alternatives-agent liability in the HBLR penalty mode
and then the various types of Standards.
A. Enterprise Liability in the HBLR Penalty Mode
In our metal-smelter illustration, the Enterprise HBLR(P) approach
would entail no legal action until the poisoning or damages had
73. By "more or less absolute conditions," I mean conditions such as those described
in note 72 supra whose violation is almost certain to bring punishment.
74. Cf. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines on
Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHi. L. REV. 681, 706-08 (1973) (penalties preferable to injunc-
tions in area of land use controls because they preserve market-sensitive measures of
value).
75. Whether the liability rule is based on strict liability or negligence is unimportant
in this context.
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reached some recognized level,7 6 at which time a penalty would be
exacted over and above the prospects of all ordinary damage liabilities
that might be imposed on the enterprise.77 There are several steps
that the enterprise can take to reduce its risk of liability, including
a substitution of inputs, an increase in monitoring, and a reduction
of output. Each alternative represents a cost that we are assuming to
be greater than the cost the enterprise would incur if responding
only to the spectre of HBLR damages. I will use C to designate the
incremental costs assignable to the avoidance of the penalty "correc-
tion." We will assume, first, that the penalty liability rule is clear 78
second, that the upper boundary of C is a limit L, the cost of installing
a technologically feasible control device-that is, smaller expenditures
will reduce the risks, but the device, at a cost of L, will virtually elimi-
nate them; and third, that L is within the range of the "premium"
that society is prepared to expend to eliminate the outcome.7 9
It is readily apparent that the Enterprise HBLR(P) technique gives
the enterprise a choice of risks. By taking its chances that it will not
cause the harm or, at least, that it will not be convicted, the firm will
face an upside possibility of L as a gain by saving itself the cost of the
device. The downside risks are a function of the level of the penalty
that the potential defendant can expect if convicted, P, and the prob-
ability of being subjected to it, f. Employing the simplifying assump-
tions of classic economic rationality-that the enterprise seeks to
maximize share values, that it has access to and rationally processes
all relevant information, and that it is risk neutral-the firm will be
"persuaded" to install the device (if not to find a better alternative)
when the net expected present value of Pf rises to the level L.
76. There is no universally recognized test for determining when "poisoning" and
"damaging" have occurred. The difficulty of resolving the question, as suggested by Mink
v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (increased susceptibility to
vaginal cancer of daughters of women who took certain drugs not actionable harm, but
merely greater risk for which daughters could not themselves recover), may well lead us
to substitute Standards for HBLRs in some circumstances.
77. See note 64 supra (discussing correction of HBLR as second-best solution). Gen-
erally, the state would collect this penalty, but the plaintiff in a civil damage action
could also collect the appropriate penalty "correction" amount, as is done in treble
damage actions under the antitrust laws. On the relative merits of public versus private
fine enforcement, see Becker & Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensa-
tion of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974). But our definition of "penalty" and the
discussion in text is unaffected by the choice of who best collects it.
78. The concept of "understanding a rule" is complex and can mask considerations
important to the present inquiry. For example, whether a firm finds its equal employ-
ment obligations "clear" may reflect its prior decision to bear the increased risks of
violating them, rather than pay the costs of understanding them better. We will relax
this assumption that the rule is clearly understandable at pp. 25-26 infra.
79. See note 56 supra (discussing society's risk premiums).
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The best that can be said for this technique-and it is a strong war-
rant-is that the penalty approach leaves each enterprise maximum
flexibility to work out the best harm-avoiding solution. For example,
in contrast with a highly intrusive interventionist technique, such as
a Standard that mandated installation of a specific device for all
smelters, the HBLR(P) approach allows readier accounting for devi-
ations among plants: if some preferable solution exists or emerges,
each plant will be free to implement it.
Misgivings over this penalty approach begin with some of the same
doubts that undermine faith in the nonpenalty Enterprise HBLR:
the fear that the enterprise may not respond in the manner implied
by the classic rationality assumptions. Over some interval (presum-
ably when profits are sufficient to retain the managers in power), so
the managers may trade off the maximization of share values for the
maximization of some competing value, such as prestige, expansion,
or sales.8 ' If the enterprise employs an abnormally high discount rate
or is a strong risk preferrer,8 2 the Pf combination that will sway the
"rational" firm to install the device-Pfir-will be inadequate. There
is the further possibility that, whatever those nominally in control of
the enterprise are seeking to maximize, their actual control, particu-
larly in a huge and complex modem bureaucracy, will erode. The
80. See J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 115 (1967) (when earnings above
certain minimum, management has little to fear from stockholders); Cf. W. BAUMOL, Eco-
NOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 383-85 (4th ed. 1977) (management seeks to
maximize sales while also maximizing profits, which is independent and principal con-
cern of shareholders).
81. Prestige, expansion, market share, sales, and other values are not antithetical to
profits. On the contrary, the realization of these supposedly non-profit-maximizing values
are in general assisted by profits, and thus the question of conflict and trade-off occurs,
if at all, only within relatively restricted boundaries. Cf. note 23 supra (organizational
decision-making better described as choice subject to multiple constraints, rather than
pursuit of "a goal").
82. It is not clear under what set of assumptions the enterprise would prefer risks.
Shavell suggests that shareholders as a group are likely to be "a risk neutral principal,"
and employs an example that assumes a risk-averse manager. Shavell, Risk Sharing and
Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. EcoN. 55, 66 (1979). But
whatever assumptions one makes regarding the relative risk postures of the shareholders
and agents, one cannot clearly infer the risk posture of the corporation, which can be
viewed as possessing a somewhat distinct life and somewhat distinct incentives. See p.
9 supra. By virtue of limited liability, shareholders are buffered from the full impact
of the corporation's liability, but if no liability-creating incidents occur, they will reap
the benefits of skimping on safety measures. As to executives, lawsuits against the cor-
poration almost inevitably leave executive tenure and salary untouched. Indeed, executive
compensation is often designed to increase if company earnings rise but not to fall beneath
some assured base should the company sustain losses. How the enterprise likes risk is
going to be a complex product, therefore, of the relative risk preferences of investors
and managers, the balance of control between them, and their likings and capacities for
various means of extracting wealth.
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reasons for such erosion range from subgoal pursuit-a particular
division may pursue some target not wholly congruent with ostensible
company goals 53-to outright opportunism of various agents and sub-
agents-individual agents may seek to maximize their own welfare in
ways inconsistent with the welfare of the enterprise.8 4 In addition,
however "rational" the firm may be in its outlook, it may be incom-
petent in its calculations. Or the firm may be quite competent yet
deliberately eschew the global rationality of the textbooks for what
Simon calls "bounded rationality,"85 in which the manager will ac-
cept a solution that meets certain minimal aspirations, in preference
to bearing the added costs of searching for the unique optimal solution.
It is true that we lack empirical evidence that such phenomena
produce widespread deviations from classical profit-maximizing be-
havior. Nor can we be certain that, to the extent such deviations
exist, each operates to make the enterprise less rather than more sen-
sitive 6 to the law's threats, although the former seems more likely.
87
83. See H. LEIBENSTEIN, supra note 36, at 161-65; 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 36, at
118-26; Simon, Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, 69 AM. ECON. REv.
493, 500-01 (1979).
84. At the extreme, an agent who appreciates the risks of a certain course of conduct
and who owns shares might underprotect the corporate interest in the hope of capturing
short-term personal gains. By foregoing the present costs of avoiding future harms, the
present value of his shares will benefit; he may be able to sell before the stock market
comprehends and discounts for the prospects of legal liability. Other sources of control
loss are reflected less in blatantly calculated self-interest than in the inherent complexities
of bureaucratic management, such as the difficulty of communicating information. See
R. CYERT & J. MARCH, supra note 23, at 26-38; C. STONE, supra note 13, at 43-46; Coffee,
Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and
an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. Rlv. 1099, 1136-41 (1977).
85. See Simon, supra note 83, at 495, 501.
86. Even if we abandon the simplifying assumption that the enterprise is risk neutral,
we cannot say with confidence that it is more likely to be a preferrer than an avoider
of law-transmitted risks. For example, that a company is oriented more towards prestige
than towards profits does not make the law's threats ineffective. A company that will
sacrifice profits for prestige may be more sensitive to the law's threats than one that is
purely profit-oriented, if it weighs the prestige loss that accompanies the prosecution
more heavily than the lost profits. Even the possibility of an abnormally high discount
rate, see note 59 supra, has ambiguous implications depending upon the anticipated
sequence of private benefits from ignoring the liability rule and of private costs from
paying liability claims. It is possible that high social benefits associated with not violat-
ing some law will not begin to flow until some relatively distant future, in which case
the firm would be (from society's perspective) overly cautious.
87. One can draw this implication from bounded rationality, for example. If a firm
is going to sacrifice the processing of some information, it may have incentives to under-
consider (from a social point of view) factors that bear on its legal liabilities. This decision
to ignore may be quite rational because giving full consideration to the risks of legal
liability has the peculiar character of increasing those risks. First, with the rise of com-
puter technology, consideration of legal liability will help create a trail of evidence
whose eradication will require concerted action that may involve several levels of bureau-
cratic authority. Second, the imposition of punitive damages and criminal penalties on
the corporation may depend upon actual or constructive knowledge by top management.
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In all these matters, both the classical economists who follow in the
mold of Marshall, and the "behavioral theory of the firm" propo-
nents such as Simon, Cyert, and March, rest much of their cases
on hunches and plausibilities s s Yet it is important to bear in mind
that our own heuristic interests-the design of legal strategies-are
narrower than those of the macroeconomists, and we cannot pass over
so lightly the potential for nonrational firm activity. For the macro-
economists' task of describing the whole economy, it is more reason-
able to disregard deviations among particular firms on the assumption
that firms that are deviant will fall by the wayside. From that per-
spective, variations from the classical assumptions, particularly short-
term variations, are as likely as not to cancel out in portraying the
long-run activity of the total economy.8 9 But because our concern is
with establishing liabilities to restrain incidents of misconduct by
individual firms, it is best to presume both that there exists a certain
amount of "irrationality," and that it tends to desensitize firms to
the law's profit threats. To do so is prudent even if these presumptions
characterize only the atypical firm, or the typical firm only in its
moments of temporary or small-scale internal deviance from "ordinary"
firm behavior. Just as the laws that constrain natural persons have
to be written not only with the average but also with the atypical
person in mind-not the ordinary reasonable man, but the killer, the
robber0 0-so the corporate penalties must account for the one highly
irrational metal smelter, insensitive to profit, that can produce toxic
emissions causing enormous amounts of uncompensated and perhaps
noncompensable losses.
This prudent presumption that we are dealing with enterprises that
deviate from "pure" profit-maximization in the direction of insensi-
Such knowledge becomes more probable the more exhaustively the risks of any course
of conduct are considered. Indeed, evidence that the firm rationally mulled over its pros-
pects of ordinary civil liability may be seized upon by a jury as an element warranting
punitive damages in a civil suit, and as support for premeditation or a comparable ele-
ment in a criminal prosecution. See, e.g., Harris, Why the Pinto Jury Felt Ford Deserved
$125 Million Penalty, Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1978, at I, col. 4 (jury awarded punitive dam-
ages in design defect case partly because of evidence that defendant balanced production
savings against safety factors from different designs).
88. For a survey of some of the empirical attempts see Simon, sutpra note 83, at 501.
For reviews of behavioralists' positions, see A. HIsHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 5-15
(1970); H. LEIBENSTEIN, supra note 36, at 42-44.
89. Cf. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. EcON. 211,
213-14 (1950) (economic sistem can be studied as a whole even though individual firms
drop out or fail).
90. Our deterrence strategies must account for persons of far less than average sensi-
tivity to threats, and probably become increasingly ineffective at any level of punishment
as we encounter actors who do not behave according to the law's presumption of self-
interest. See IV. Bimxs, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 128-30 (1979).
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tivity towards the law's threats does not of itself eliminate enterprise
liability as an appropriate strategy. If we lack confidence that Pfr will
be an adequate intimidation, the most obvious response is to increase
the threat of the law to ever higher levels. Two variables can be em-
ployed for this task, separately or in combination. First, the prob-
ability of punishment, f, can be increased within the limits of budget
constraints on enforcement expenditures. Second, the level of penalty,
P, can be raised.91
Other things being equal, escalating the penalty would seem pref-
erable: whereas increasing the rate of conviction entails increasing
demands on the public budget, P appears susceptible to unrestricted
manipulation. 92 This notion, however, is misleading. Several signifi-
cant factors constrain our escalating P to an unlimited in terrorem
level.93 First, the defendant's wealth puts a ceiling on the values we
can assign to P. The enterprise cannot be forced to pay out in penalty
more than it has,94 and in the case of the business corporation, what
it "has" can be restricted through limited liability as well as bank-
ruptcy.95 Second, the enforcement costs rise with the level of P. The
higher the penalty, the more the enterprise will impede detection by
covering up, and the more it will resist conviction if charged.90 Both
91. See Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169,
177, 183-84 (1968); Polinsky & Shavell, The Optimal Trade-Off Between the Probability
and Magnitude of Fines, 69 Am. EcoN. REv. 880, 880 (1979); Stigler, The Optimum En-
forcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 528 (1970). Generally, the authorized P is a
variable to be fixed by the sentencer, at his discretion, within a certain range; as used in
the text, P refers to the level of penalty that the defendant can expect the sentencer to
set. The sentencer's discretion will, of course, affect some of the problems associated with
P that are discussed in the text.
92. There is, nevertheless, literature emphasizing the value of the frequency of con-
viction (and its temporal proximity to the offense) that goes back at least to Beccaria.
It is supported in contemporary literature by Block & Lind, Crime and Punishment Re-
considered, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 241 (1975), who argue that while there is no penalty severe
enough to deter every crime, there is a probability of punishment, less than one, that
will deter all crimes. Id. at 246-47.
93. The text emphasizes the economic and moral constraints on penalty escalation,
but we also should consider the constraints implicitly suggested in the psychology and
sociology literature. See W. BAGEHOT, PHYSICS AND POLITICS 44-84 (1948) (conflict tends
to intensify loyalty of group members to their respective groups); L. CosER, THE FuNC-
TIONS Or SOCIAL CONFLICT 33-38 (1956) (same). Conceivably the intensification of challenges
to the corporation, particularly when they are viewed as silly or outrageous by the cor-
porate employees, will have a perverse effect on law compliance, creating a "siege men-
tality" that unites the employees against the government in the determination to get
away with whatever they can.
94. See Block & Lind, supra note 92, at 242-44.
95. Strictly speaking, corporations cannot be "discharged" in bankruptcy. See I1 U.S.C.
§ 727(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979). A bankruptcy discharge would, however, apply to any of the
investors' debts arising out of liabilities to the corporations' creditors that were not im-
munized by limited liability.
96. See Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & EcoN. 61, 69-71, 99
(1971).
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reactions operate to increase the toll on enforcement budget resources.
Third, there are target efficiency 97 constraints. We do not want to
impose on the enterprise marginal costs that exceed the marginal
benefit of compliance.9 s The question of efficiency constraints poses
the most difficult problems. The benefits of avoiding some undesir-
able conduct are so high and unambiguous, and the costs imposed
on the enterprise so merited and containable, that we hardly consider
excess caution an issue. For example, the penalties we attach to de-
liberate price fixing are probably independent of target efficiency
constraints. In such instances, however, the conduct we want to re-
strict can be defined and prohibited with virtually no toll on bene-
ficial activity-that is, price fixing can be eliminated without any
social loss. But because liability rules cannot commonly be framed in
a way that so precisely severs the deliberate from the unintended, and
the unwanted from the beneficial, the desirability of liability rules
is ordinarily less certain.
On the one hand, laws that are too vague may be ignored 9 or may
even prove constitutionally infirm. 0 0 On the other hand, they may
have a chilling effect on the enterprise whose managers, uncertain of a
prohibition's bounds, are so intimidated that they avoid behavior that
would prove, if they chose to litigate the issue, lawful. 1' 1 Moreover,
even if the law's commands can be rightly understood, the higher the
threatened penalties, the greater the risk of compelling the firm to
make expenditures disproportionate to the benefits that society seeks.
The risks of overdeterrence are heightened when there is no certain
97. I use the term target efficiency to denote efficiencies in the production of goods
and services, as distinct from efficiencies in law enforcement and administration.
98. By benefits I mean, of course, external benefits, not merely benefits to the enter-
prise. This efficiency concern operates not only to restrain the levels of penalty, but to
affect the choice of liability rules as well. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
438 U.S. 422, 441 & n.17 (1978) (concern about not deterring "salutary and procompetitive
conduct" under Sherman Act renders strict liability judicially disfavored absent clear
legislative authorization.)
99. See C. STONE, supra note 13, at 41. In some circumstances, efforts to provide su-
perior bright line rules will sacrifice achievement of the underlying values that the law
seeks to advance. See, e.g., Ackerman & Sawyer, The Uncertain Search for Environmental
Policy: Scientific Factfinding and Rational Decisionmaking Along the Delaware River,
120 U. PA. L. Rav. 419, 436-49 (1972) (use of dissolved oxygen as readily available and
accepted measure of environmental degradation shown to correlate poorly with advance-
ment of clean river goals).
100. See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 457-58 (1939) (vague, indefinite,
and uncertain terms in state criminal statute violate due process).
101. Moreover, just as uncertainty as to the law's reach can, through its chilling effect,
produce unwanted results, so too can certainty. The creation of a set of legal bright lines
may vitiate responsible corporate self-control, for the businessman will then feel less
compunction about extending his behavior to the very limits of what the rule allows.
See C. STONE, supra note 13, at 100-03.
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expense, such as the installation of known technology, that will avoid
the liability with certainty. 10 2 At what price can management guar-
antee that its workers will not die in coal mines, or drivers of its cars
in accidents from failed brakes? Moreover, in the context of a large
enterprise, where problems of opportunism exist, 03 many outcomes
that are within the "deliberate" control of an individual are less in-
telligibly "deliberate" as matters of corporate conduct, there being no
level of commitment by the enterprise's managers that can insure com-
pliance at all levels of the organization.
As a consequence, much corporate misconduct will be relatively
inelastic to changes in expected penalty levels,10 4 over a moderate
range of penalty. And as we escalate penalty levels into a range where
they should modify behavior effectively, we are increasingly likely to
conflict with efficiency considerations.
Finally, there are moral constraints'0 5 on the escalation of P. Some
of these have found formal recognition in independent legal and per-
haps even constitutional barriers, such as those that constrain the im-
position of fines for offenses not requiring intent.'0 6 For moral rea-
sons, too, we are restricted from trading off an increasingly higher
P for a reduced f in an effort to achieve the same level of deterrence
at a reduced cost. To do so entails punishing a few miscreants severely
in order to serve as an example to all, a strategy that conflicts with
fundamental precepts of equality.
10 7
102. That is, we are relaxing here the second initial assumption-that the cost of
compliance, C, has a clear limit, L. See p. 20 supra.
103. Opportunism must be understood in this context to include laziness-maximizing
leisure at investor expense-see Anderson, Conflicts of Interests: Efficiency, Fairness and
Corporate Structure, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 738, 776 n.lll (1978), a form of self-benefit that
may increase hazards to third parties as well as to investors.
104. For a discussion of the implications of an inelastic supply of offenses for the level
and probability of punishment, see Wittman, supra note 38, at 198.
105. Obviously, there are "moral" justifications for the efficiency constraints discussed
in the text, justifications that derive from the positive welfare effects of efficient produc-
tion and distribution. What I deem in the text "moral constraints" stem from sentiments
that resist reduction to efficiency terms, whether they are viewed as deontological limits
on utility-maximization, or otherwise.
106. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952) (relatively small penalty
one of several conditions that criminal statute not requiring intent must meet in order
to satisfy due process clause); cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 205(2) (1962) (strict liability of-
fenses never more than "violation," which is less than petty misdemeanor and does not
constitute "crime").
107. See Wittman, supra note 38, at 201 (ex post inequitable to make convicted crimi-
nal "pay price" for unconvicted criminals through high penalty to compensate for low
probability of conviction). John Rawls suggests a case rejecting similar punishment policy
-"telishment"--without introducing nonutilitarian premises. Rawls, Two Concepts of
Rules, 64 PHIL. REv. 3 (1955).
We may also prefer to restrict the level of P, for any particular crime, in order to hold
in reserve a yet higher level as a discriminating mechanism. See Stigler, supra note 91,
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Moreover, many of the prevailing moral constraints that affect the
imposition of penalties in law are even stricter in the corporations
context because of an inevitable vicariousness. Corporate penalties
often impose losses in circumstances when no one appears blameworthy,
least of all the investors, employees, consumers, and dependent com-
munities, who will bear the brunt of the burden. 08 True, we allow
some of these same innocents to suffer (the investors, for example,
through a decline in share values) when corporate agents wrongfully
break a contract or commit a tort, notwithstanding the unlikelihood
that they could have monitored and halted the misconduct. But it
seems one thing to make a blameless investor help absorb ordinary
damages, which amounts to compensating an equally blameless in-
jured party from corporate funds, and quite another thing to reduce
his investment further by imposing a penalty. It may be for such
reasons that courts and prosecutors, even when armed by the legisla-
ture with increased penalties for crimes as deliberate and socially
unredeemable as price-fixing, appear little inclined to exact the sanc-
tions to the fullest.10 9
None of these observations proves that correcting the general de-
terrence regime via Enterprise HBLR(P)s is necessarily inferior to its
alternatives, which we have yet to examine. There is some support
for the view that, even when we have allowed for the various con-
straints, the expected level of penalty for many offenses can be raised
to a point high enough that most enterprises will behave correctly
most of the time."10 As I have already indicated, trying to remain
within this framework has the additional virtue of flexibility, in that
the firms most ready to comply are free to work out the most cost-
at 527-28. For example, we may not wish to apply the death penalty for airline hijacking
because, by holding the higher penalty in reserve for murder, we may be able to dissuade
the hijacker from carrying out more onerous acts.
108. See, e.g., G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW § 283, at 865 (2d ed. 1961) (criticizing cor-
porate criminal liability because "punishment does not fall upon those who are really
responsible").
109. See M. CLINARD, ILLEGAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 147-48 (1979); Posner, A Statistical
Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & EcON. 365, 388-95 (1970). Posner reports that,
although the maximum penalty for violations of the Sherman Act was raised tenfold
(from S5,000 to S50,000 in 1955), the average fine actually assessed during the period
1960.1969 increased only four-fold over that of the period 1890-1954. Id. at 390. From
1967 to 1970, in cases in which sentencing occurred under the federal antitrust laws, the
Department of Justice recommended the maximum fine (then only $50,000) only 27 per-
cent of the time. See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAw
AND ECONOM.ICs 61 (1976).
110. K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 109, at 115; Note, Increasing Community Con-
trol Over Corporate Crime-A Problem in the Law of Sanctions, 71 YALE L.J. 280, 294-95,
302 (1961).
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effective solutions. A significant number of the most undesired out-
comes will be eliminated with minimum social cost.
The infirmity of enterprise-oriented HBLRs concerns that group
of firms, impossible to identify in advance, whose behavior in the
face of realistically achievable penalty levels will remain inadequately
modified. To bring such firms to heel, our best hope will be to bring
f, the probability of conviction, closer and closer to 1. But many of
the measures we might employ to increase f, such as shifting burdens
of proof against defendants, are subject to their own moral, if not
legal, restrictions;"' and the measures that are allowable, such as in-
creased policing and prosecution, obviously entail greater and greater
enforcement costs. Hence, even if the alternatives to Enterprise HBLRs
-agent penalties and interventions via Standards-entail their own
peculiar costs, it does not necessarily follow that those alternative
techniques are less efficient means of achieving the best balance of
caution and unwanted outcomes.
B. Agent Liability
Where enterprise liability appears deficient, some of the slack can
be taken up through penalty HBLRs that target agents directly: what
I have denominated Agent HBLR(P)s. 1" 2 Certainly, the appeal of
direct agent liability is widespread and obvious." 3 A close examina-
tion, however, reveals that its case for displacing or even sharing duty
with enterprise liability is not as persuasive as some of the literature
suggests.
To begin with, we should note that the issue is not one of shifting
from a system that leaves agents untouched to one that affects them.
111. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1969) (statute that reduced standard of
proof from "beyond a reasonable doubt" to "by a preponderance of the evidence" violated
due process). Civil penalties may soften or circumvent the impact of traditional restric-
tions on criminal fines. See United States v. Ward, 100 S. Ct. 2636, 2640-44 (1980) (im-
position of civil penalty under Federal Water Pollution Control Act does not trigger
Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination presumably available to corporate
officer in instance of criminal proceeding).
112. Our concern here is not with ordinary civil liabilities of agents, which are ordi-
narily shifted without objection to the enterprise, see pp. 12-13 supra, but with the
application of some penalty increment. Furthermore, we consider here only agent penalty
liability for a violation of a harm-based rule; the special case of agent liability for vio-
lation of a Standard is discussed at pp. 43-44 infra.
113. Traditionally, support for agent liability has been drawn from notions of blame-
worthiness, deterrence, and distributive justice. See Mueller, supra note 14, at 45; Com-
ment, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Really Necessary? 29 Sw. L.J. 908, 919-24 (1976).
But see New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 496 (1909)
(corporate criminal liability only means of effectively controlling and correcting abuses);
K. ELZINGA & W. BRaaiT, supra note 109, at 132-33 (managerial fines unfavorably com-
pared to fines against corporations).
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Under the rules aimed at the enterprise, the enterprise presumably
will deal as it sees fit with the employee whose conduct risks or has
actually caused its liability. These sanctions available to the enterprise
may range from ostracism and "passing over" in the matter of pro-
motions and raises, to dismissal, or even the institution of an em-
ployer's indemnity action." 4 Indeed, the employer and the employment
environment have a strong and immediate influence on employees,
whereas the state, for all its nominal authority, is distant and abstract.
As a consequence, one might well prefer to sanction the whole enter-
prise and thus induce it to reform its internal environment in the
most appropriate manner." 5
We may also suppose that it is ordinarily less costly to identify and
convict whatever enterprise was responsible than to go further and
fix responsibility on one of the enterprise's agents.",6 If so, one would
expect increases in enforcement expenses to yield a higher rate of
conviction, at any margin, if the enterprise rather than the agent is
the target. Thus, to the extent that the enterprise can be presumed
to respond rationally to its penalties, it would seem preferable, within
the range that constraints on the escalation of enterprise penalties
permit, for the law to aim its penalties at the enterprise and entrust
the enterprise to discipline its agents.
Nevertheless, there are reasons to make the agent answerable di-
rectly to the state in its own forum, rather than indirectly through
the agency of the enterprise.117 Most obviously, the agent's misconduct
may have been so egregious as to demand a penalty, such as imprison-
114. See pp. 56-60 infra; cf. S. 1722, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. § 2202(a)(4) (1979) (amount
of fine imposed on defendant organization should take into account "any measure taken
by the organization to discipline its employees or agents responsible for the offense").
115. Indeed, it is a commonplace that one of the principal features, and perhaps
virtues, of a bureaucracy is that it makes individuals subordinate to and substitutable
in a dominant institutional structure. The influences of bureaucratic structure and peer
group pressure are particularly likely to dilute the force of more distant and contingent
legal rules as such rules become increasingly "technical," that is, morally neutral. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, Comment, at 148-49 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); C. STONE,
supra note 13, at 67-69; Cressey, Culture Conflict, Differential Association, and Normative
Conflict, in CRIME AND CULTURE: EssAYS IN HONOR OF THORSTEN SELLIN 43-47 (M. Wolf-
gang ed. 1968). This is a strong argument for probationary terms that alter bureaucratic
features as a remedy for corporate wrongdoing. See Note, Structural Crime and Institu-
tional Rehabilitation: A New Approach to Corporate Sentencing, 89 YALE L.J. 353, 370
(1979).
116. See United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973) (corporate liability for antitrust violation justified in part
because of difficulty of identifying responsible agents). The task becomes more difficult
as institutions become larger and more complex. See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note
109, at 38-39.
117. In addition, if the potential fine exceeds the cost of collecting it, the state will
prefer to punish the agent directly.
The Yale Law Journal
ment, that is beyond the power of the enterprise to mete out. But
less clear-cut situations occur when the agent's misconduct would
concededly merit no more severe a penalty than a fine. The question
then arises whether, supposing the enterprise to be capable of exacting
from the wrongdoer a "penalty"-through dismissal, an indemnity
action, or whatever-exactly equivalent in monetary value to the fine
that the state would exact, any reason remains for the state to under-
take the added costs of identifying and convicting the responsible
agent itself.
At least in some of the more serious cases meriting legal fines, pub-
lic prosecution of agents is arguably appropriate. In this view, even
though imprisonment is not demanded, the law may yet have a retrib-
utive, even denunciatory role to play, one that requires the cere-
monial trappings of public prosecution for symbolic and educative
purposes. In many such cases, moreover, we are likely to be skeptical
that the enterprise, having been prosecuted, will in turn proceed to
identify the wrongdoing employee and impose the appropriate sanc-
tion. The enterprise's own notions of what constitutes blameworthy
conduct may be too lenient to suit the collective preferences of society.
In addition, we may suspect the integrity of the enterprise's internal
sanctioning process, which is, after all, largely in the hands of high-level
managers who have their own welfare to protect. The managers may
tend either to find a scapegoat or to accord light treatment to a true
culprit in exchange for his not implicating them. 118
Thus, when we are dealing with the most reprehensible agent con-
duct, the case for agent penalties is clear, and the only real question
is whether to rely on them exclusively, or to employ them in tandem
with the enterprise-liability sanctions. This decision would seem to
turn on pragmatic considerations, such as whether the availability of
the enterprise as a target will distract public and prosecutorial attention
from the individual in circumstances where the individual is the pref-
erable target.1" 9
118. For an instance of "light treatment," see note 209 infra (executive fired for role
in foreign bribery scheme later hired as consultant). The aim of S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 2202(a)(4) (1979) (amount of corporate fine should account for corporation's own
disciplinary action against employees responsible for offense), is evidently to induce more
intensive private sector discipline.
119. See G. WILLIAMS, suPra note 108, § 283, at 865; cf. Lee, Corporate Criminal Lia-
bility, 28 COLUM. L. Rav. 1, 187 (1928) (traditional sanctions affect innocent shareholders);
Note, supra note 110, at 292-93 (traditional sanctions do not reach important policy-
makers). The availability of both enterprise and individual targets may lead to unjust
conviction of corporations. The prosecutors may indict both the enterprise and individu-
als with the intention of dropping charges against the defendant executives in exchange
for a guilty plea by the corporation. See I NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAws, WORKING PAPERS 180, 199 (1970).
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The most important point, however, is that the bulk of harm-caus-
ing corporate conduct does not typically have, at its root, a particular
agent so clearly "to blame" that he or she merits either imprisonment
or a monetary fine extracted in a public ceremony. A bribe, for ex-
ample, can be traced to a particular hand and mind; not so a new
car with flawed brakes. In a large organization, the division of bu-
reaucratic functions makes it difficult to ascribe individual respon-
sibility for the brake design even when we are using "responsibility"
in its moral sense.120 To establish the legal responsibility of an agent
is even more costly and problematic, especially in criminal actions
where the burden of proof and various due process constraints impede
prosecution. Indeed, there may be circumstances in which we find it
appropriate to judge that a wrongful act has occurred, but to ascribe
it-both in morals and in law-to the corporation rather than to any
agent. Such an attribution has appeal when, for example, the society
wishes to denounce the conduct and rehabilitate' 2' the actor, but the
source of the wrongdoing seems to lie in bureaucratic shortcomings-
flaws in the organization's formal and informal authority structure,
or in its information pathways-rather than in the deliberate act of
any particular employee. 122 In these circumstances, it may be more
intelligible, and make better policy, to focus the sanction on the
enterprise.
23
As we move away from highly blameworthy individual misconduct,
then, towards situations in which agent culpability is not so readily
apparent and in which weighing an activity's costs and benefits at
different margins 24 overrides the law's interest in retribution, the
120. The agents themselves may not be able correctly to describe their own respon-
sibility, often carrying out "series of apparently rational actions without any ideas of
the ends they serve." C. MiLLS, THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 168 (1961).
121. Rehabilitation would occur through corporate probation. See Stone, Proposed
Model Code for Corporate Rehabilitation, reprinted in Corporate Rights and Responsi-
bilities: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 297-301
(1976); Note, suPra note 115, at 364-75 (advocating corporate probation as technique to
rehabilitate corporation).
122. See French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 Ams. PHIL. Q. 207 (1979)
(attributing moral characteristics to corporations for reasons given in text). But see Ladd,
Morality and the Ideal of Rationality in Formal Organizations, 54 MoNsST 488 (1970) (na-
ture of formal organizations makes it unintelligible to ascribe moral responsibility to
them). The law can be regarded as subscribing to some view of institutional blameworthi-
ness in situations in which the corporation is held liable for a non-strict-liability offense
without proof of specific intent of a particular employee. See United States v. Hilton
Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1005-06 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
123. One such policy reason flows from the likelihood that the public knows the
corporation, but probably not the agents, by name. See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 108, §
283, at 863. The adverse corporate publicity will have a deterrent effect and may enable
the public to protect itself against dangerous enterprises.
124. The cost-benefit analysis justifications seem appropriate to "crimes" ordinarily
labeled "regulatory" or "public welfare" offenses in the literature, and where the con-
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case for pursuing agents rather than the enterprise becomes increas-
ingly unsure. If, for example, the law imposes its penalty on the
manager of our hypothetical smelting plant, the same constraints that
inhibit the escalation of enterprise penalties-defendant wealth, effi-
ciency, morality, and so forth-limit even more stringently the sanc-
tions against the agent.
Thus, although proposals recur to legislate severe penalties for
conduct such as failure to supervise, 2 5 it is far from clear that such
reforms are either prudent or workable. To criminalize behavior that
is essentially beyond the actor's control undermines the moral basis
of the entire criminal justice system. 126 Even at this high price, we
are likely to realize only a marginal diminution in misconduct, for
the more the conduct is unpremeditated, or is a joint product of many
agents' acts over which the targeted agent has limited control, the
more inelastic its "supply" will be to changes in expected penalty
levels. The likely results are a rate of conviction of those prosecuted,
and a level of punishment of those convicted, 2 7 that are far lower for
siderations that dominate liability rules merge with those of accident law. See gen-
erally Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Eco-
nomic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 423 (1963); Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33
CoLum. L. REv. 55 (1933). The Polinsky and Shavell analysis seems particularly appro-
priate for offenses of this sort, as evidenced by their principal illustration, parking viola-
tions, an offense that carries little moral freight. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 91,
at 886-87.
125. See, e.g., S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 403(c) (1975) (supervisor criminally liable
for organization's offense if "reckless failure to supervise" permitted or contributed to
its commission). This section has not been carried forward in the bills currently pending
before Congress. See S. 1722, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979). But see H.R. 4975, 96th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1979) (penalizing person having management authority in business entity who,
discovering serious danger, fails to inform appropriate federal agencies and warn affected
employees).
126. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 359 (1968) ("If we make
criminal that which people regard as acceptable, either nullification occurs or, more subtly,
people's attitude toward the meaning of criminality undergoes a change."); White, Mak-
ing Sense of the Criminal Law, 50 COLO. L. Rxv. 1, 21 (1978) (finding criminal responsi-
bility without regard to fault both unfair and senseless as "crazy obliteration of distinc-
tions that are essential resources for our collective life").
127. Comparisons among levels of punishment are complicated, since fines and impris-
onment are not the only alternatives. In the 1974 Paper Label Case, United States v.
Blankenheim, No. 74-182 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 1974), Judge Charles Renfrew, reluctant to
imprison five executives convicted of price-fixing, but concerned that the fines he im-
posed would not adequately deter other potential price-fixers, required each executive
to make several speeches to business, civic, or other groups about the case and his par-
ticipation in it, and to submit to the court a written report on his experiences in doing
so. Renfrew, The Paper Label Sentences: An Evaluation, 86 YALE L.J. 590, 592-94 (1977).
But see The Paper Label Sentences: Critiques, 86 YALE L.J. 619 (1977). The critiques point
out three factors seemingly ignored by Judge Renfrew: the deterrent value of incarcera-
tion, see id. at 619-25 (critique by Baker & Reeves); the impropriety of courts usurping a
legislative function, see id. at 626-29 (critique by Dershowitz); and the risks of inequity
inherent in such creative sentences, see id. at 630-35 (critique by Liman).
Another punishment alternative is to empower sentencing judges to disqualify organi-
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the same offense than the enterprise would be likely to bear. 128
Even if we presume that the penalty that the agent can realistically
expect in these circumstances is less, per enforcement dollar, than
the penalty that the enterprise can expect for the same conduct, we
cannot conclude that the dedication of enforcement resources to the
pursuit of agents would be less effective a deterrent at any margin
than the pursuit of enterprises. To make a comparison of the respon-
siveness of unwanted conduct to increments in enterprise-targeted
and agent-targeted enforcement programs, we would have to place the
penalties in a broader context. What burdens do the respective pen-
alties impose on agent and on enterprise, considering all the direct
and indirect, monetary and nonmonetary implications?129 What does
each party stand to gain if the conduct is not detected?130 What are
zation executives from exercising functions giving rise to violations. A few statutes do
provide for such disqualifications. See 12 U.S.C. § 1829 (1976) (disqualifying persons con-
victed of certain offenses from holding positions in banks whose deposits are insured by
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); 29 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1976) (disqualifying union
officers convicted of certain offenses from holding office in labor organizations). Of
course, in areas of activity requiring licenses, discipline may include suspension of the
right to engage in an activity. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (1976) (Securities and Exchange
Commission empowered to censure, deny, suspend, or revoke license of broker-dealer "in
the public interest"); 46 U.S.C. § 471 (1976) (Federal Maritime Board empowered to
suspend license of officer in charge of steamer in certain circumstances).
128. The likelihood of leniency toward individuals may be inferred from the treat-
ment accorded executives convicted of antitrust violations, usually price fixing. See Baker
8 Reeves, The Paper Label Sentences: Critiques, 86 YALE L.J. 619, 623 n.17 (1977) (none
received prison sentences during period 1962-68; fewer than twelve received sentences
exceeding 30 days during period 1969-77). Similar leniency appears in a study of various
types of illegal corporate behavior from 1890 to 1976, when
of the 56 federally convicted executives of all 683 corporations, 62.5 percent received
probation, 21.4 percent had their sentences suspended, and 26.6 percent were incar-
cerated . . . . The average prison sentence for all those convicted, whether or not they
went to prison and regardless of the offense, averaged 2.8 days. There were 10 officers
who had their sentences suspended . . . . The average for all [16] imprisoned execu-
tives was 37.1 days; excluding the two six-month sentences the remaining 14 averaged
16.7 days ....
M. CLINART, supra note 109, at 209.
129. Obviously, the fine represents a welfare loss not adequately expressed in the
amount of the judgment-that is, presumably those involved would not be indifferent
as between paying SX in a fine and losing $X in an uninsured accident. But even account-
ing for these effects, it is difficult to generalize as to which enforcement emphasis-
counter-agent or counter-enterprise-is likely to result in the greatest degree of deter-
rence per enforcement dollar. The criminal process is humiliating to the agent, and
may reduce his future earning power, but it also has a demoralizing effect on the organi-
zation, perhaps one not readily expressed in dollars as loss of economic "good will." The
comparisons are further complicated by the fact that, especially when the enterprise is
targeted, the criminal conviction may provide collateral assistance to civil plaintiffs seek-
ing recoieries far in excess of the fine (in treble-damage antitrust actions, for example).
130. Again, we are not concerned solely with monetary benefits; conduct in violation
of the law, particularly where the rules seem technical, may itself produce a welfare gain
for the violator, just as gambling does for the gambler, independent of outcome. See C.
STONE, supra note 13, at 68-69.
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their respective risk preferences,' 3' and their respective capacities to
modify the unwanted outcomes? There is simply no way we can begin
to answer these questions in the abstract, or even, with a high degree
of confidence, in any concrete situation.
Despite our ignorance on these points, some conclusions are possi-
ble. As we advance into the area of unpremeditated and morally
neutral conduct, whichever way we decide to distribute the liability
in the first instance, the parties will tend to continue the disfavored
conduct at a level that is relatively independent of the original dis-
tribution of liabilities.13 2 To illustrate, suppose that society opts to
correct the emission level of our hypothetical plant by threatening a
$10,000 penalty upon the plant manager. The manager's reaction will
be self-protective. He may divert corporate resources to make as cer-
tain as possible that no potentially harmful discharge occurs-shutting
down operations for repeated cleanings, or ordering additional moni-
toring-and he can be expected to demand an increase in compen-
sation to cover the risks of liability that remain irreducible after
whatever resource diversion he can arrange. 33 These demands will,
in turn, set in motion a reaction by the enterprise that will depend
upon several factors, including the costs of inducing the agent to
maintain, at personal risk, the level of activity that maximizes the
enterprise's welfare. To the extent that the enterprise, considering its
131. It has been argued thit managers will be less inclined than shareholders to
take risks "since if the gamble is successful, most of the benefit will go to shareholders,
while if it fails, the manager may lose his job." Anderson, supra note 103, at 785 n.143.
Their relative likings for risk, however, would seem to depend upon many variables
about which it is difficult to generalize. See note 82 supra.
132. This position is perhaps implied by the Coase Theorem, see Coase, The Prob-
lem of Social Costs, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). There is, however, one twist. Where we are
concerned with ordinary unintentional and unblameworthy accidents, we may be in-
clined to place the loss, in the first instance, on the "cheapest cost avoider." See G.
CALABRESl, supra note 40, at 135-50. But where our aim shifts to the deterrence of highly
undesirable conduct, we may wish to place the initial penalty on what we might call the
most expensive cost avoider, so as to increase the inefficiency of noncompliance. Suppose,
for example, that the easiest way to avoid conviction is to bribe enforcers, and that the
most effective briber-the party that carries out the bribe most cheaply, with the least
visible trail of evidence-is a particular agent. All else being equal, we would incline to
place the fine on the enterprise because it is the least efficient-more cumbersome-ar-
ranger of the conviction-avoiding bribe. The irony is that this result seems to present
a case, perhaps an important class of cases, in which social costs may be minimized by
maximizing an individual's private costs.
133. Cf. Mashaw, Civil Liability of Government Officers: Property Rights and Official
Accountability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Winter 1978, at 8, 26-28 (examining efficiency
implications of public official liability). In addition to inducing excess caution, there is
also the prospect that intense agent liability will yield a perverse substitution of factors.
High quality, relatively risk-averse managers may be replaced by less risk-averse but less
qualified personnel in the very jobs where we least want such a change to occur.
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independent incentives, finds the agent's risk-taking attractive, it will
be tempted to pay him to take the additional risks and to monitor his
performance to make certain that he is taking the risks he is being
paid to take.134 In either case, the enterprise will be called to ac-
count. 1
3 5
I do not wish to suggest that the supply of harm will be exactly the
same, irrespective of the initial distribution of risk. The equivalence
would seem to hold in the limiting case where the plant manager
and the enterprise (1) have equal capacity to appreciate the risks, (2)
are equally averse to the $10,000 risk at existing margins, and (3) have
equal control over outcomes. Any variance between manager and en-
terprise, respecting any of these three factors, however, would rein-
force a particular preference for the initial placement of the loss. For
example, the plant manager may not appreciate the hazards as accu-
rately as does the enterprise, with its staff resources, or he may be rela-
tively risk-preferring, or he may have only partial control over the
relevant outcomes. In each case, the $10,000 fine would be less effec-
tive a deterrent if we direct it towards the agent rather than towards
the enterprise.
Although such reasoning suggests a theoretical preference for plac-
ing the liabilities on one party rather than on the other,130 the sig-
nificance of the initial choice is narrowed still further by the likelihood
that the parties will attempt through indemnification (or some ap-
proximation) to re-establish their preferred outcome. In order to make
society's selection stick, it may be necessary to limit indemnification,
an effort that involves a special, complex set of problems reserved for
discussion later.' 37 At this point, I observe simply that, although a
case can be made that some constraints on indemnification are clearly
desirable, there are limits on how effectively we can enforce them.
Holding agents liable is subject to more of the infirmities of enter-
prise liability than one first imagines and, outside the region of the
most blameworthy wrongdoing, tends to permit a similar level of harm.
134. The enterprise can be expected to bear those expenditures until the marginal
cost to it reaches its marginal benefits. Whether the incremental $10,000 penalty falls
on the enterprise in the first instance or upon the agent should have little effect on
the amount of risk-taking.
135. See Baxter, Enterprise Liability, Public and Private, LAiv & CONTEMP. PROB., Win-
ter 1978, at 45, 47.
136. In addition to the concerns about efficiency emphasized in the text, the initial
placement of the penalty may reflect considerations of distributive justice, moral edu-
cation, and other factors.
137. See pp. 45-65 infra.
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C. Intervention by Standards
I have suggested that while there is a valuable place in the law for
both enterprise liability and agent liability, neither technique is ade-
quate to produce the desired behavior-modifying corrections in all
circumstances. There is, however, another set of strategies through
which we can achieve those aims: Standards. As I have already indi-
cated, Standards are distinguished from the various HBLRs by the
way in which they constrict managerial autonomy. With HBLRs, the
actor is left free to permit the harm on the condition that it pay the
damages or a penalty; the supply of unwanted conduct is affected by
altering financial rewards. By contrast, Standards transmit collective
judgments not only through liabilities that affect financial prospects
if harm occurs, but also by prescribing the means by which the harm
is to be avoided.
Standards are of various sorts. The example employed earlier, man-
dating a fire sprinkler system in building codes, 138 illustrates what I
call a factor constraint: it removes from the enterprise participant
full autonomy over product and process variables. In the illustration
of the smelter, a factor constraint could take the form of mandating
that the plant use only ore with a specified low sulfur content. A
second group of Standards, performance constraints, specify minimum
acceptable levels of product and service performance. 13 9 This could
involve, for example, restricting emissions of particulates to a level
less than N per hour, but leaving the firm free to achieve the re-
quired level by whatever technique it prefers, an option foreclosed
by the factor constraints.140 A third group consists of information con-
straints:.41 the smelter could be forced to disclose certain hazards as-
sociated with its operations.
Finally, there has been a recent trend towards what I call bureau-
cratic constraints. 42 The harbingers are appearing so unobtrusively
138. See p. 18 supra.
139. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Standards, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001 (1979)
(establishing maximum permissible levels of exposure to asbestos fibers).
140. See Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89
YALE L.J. 1466, 1521-28 (1980) (criticizing factor constraint-required coal scrubbing-and
suggesting performance constraint-emission limitation-in EPA's regulation concerning
sulfur dioxide emission from new coal-burning power plants).
141. See, e.g., Guide Concerning Fuel Economy Advertising for New Automobiles, 16
C.F.R. §§ 259.1-.2 (1980) (FTC regulations).
142. Constraining bureaucratic variables is a technique not unknown to the law. That
a corporation has a board of directors, for example, is not the outcome of unrestrained
manager-investor negotiations, but a requirement of corporation codes. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (Supp. 1978); ABA-ALI MODEL BUS. CORP. AcT § 35 (1979).
It is also through law that certain of the agent's functions are established. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170(a) (1974) (directors authorized to declare dividends); ABA-ALI
MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 45 (1979) (same).
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and in such unrelated areas that few people, probably not even their
draftsmen, have yet recognized that, taken together, they constitute
a new and significant species of corporate control device. For example,
in recent years we have seen significant intrusions on companies' in-
ternal information networks to assure that data of a certain sort are
gathered by the organization and delivered to specified desks for ac-
tion.143 Corporations have been required by law to establish new
posts144 and to endow existing jobs with powers and obligations spe-
cified by the outside world.' 45 In several areas, constraints are immi-
nent as to who may, and may not, 40 hold certain corporate jobs. In
It is important to recognize, however, that existing bureaucratic constraints are typi-
cally subject to three significant limitations. First, they affect the highest echelons of
the firm's bureaucracy only-directors and various classes of "controlling persons"-rather
than day-to-day managers, much less subordinate agents. Second, even the corporate of-
ficers affected are restrained in only a few of their functions, which ordinarily constitute
a small fraction of their total work. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 152 (Supp. 1978)
(requiring directors to value property received in exchange for company's stock); ABA-
ALl MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 19 (1979) (same). Third, the limitations focus almost ex-
clusively on the interests of investors, rather than on those of third parties-the corpora-
tion's neighbors and fellow citizens.
Because of the significant effect of interior bureaucratic arrangements on noninvestors,
see note 36 supra, whose transaction costs of negotiating a favorable rearrangement are
higher than the negotiating costs for investors, one might expect the law to be readier
to constrain the corporate bureaucracy in the interest of noninvestors, and to leave in-
vestor concerns to market forces.
143. See, e.g., AT & T Discrimination Settlement, 8 LABOR REL. REP. (BNA) (431 Fair
Empl. Prac. Man.) 73, 95-96 (1973 consent decree between AT &T and EEOC including
several informational requirements); 10 C.F.R. § 21.21(a) (1980) (Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission regulation requiring subject firms to adopt procedures to inform responsible of-
ficers of failings or defects in construction or operation of facilities or activities); Current
Good Manufacturing Practice for Finished Pharmaceuticals, 21 C.F.R. §§ 211.1-.208 (1980)
(FDA regulation requiring pharmaceutical firms to establish procedures to bring certain
FDA regulatory activities to attention of executives).
144. See AT & T Discrimination Settlement, 8 LABOR REL. REP. (BNA) (431 Fair Empl.
Prac. Man.) 73, 87 (AT & T consent decree requiring each major subdivision to establish
"Equal Employment Opportunity Coordinator" to assist in preparation of local affirma-
tive action programs, to receive and investigate employee complaints, and to report to
Assistant Vice President-Personnel if corrective action necessary); 10 C.F.R. § 73.50(a)(3)
(1980) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulation requiring licensee to establish security
organization that "shall establish, maintain, and follow written security procedures").
145. Most of the experience with imposing new obligations on pre-existing officers
has involved furtherance of investor interests under the securities laws. See Comment,
Court-Appointed Directors: Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law Enforcement Ac-
tions, 64 GEo. L.J. 737, 744-46 (1976). The establishment of new duties for executives in
furtherance of noninvestor interests, however, did occur in the AT & T Discrimination
Settlement, 8 LABOR REL. REP. (BNA) (431 Fair Empl. Prac. Man.) 73, 86-88. Another ex-
ample is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirement that directors and responsible
officers of subject companies report to the NRC any information concerning certain
failures, hazards, or defects. 10 C.F.R. § 21.21(b)(l)-(4) (1980).
146. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 211.25 (1980) (FDA requires broad qualifications for person-
nel engaged in manufacture of drug products); cf. 10 C.F.R. § 73.30(d) (1980) (Nuclear
Regulatory Commission licensee required to submit plan for selection and qualifications
of escorts for nuclear materials).
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other areas, the managerial level at which decisions of a certain char-
acter must be made is no longer a matter solely for managerial dis-
cretion. 147 There are even suggestions that the government is pre-
pared to intrude in the selection process by which key corporate slots
are filled. 148
These bureaucratic constraints, it should be observed, are particu-
larly germane to a theory of controlling large organizations. Factor,
performance, and information standards all play significant roles in
the control of modern corporations. But they apply indiscriminately
to all social actors, rather than to large-scale organizations in particu-
lar. That is, a ban on cyclamates in soft drinks is as intelligibly ap-
plied to a sole proprietor, who bottles soft drinks commercially in
his garage, as to a 10,000 employee conglomerate. By contrast, bureau-
cratic standards, such as those that mandate reporting obligations
between vice-president and president, are, as control devices, inher-
ently corporate.
Obviously, the predominant attraction of all four types of Standards
is the hope that they will prevent outcomes that are underdeterred
by the various HBLRs. Conversely, the principal risk of Standards,
relative to HBLRs, is that they will overdeter. Most corporate-caused
harm, especially if unpremeditated, is likely to be the product of
many variables. Whenever the law opts to single out a particular vari-
able and dictate some resolution of it without regard to enterprise
preferences, we are meddling in a process about which we on the
outside ordinarily know considerably less than do the enterprise man-
agers.14 The remedy may impose on the firm costs in excess of the
expected social harm that constituted the original justification for the
intervention.150 Industrial development and innovation may be stulti-
fied.15 And the "protection" may prove, in the end, illusory. There
147. See pp. 44-45 infra (discussing FCC requirement that radio stations screen record-
ings to eliminate songs advocating drug use).
148. One federal case suggests the appropriateness of a court-ordered, even court-ap-
pointed, "probation officer" to take over critical functions of a company in the interest
of noninvestors. See United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1972)
(district court's probation order, which required oil spill containment program, remanded
to make conditions less onerous). For a discussion of this case and of the possibility of
corporate probation, see Comment, 3 U. BALT. L. REv. 294 (1974).
149. Even in circumstances where the state may be presumed to have better informa-
tion-gathering and assessment resources than corporate managers-the area of health and
epidemiology, for example, see Cohen, Book Review, 62 VA. L. REv. 259, 267 (1976) (re-
viewing C. STONE, supra note 13)-it may be preferable for the government to publicize
the risks before it mandates solutions.
150. See Ellickson, suPra note 74, at 687 (imposition of Standards may prohibit con-
duct even though actor willing to pay external costs of such conduct).
151. See Vagts, Book Review, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 635, 638-39 (1976) (reviewing C. STONE,
suPra note 13) (speculating whether federal regulation would inhibit industrial innova-
tion).
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is always the risk that the formal arrangements mandated by the law
will be subverted by the organization's informal procedures and stan-
dards, factors that are more difficult, perhaps impossible, for the
outside world to bring under control. 152 Indeed, the more strategically
the externally imposed adjustment threatens the firm's way of doing
things, the more likely it is to induce a counter-attack of bureaucratic
hindrance. 15 3
Because the risks of overdeterrence and outright waste are signifi-
cant, Standards probably ought to be reserved for two situations. In
the first, the Standard is preventative and is imposed across an entire
industry; in the second, the Standard is remedial and is reserved for
a selected firm in response to a particular incident or pattern of
wrongdoing.
In the preventative situation, it seems prudent to displace mana-
gerial judgment with a Standard only when there is some strong
combination of the following characteristics:
(1) there are features of the hazard that render the HBLR strategies,
with their after-the-fact solutions, inferior to a more directly preventa-
tive approach; such qualities might include a deep societal aversion
to the harm, the inadequacy of monetary compensation, and antici-
pated problems of litigation and proof; 5 4
(2) the government, because of its ready access to the relevant data,
or through publicly funded laboratories, for example, is able to as-
152. See DeMott, Reweaving the Corporate Veil: Management Structure and the Con-
trol of Corporate Information, LAiw & CONrEMP. PROB., Summer 1977, at 182 (pessimistic
conclusions about implementation of corporate restructuring proposals based on analysis
of operation of Emergency Loan Guarantee Board and its relationship to improper pay-
ments by Lockheed Aircraft Corporation). Similar reservations are expressed in Cohen,
supra note 149, at 263-70, and in Stone, Law and the Culture of the Corporation, Bus.
&- Soc'y REv., Fall 1975, at 5.
153. This conclusion is somewhat speculative, because there is little experience in the
for-profit sector with mandatory bureaucratic constraints on behalf of third parties. In-
terventions on behalf of investors-the appointment of a receiver or special counsel, for
example-are likely to enjoy more success than interventions on behalf of other groups
affected by corporate action, because the former enjoy the support of a strong and tra-
ditional constituency. See Stone, supra note 152, at 6, 13-14. Nevertheless, there have
been some studies of the processes by which organizations generally resist incursions com-
parable to the imposition of bureaucratic constraints. A classic study, based on the re-
sistance of British coal mines to technological changes in production methods, is Trist &
Banforth, Some Social and Psychological Consequences of the Longwall Method of Coal-
getting, 4 HUMAN REL. 3 (1951), discussed in D. KATz & R. KAHN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
OF ORGANIZATIONS 435-42 (1966). Of closer legal interest is Note, The Wyatt Case: Imple-
mentation of a Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338, 1347-78
(1975) (discussing use of structural injunction in Alabama state mental hospitals). See also
J. THtoIFSON, supra note 21, at 19-23 (proclivity of large organizations to "buffer" them-
selves from environmental forces).
154. See p. 14 sup ra.
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sess the positive and negative impacts of the Standard at least as well
as the enterprises can; 1 5
(3) the enterprises affected by the Standard are relevantly similar,
so that the cost that a blanket stricture imposes by strait-jacketing in-
novative and compliant companies is outweighed by the benefit of
controlling their more intransigent competitors;',"
(4) there is a strong relationship between the variable that the stan-
dard affects and the outcome to be avoided, such as exists, for ex-
ample, between automobile brakes and automobile accidents;1
57
(5) the cost of the constraint, considering its alternatives, is not
likely to exceed what society is prepared to expend to avoid the harm.
On the other hand, in circumstances where Standards are being
fashioned as part of a remedy in response to demonstrated miscon-
duct by a particular corporation, the general presumption against
preventative Standards could be somewhat relaxed:158 (1) rather than
anticipating the harm, the government will have stayed its hand until
the occurrence of wrongdoing; (2) the presumption that the managers
possess superior abilities in the design of avoidance measures will have
been called into question by the harmful action itself; (3) the risks
presented by blanket application of general rules are avoided; (4, 5)
the relationship in the particular circumstances between variable and
violation, and the cost of the constraint, can be examined and dem-
onstrated. Thus, in many cases it may be appropriate for the relief
-through corporate probation, for example' 59-to require mandatory
155. See S. Shavell, supra note 38, at 3. This circumstance leaves open the important
regulatory question whether the government should publish the superior information
for the firms' benefit, to use as they choose. As a result, this information access criterion
cannot by itself justify a mandatory Standard.
156. Cf. Wittman, supra note 38, at 199-200 (examining implications of nonuniformity
among offenses rather than among offenders). Nonuniformity among offenders may consti-
tute a reason to reserve mandatory Standards for remedial decrees. Nevertheless, industry-
wide Standards on a nonremedial basis may be appropriate in circumstances when Stan-
dards actually command support among industry leaders, but when no single firm is
prepared to suffer the competitive disadvantages of being the sole implementor.
157. See Wittman, supra note 38, at 198-99.
158. Mandatory Standards possess several virtues in such circumstances. First, firms
that can find their own cost-effective manner to obey the law are left free to do so.
Second, employees of firms that have failed repeatedly to work out their own compliance
solutions may recognize the justice of the intrusions and accept them more willingly
than they would otherwise. Third, the ordering of a special compliance program may
serve the ends of the criminal law more effectively than do fines: they may rehabilitate
the defendant corporation, serve retributive ends by shaming the organization more than
would a fine, and deter violations by other companies to the extent that others regard
the partial invasion of managerial autonomy as a vexatious form of punishment.
159. See note 121 supra (citing sources recommending corporate probation). In civil
suits an injunction, rather than probation, would provide the mechanism for imposing
mandatory standards.
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Standards, such as the addition of specific duties to existing corporate
offices, or the addition of special compliance officers and committees. 10
Employed either as preventative or as remedy, Standards possess
several advantages over harm-based liability rules. First, in some cir-
cumstances Standards offer the prospect of reducing the costs of mon-
itoring and enforcement, from detection through conviction. To re-
turn to our smelter example, if we wait for an outbreak of blood poi-
soning to trigger a legal reaction, there will be significant proof prob-
lems in correlating a plaintiff's injury to different levels of pollution
and in allocating responsibility among multiple sources. 161 By con-
trast, when we focus the monitoring effort on a mandatory standard,
the cost of detecting a violation obviously drops.0 12
Bureaucratic Standards in particular may hold promise in reducing
monitoring costs, especially when they are employed to reinforce
internal law-compliance programs. In our smelter example, the clue
that the emission standard has been violated may take the form of an
increase of ten micrograms per cubic meter in the level of particulates
in the air basin. An outside enforcement agency faces the costs of
determining whether there has in fact been a violation (rather than
a change in natural conditions, exacerbated by coincident, but lawful,
discharges), and, if a violation is likely, the costs of ascertaining which
of the many plants in the air basin was responsible. To reduce the
costs of determining whether this standard-itself a performance stan-
dard-has been violated, it may be worthwhile to introduce bureau-
cratic standards that transfer some of the duties and costs of monitor-
ing onto the firms themselves. We could provide, for example, that
some designated company employee has to keep the monitoring de-
vices under observation and personally verify compliance by signing
the emission monitoring log. Although mandatory self-monitoring
requirements, like all laws, provide incentives and opportunities for
new forms of cheating, we may expect an outside agency to bear
fewer costs if it serves merely to police various self-monitoring de-
vices, records, and organizational plans, than if it undertakes all the
160. See notes 144-45 & 148 supra (citing commentary and examples).
161. Flexible, nontraditional modes of allocating responsibility may mitigate this prob-
lem, at least for plaintiffs. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610-13, 607
P.2d 924, 936-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 143-46 (1980) (plaintiff, unable to prove which of sev-
eral defendant manufacturers produced drug that caused her injury, allowed to hold each
liable on basis of market share, with burden on each defendant to rebut inference of
causation).
162. For an examination of how variations in the costs of detecting ex ante offenses
-violations of Standards-affect the ideal levels of both ex ante and ex post penalties, see
Wittman, supra note 38, at 195-97.
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monitoring from scratch and at arm's length. Commissioning enter-
prises to shoulder a greater share of the monitoring burden may not
only prove more efficient in some circumstances, achieving the same
level of behavior modification at reduced costs. It may also be viewed
as apportioning those costs more equitably, laying a larger portion
of them on those who cause harm rather than on the society at large.
Besides the possible benefits associated with monitoring costs, an
advantage of Standards over HBLRs is that it is easier to raise the
penalty that the liability target can reasonably expect to the level
that is ideal for enforcement. 1 3 This result obtains, first, because
the ideal penalty level will be lower for a Standards violation than
for the consummated injury that the Standard was designed to pre-
vent, at least as long as the correlation between meeting the Stan-
dard and avoiding the harm is not perfect. This can be illustrated
by reference to our smelter example. Suppose that the health hazard
to be avoided has a net expected present value of one million dollars.
If installing the required device were an absolute guarantee that the
harm would be avoided, we would be prepared to impose costs on
the noncomplying firm of one million dollars. But in the more likely
case, the harm will be the product of many factors, and no single
Standard can do more than reduce the probability of its occurring, or,
more accurately, reduce its net expected present value. If, for exam-
ple, the device reduces the expected damages by a factor of ten, then
the imposition of costs greater than one hundred thousand dollars
would constitute overdeterrence. As a consequence, some of the con-
straints that retard our raising the expected level of penalty to the
ideal level-limited liability and the added prosecutorial resources
that the imposition of heavy penalties requires, for example-are less
significant when it comes to enforcing the lower sanctions associated
with Standards.
Second, when we shift to Standards, both the target-efficiency and
the morality constraints are less obstructive. This feature is partly a
result of the lower penalties. But it also follows from the fact that
Standards tend to transmit clearer signals, and to affect matters that
are more directly under management's control ("install a device D"),
than do HBLRs ("don't be a cause of blood poisoning"). When an
enterprise fails to comply with a clear Standard, its misconduct may
163. This result assumes the use of Standards coupled with contingent liability, rather
than with what I call "more or less absolute conditions." See note 73 supra.
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rightly appear more deliberate, and consequently more blameworthy,
than would violation of a general harm-based liability rule.
164
Moreover, as we have seen, at the time of a collective decision to
impose a penalty via an HBLR, we have little way of calculating how
costly compliance may prove; that ignorance may lead to inefficiencies.
By contrast, the costs of complying with Standards, while rarely cer-
tain, are likely to fall within more predictable limits, particularly if
there has been broad opportunity for affected parties to be heard.
Rather than force the enterprise to be a surety against harm, society
effectively agrees, by mandating Standards, to share the added social
costs of especially protective harm-avoidance measures. The firm sub-
ject to regulation pays its share not in cash, but through some altera-
tion of the factors it employs or of its bureaucratic arrangements.
Society contributes by absorbing the higher costs that will therefore
be passed along, and perhaps by allowing the firm immunity from
some harm-based penalty judgments if it abides by the Standard. 105
This approach, like any risk-spreading system, may be more efficient
than placing the full burden on a single actor.
The various advantages of Standards are probably even more sig-
nificant when we turn from those that apply to enterprises to those
that operate directly upon agents. Agents can often avoid stiff penalties
because of the difficulty of establishing individual accountability,
both moral and legal, in a giant, complex institution. When an air-
plane falls apart in the air, who can we say was to blame? But when
we require bureaucratic standards that make certain features of the
agent's performance mandatory and visible to all, accountability can
be improved in two ways. First, we can attach individual liability to
non-performance of the required tasks. With lines of responsibility
clarified, the costs of identifying and prosecuting violators will de-
cline, and the penalty that the non-performing agent can realistically
expect will be brought into line with the ideal level. Second, we
should not forget that the control of organizational behavior depends
importantly, perhaps ultimately, upon how people feel about them-
selves and their jobs. Clarifying what is expected of a person may
make the agent feel responsible and may be effective in modifying
164. On the other hand, in those cases in which no harm resulted from the Standard
violation, the trier might view such a merely "technical" misfeasance more leniently.
165. Whether or not abidance by a Standard is construed to provide the defendant
with immunity from compensatory damage claims, we are probably prepared to withhold
punitive and criminal judgments for acts done in compliance with a Standard. An analo-
gous principle is that good-faith reliance on counsel may provide a defense to punitive
damages. See Fox v. Aced, 49 Cal. 2d 381, 385-86, 317 P.2d 608, 610-11 (1957).
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his performance, quite aside from the threat of suit. Both the legal
and the social-psychological effects should translate into a lower in-
cidence of violation, and the social costs may well prove moderate.',
Before leaving the subject of Standards, two other special warrants
for the use of Standards-of bureaucratic Standards, in particular-
deserve some comment. One of the most important is to serve as an
interim measure during a period when a preferable rule is being de-
veloped and put into place. The need springs from the inevitable
delays between society's appreciation of an evolving danger and the
promulgation of a specially tailored legislative or administrative re-
sponse. These hiatuses present a law-making dilemma. On the one
hand, the longer we temporize, the more damage can occur before
an ideal rule is established. On the other hand, public outcry may
prompt lawmakers to act even on the basis of inadequate data, pro-
ducing rules that overdeter-that is, impose more costs than benefits
-or are unjust. In some such situations, bureaucratic Standards can
secure some measure of interim protection, at the same time advanc-
ing the collection of data appropriate to the alteration of the more
traditional measures, such as ordinary liability rules. 10 7 Indeed, the
very assurance that potential harm and its amelioration are under
investigation allows rules to evolve that may prove far more realistic
from a cost-benefit point of view.
Second, there are occasionally outcomes that we wish to restrict,
but for which imposing HBLRs or even nonbureaucratic Standards
may conflict with assorted policies other than efficiency. Consider, as
an illustration of this use of bureaucratic Standard, the broadcasting
of popular records whose lyrics promote illegal drug use. The Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC) has power over station li-
censing, but no apparent authority to prevent stations from playing
particular records. Nor is it clear how much power Congress could
give it in this area without encroaching on First Amendment values.
Furthermore, questions of power aside, it would obviously be diffi-
cult to formulate and police workable standards as to which records
were allowable and which were not, especially considering that the
166. For example, requirements that companies provide and publish the details of
certain key individuals' duties, such as currently exist in nuclear utility regulation, see
10 C.F.R. § 73.50(a) (1979), are difficult to fault as stultifying, particularly when the
corporation, not the government, supplies the details of organizational responsibility.
167. Some suggestion of this approach appears in the Toxic Substances Control Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976). Under the Act, the Administrator can order manufacturers
to test suspect chemical substances, id. § 2603(a), to monitor their own compliance with
certain required procedures, id. § 2605(a)(4), and to report their proposed quality control
protocols, id. § 2605(b)(1). Should he find those protocols inadequate, the Administrator
can order them revised. Id. § 2605(b)(2)(A).
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lyrics may play on sly insinuation rather than on blatant advocacy of
drug use.
168
The solution that the FCC reached was a somewhat unorthodox
bureaucratic Standard, but one that may prove generalizable to other
circumstances. The decision as to which records were playable was
left with the broadcasting companies, but the companies were required
to establish internal bureaucratic procedures to insure that whenever
a question arose as to whether a record promoted illegal drug use, not
the disc jockeys alone, but "someone in a responsible position (i.e., a
management level executive at the station)" would exercise review. 169
Advancement of equal employment goals presents comparable prob-
lems, and has yielded some comparable bureaucratic Standards, as the
AT&-T Anti-Bias Consent Decrees illustrate.
7 0
In summarizing Cluster 1, it seems to me that of all the prospective
devices available to the law, those that warrant the most attention are
Standards, and perhaps bureaucratic Standards in particular. Indeed,
if we return our attention to the larger undertaking outlined in the
introduction-the design of a general theory of corporate control-
we see that Standards have an especially prominent role to play: their
partial independence from profit threats makes them suitable for
disciplining the vast population of organizations that lack the handle
of profits or some close analogue. Nevertheless, because our experi-
ence with such measures is limited, and the risks significant, it may
be appropriate initially to reserve their use to the few areas that meet
the strongest combination of conditions set forth above,'17 such as the
production and handling of radioactive materials, pharmaceuticals,
and toxic substances, and, in addition, to some instances of wrong-
doing warranting special interventionist remedies.
III. Cluster 2: The Indemnification Equilibrium
The second cluster of relationships vital to a comprehensive under-
standing of enterprise liability involves the freedom of the firm and
its agents to shift between themselves the risks of law-imposed losses.
168. See Note, Drug Songs and the Federal Communications Commission, 5 J.L. REF.
334, 337-38 (1972).
169. In re Licensee Responsibility To Review Records Before Their Broadcast, 28
F.C.C.2d 409, 409 (1971). See Memorandum Opinion and Order of April 16, 1971, 31
F.C.C.2d 377, 379-80 (1971), aff'd sub nom. Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 914 (1973).
170. See 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (431 Fair Empl. Prac. Man.) 73, 86-88, 95-96 (AT & T
discrimination settlement imposing new responsibilities on managers and establishing new
reporting systems).
171. See pp. 39-40 supra.
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Such shifting takes place in both directions. The agent may wish to
arrange that if he suffers judgment for conduct undertaken "on ac-
count of the agency," he shall have employee's indemnity to recoup
his losses from the firm.172 Conversely, the firm, wary of agent mis-
conduct that may be imputed to it on a respondeat superior or other
basis, may wish, through employer's indemnity, to shift the losses back
onto the agent.
173
The product of these two recoveries-the balance of risks between
agent and firm-I will call the indemnification equilibrium. In any
enterprise, the equilibrium is established, depending on the particular
risk, in part by status-based rules and in part by contract, within
bounds of variation permitted by legal doctrine. If we trace these
doctrinal constraints on indemnity through history, and regard them
as evidence of the prevailing practices, a general trend clearly ap-
pears: the balance of risks has been shifting, for an ever-broadening
range of injuries, away from the agent and towards the enterprise.
Today, the agent can recoup his losses from the firm in circumstances
in which, in earlier law, he would have failed, 174 and the firm will
not recover from its agents in some cases in which, in earlier law, it
would have succeeded.
1 75
It is not my purpose, in emphasizing externalities effects, to ques-
tion the proposition that the equilibrium that evolves through the
"bargaining" of investors and managers optimizes their own welfares.
The investors, for their part, have reason to be wary of employer in-
demnification that is too liberal, not only because they will want to
avoid the payments, but because anything that encourages their agents
172. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 438(b), 439(c)-(d) (1957).
173. See id. §§ 401-404; Steffen, The Employer's "Indemnity" Action, 25 U. Cm. L.
REv. 465 (1958).
174. The posture of earlier doctrine is reflected in New York Dock Co. v. McCollum,
173 Misc. 106, 111, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844, 848-49 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (corporation not "legally obli-
gated" to indemnify employee who has totally vindicated himself on merits unless vindi-
cation produced some definite benefit to corporation). The subsequent liberalization of
indemnification law was aimed at clarifying the "right" of the employee to recover. See
G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, INDEMNIFYING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 112-68 (1963); Bishop,
Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Di-
rectors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1081-87 (1968).
175. Some of the developments that have eroded the employer's indemnity action, par-
ticularly in the corporate area, where suit is often triggered by shareholders rather than by
management, include the requirement that shareholders instituting the action post se-
curity for expenses, see, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(d) (West 1977); ABA-ALI MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT § 49 (1979); the liberalization of defenses based on an officer's "right
to rely" on corporate records, reports, committees, and opinions of counsel, see, e.g., CAL.
CORP. CODE § 309(b) (West 1977); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 35 (1979); and the
possibility that the shareholders, or a disinterested majority or committee of the board,
may terminate the action on relatively nonreviewable "business judgment" grounds, see
note 222 infra.
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to regard misconduct lightly increases the risk of the enterprise's li-
ability.17 From the agents' perspective, the more vulnerable they
feel to personal liability, the higher the compensation they will de-
mand, and the more they will divert their time and other company
resources into self-protection. By and large, the investors should be
able to extract whatever degree of managerial diligence they are pre-
pared to compensate. Moreover, indemnification, like insurance, in-
volves a spreading of risks; it therefore follows, if we assume that the
agent is more averse to risks than the enterprise (which is a spreader
of risks), that there will be some range through which it will be more
efficient for the investors to offer their agents, in lieu of salary, a
betterment of their indemnification equilibrium. The betterment will
comprise some combination of waivers of claims otherwise available
to the investors and increases in claims available to employees. As to
the outcome of this negotiation, 177 the outside world would seem to
have no more interest in how the parties choose to compensate per-
formance that is defective than in how they reward performance that
is superior.178 Our interest, however, principally concerns the exter-
nalities effects: the possibility that the outcome that the investors and
managers arrive at may harm or be suboptimal for third parties or
public policy.
A. The Employee's Indemnity
Although an agreement to indemnify agents against their ordinary
negligence may constitute a marginal incentive to harm-causing be-
havior, and thus adversely affect third parties, attempts to restrict in-
demnification in such circumstances would quite likely create inef-
176. In some cases, however, penalties will be low enough and benefits of law viola-
tions high enough that enterprises will want agents to misbehave, a prospect discussed
below. See pp. 52-53 infra.
177. In most cases investors do not, strictly speaking, bargain over terms with their
agents, but purchase securities from other investors in a public market. If we assume,
however, that the indemnification laws of the various leading states of incorporation are
known to the investors-at least to investors whose trading influences market price most
heavily-then it would seem that the indemnification provisions optimize the preferences
of the investors and their agents inter se. Cf. Winter, supra note 33, at 257-58 (liberality
of state corporation codes one factor in investors' decisions to purchase stock).
178. Perhaps ironically, present law makes employee indemnification less readily
available when the underlying injury stemmed from negligence or misconduct to the
corporation than when the injury was to third parties. See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP.
Aar § 5(a)-(b) (1979) (where liability to corporation based on negligence or misconduct,
indemnity allowed only if court finds that "in view of all circumstances of the case," em-
ployee "reasonably entitled" to indemnity despite liability; indemnity otherwise allowed
if employee shows good faith and acts in or not opposed to corporation's interests).
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ficiencies."1r Indeed, in the context of ordinary accidents, where the
law aims principally to compensate victims and to spread unavoidable
losses, indemnification shares the virtues of insurance, without any
apparent sacrifice of public policy.'8 0
The policy objections come into play when indemnification takes
the form of reimbursing agents for fines and penalties,' 8 ' a practice
that amounts to little more than permitting the parties, by private
agreement, to undo society's judgment as to the appropriate deter-
rence strategy. Recall that the key component of this strategy is Pf,
the product of the level of penalty that a defendant can expect if
convicted, P, and the likelihood of conviction, f, the latter itself a
function of social enforcement costs. If the target of the law is an
officer who, let us suppose, stands a fifty percent chance of being
indemnified, 182 then for him the expected penalty falls to one-half Pf.
This outcome introduces unjustifiable distinctions between corporate
employees and others. And if Pf is the ideal level for deterrence, then
to reestablish that level, society has to make an adjustment that is
suboptimal. For example, society could increase the enforcement re-
sources enough to double the rate of detection and conviction, f. But
note that these increased expenditures represent the amount that so-
ciety would be willing to pay the parties not to indemnify, 8 3 which
179. Inefficiency would arise where the employee is more risk averse than the enter-
prise. See note 202 infra (discussing effect of different risk preferences on enterprise ac-
tivities).
180. Unlike insurance, however, indemnification does not provide a superior compensa-
tion fund: indemnification only repays the agent what the plaintiff was able to extract
from him, which would be limited by the defendant's wealth. Indeed, if there is a trade-
off of indemnification for wages, as suggested above, see p. 47 supra, then the effect, in
terms of compensating victims, may be perverse. An increased indemnification right will
imply lower wealth for the agent, thereby reducing his ability to compensate.
181. By contrast, the right of the parties to arrange reimbursement of agents for
legal expenses connected with unsuccessful defenses seems harder to fault, even though
these expenses are often more substantial than the fines the agents are likely to receive,
largely because the amounts so expended are not integral to the deterrence strategy. See
Bishop, New Problems in Indemnifying and Insuring Directors: Protection Against Lia-
bility Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1972 DuxE L.J. 1153, 1164 (1972).
182. Indemnification will not be certain due to inevitable problems of interpretation,
both of fact and of the controlling state code and the corporation's articles and by-laws.
183. Employee indemnification might also be opposed on distributive justice grounds
in order to protect investors. This position proceeds on the view that the "consent" of
investors to bear indemnification for grossly improper acts is too tenuous, considering the
manner in which investors, in purchasing securities, "agree" to indemnification arrange-
ments. See notes 33 & 177 sukra. For instances when statutory policies were held to pro-
hibit indemnification-although not of employees-see Professional Beauty Supply, Inc.
v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1182-87 (8th Cir. 1979) (pro-rata contribu-
tion but not indemnification allowed among joint antitrust tortfeasors); Globus v. Law
Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1283-89 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970)
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is, in turn, an index of the externality that the parties are imposing
on society by their indemnification agreement.
It is true that even the most lenient states still require an agent
seeking indemnification in such circumstances to demonstrate to the




that the actions were "in good faith," that they were undertaken in
the interest of, or at least not opposed to the interest of, the corpora-
tion, and that, where a crime was involved, the agent had no reason
to believe his conduct was unlawful. s5 But these conditions hardly
set the policy conflicts to rest. Consider the case of an officer who has
been convicted and fined for a federal offense that dispenses with
or strongly reduces proof of intent or knowledge. 8" If the executive
can be indemnified because he had no reason to believe his conduct
was unlawful, the enterprise is permitted, under cloak of state law,
to amend into the definition of the federal crime an element that
Congress chose to omit: knowledge of wrongdoing. Indeed, by pro-
viding that conviction "shall not, of itself, create a presumption that
the person did not act in good faith,"'187 such statutes introduce an
element that is essentially irrelevant. That an agent who violated the
Civil Rights Acts acted "in good faith" in furtherance of the corporate
interest should not be a ground for undoing the public's judgment-
evidenced through prosecutorial and judicial action-that he or she
bear the fine. Nor should the directors or shareholders be allowed in
effect to nullify the agent's penalty by a special vote, 8 for it was not
on their behalf that the liabilities were established.
The potential for abuse is almost certainly larger than appears at
first blush. We may suppose that if all indemnification agreements
had to conform to the standard statutory form, and if payments had
(issuer's agreement to indemnify underwriter for securities law violation unenforceable
because liability imposed on underwriter was designed primarily to deter negligence).
184. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(d) (1974); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§ 5(d) (1979).
185. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(b) (Supp. 1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a)
(1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 724(a) (McKinney 1963); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr
§ 5(a) (1979). N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 294:4 (IX) (1977) appears to be even less restrictive,
omitting the qualification.
186. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 665 n.9 (1975) (president of warehouse
company con,.icted of violating federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act under jury instruc-
tion that be need not have committed wrong consciously, or participated personally,
if jury found he occupied position of responsibility by virtue of his executive position).
187. CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(b) (Supp. 1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1974);
ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 5(a) (1979).
188. But see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-20(a)(3) (1975) (apparently allowing indemnification
even of criminal fine upon approval of majority of disinterested shares).
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to be passed upon by the state courts, the opportunities for under-
mining public policy would be restricted. 18 9 But two considerations
conspire to make these outcomes doubtful. First, under the approach
of Delaware and the Model Business Corporation Act, the statutory
conditions for paying indemnification are "nonexclusive."' 19° This
means that the parties can arrange their own more liberal terms,
lodged discreetly in the employment contract, if they choose, rather
than in the Articles or By-laws where they would be more visible.' 9'
Second, it is not the sentencing judge to whom the officer must apply
in order to secure an indemnity; rather, the officer's cause may be
argued, ex parte, in the law offices of "independent legal counsel."
"A lawyer," one commentator has observed, "no matter how ethical
or rugged, may find it difficult to deny indemnification to directors
who are responsible for his retainer.' '1 92 There are, furthermore, no
assurances under federal or state law that every payment under an
indemnification agreement will be reported to the court, prosecutor,
or shareholders. 93
Even in the face of such possibilities for abuse, a case can be made
against the federal government's intervening to restrict these private
arrangements. Two lines of argument are possible. The first is, per-
haps ironically, moral; the second is practical.
Viewed in its most favorable light, lenient indemnification can be
seen not as a blatant attempt to flout public morals, but as something
more nearly the opposite. In many instances, the wrongdoing execu-
tive's peers and lawyers probably consider themselves to be in a better
position than "outsiders" to judge what, in the total ethical context,
189. Presumably, indemnification would be kept within the bounds of insurance: no
coverage would be available for intentional wrongs. See I R. LONG, LAW OF LIABILITY
INSURANCE §§ 1.26-.27 (1969).
190. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(f) (1975); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 5(f)
(1979). However, "[n]o judicial precedent clearly indicates how far this provision allows
corporations to make indemnification payments not permitted under the other subsec-
tions of the statute." Bishop, Understanding D & 0 insurance policies, HARV. Bus. REv.,
Mar.-Apr. 1978, at 20, 22. For criticism of these provisions, see Cheek, Control of Cor-
porate Indemnification: A Proposed Statute, 22 VAND. L. REv. 255, 277 (1969); McAdams,
A Proposal to Amend the Indemnification Section (§ 5) of the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act, 31 Bus. LAw. 2123, 2140-41 (1976).
191. For companies subject to SEC reporting requirements, however, SEC Form 10
requires a statement of the "general effect of any charter provision, by-law, contract, ar-
rangement or statute under which indemnification is available." 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
f 23,106 (1975) (emphasis added). The New York Stock Exchange listing application re-
quires no comparable information. Id.
192. McAdams, supra note 190, at 2138.
193. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(d) (1975) (indemnification may be paid
simply upon approval by majority vote of quorum of disinterested directors); ABA-ALI
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 5(d) (1979) (same).
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was truly wrongful. Loosely restricted indemnification agreements pre-
serve, as an option, the power to correct for the law's having lodged
responsibility where, according to prevailing business community sen-
timent, it was "immoral" (or "stupid") to have put it. It is possible,
too, that lenient indemnification is part of a law-making dynamic that
is too complex to permit easy condemnation. Lawmakers, prompted
by public outcry to get tough on corporate crime, may implicitly rely
on indemnification to correct penalties they do not really believe in.
Professor Reisman has demonstrated in the context of anti-bribery
crusades that such a mode of accommodating diverse interests, and
leaving underlying practices unruffled, would hardly be unique.
194
But even if we assume that the final outcome is a body of practices
that do not strongly deviate from what the prevailing moral climate
is willing to allow, such byzantine law-making, in which the indem-
nification procedures of one state are counted on to temper the pro-
fessed zeal of the federal government and sister states, is not easy to
defend. It is better that lawmakers, prosecutors, and sentencing au-
thorities act responsibly in deciding what is, and what is not, a delict
for which the agent should be the final bearer of the risk. Once that
decision is made, after due consideration of the factors examined in
Cluster 1,19- it is in principle senseless to stand by and allow the en-
terprise participants, by agreement among themselves, to deflect the
collective judgment. 190
The availability of alternatives to indemnification presents a second
set of complications. Simply stated, because there are other devices
through which the enterprise can compensate agents for the risks of
adverse judgments, government action to limit indemnification will
increase pressure to readjust compensation in other ways. In light of
the alternatives, can restrictions on indemnification be effective?
The closest substitute for indemnification is directors' and officers'
liability insurance. The Model Business Corporation Act expressly em-
powers corporations to purchase such insurance for its agents "whether
or not the corporation would have the power to indemnify" them
under its already far-reaching indemnification provisions.19 7 But while
194. See W. REISMAN, FOLDED LiEs 15-36 (1979) (discussing existence of two different
codes of behavior in society: official, normative code ("myth system") and unofficial,
effective code ("operational code")).
195. See pp. 28-35 supra.
196. The current practice retains some sense insofar as the state's interests depend,
not on extracting a penalty from the agent, so much as on the ceremony of publicly
prosecuting and convicting him.
197. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr § 5(g); see CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(a)(i) (West
1977 & Supp. 1980) (same power); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (1974) (same).
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this provision seems to invite perniciously broad coverage, 19 in opera-
tion little abuse is likely. First, it is not the practice of insurers to
underwrite intentional wrongdoing or, probably, to underwrite crimi-
nal activity of any sort, intentional or not.199 And even if the parties
could purchase from the insurers a change of heart in regard to cov-
erage, there is a fairly well established body of state insurance law, in
contrast with the paucity of reported indemnification decisions, that
would preclude enforcement on public policy grounds.200 In further
contrast with indemnification, ambiguities about both the insurance
agreement's language and the claimant's conduct will be reviewed by
the insurer at arm's length, rather than by the claimant's peers, in-
vestors, or "independent counsel."
'2 1
The other ex ante alternative to indemnification is to increase the
agent's wages in compensation for his bearing the risks without re-
course. But an increase in wage, although able to substitute for in-
demnification with little effect on the level of ordinary negligence,
provides a less ready equivalent where the conduct is of a sort that
may incur fines and punitive damages. In this latter range of cases,
restricting indemnification is likely to curb misconduct rather than
merely yield a substituted wage level. Comparison of two legally haz-
ardous activities, both of which a firm might wish its agent to engage
in, will illustrate this point.
In the first example, the company wishes its employee to drive a
truckload of explosive materials, an activity that risks civil liability
but is not illegal; in the second, it wants him to meet with competitors
to fix prices, conduct that is subject to punitive sanctions. In the case
of the driver whose risk is civil liability, precluding indemnification
would do little to alter the conduct: the enterprise would provide
additional compensation and then monitor the driver's activities to
insure that he was attending to his risky but agreed-upon duties..2 02
198. See Letter from Wright Patman to Chairman of National Governors Conference
(Jan. 28, 1971), reprinted in Bishop, supra note 181, at 1160 n.34 (Model Business Corpora-
tion Act insurance provisions undermine essential safeguards of federal and state law).
199. See Johnston, Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Directors
and Officers, 33 Bus. LAW. 1993, 2019-20 (1978) (discussing prevailing "dishonesty exclu-
sion" clause in directors' and officers' insurance contracts).
200. See, e.g., Sheeham v. Gorinsky, 321 Mass. 200, 203, 72 N.E.2d 538, 541 (1947);
Messersmith v. American Fidelity Co., 232 N.Y. 161, 165, 133 N.E. 432, 433 (1921); 1 R.
LONG, suPra note 189, § 1.26, at 1-76, 1-78.
201. These further protections for public policy may explain why the SEC, while
opposing indemnification for securities law penalties, has never taken a stand against
insuring the same losses. Cf. Bishop, supra note 181, at 1165-66 (considering possible rea-
sons for SEC's position).
202. If the driver is more risk averse than the enterprise, and if both are equally
knowledgeable with respect to the risks and have equal control over outcomes, the ex
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By contrast, when the employee is asked to fix prices at the risk of
punishment beyond damages, adjustments involving ex ante compen-
sation and monitoring are more entangling. Even if the corporation
and agent could agree on a wage appropriate to the agent's risk of
nonindemnifiable liability-perhaps including a prison term-the cor-
poration would find it virtually impossible to hold the agent to the
task.20 3 The agreement presumably would be unwritten and unen-
forceable in law; in fact, the employee's performance could not be
monitored without increasing the risks of criminal fines and punitive
damages to the corporation and its superior agents. 20 4 Consider the
trail of evidence: "Memo to Jones: We note you failed to meet with
competitors on Thursday, as agreed."20
5
None of these limits on the substitutability of wage increases for
indemnification proves that there is no cost at which the enterprise,
if determined, could purchase the unlawful behavior. But it is some
comfort that the more such an enterprise is forced to expend for its in-
tentional wrongdoing, the more it is suffering one of the competitive
disadvantages that the criminal law seeks to impose: the expense be-
comes a sort of continuous fine.20 6 Hence, where penalizable conduct
ante payments (the wage increase) and monitoring will impose greater expenses than the
firm would bear if it could pay through indemnification, ex post. In these circumstances,
prohibiting indemnification will add some cost and, in conditions of competition, reduce
shipments and, consequently, explosions. The firm's reduction of its activity would not
necessarily be socially desirable, however, if the original decision to entrust accident re-
duction to general deterrence was correct. See McKean, Should Corporate Managers'
Liability for Third-Party Injuries Be Expanded? in THE ATTACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA
86-91 (M. Johnson ed. 1978).
203. There may be incentives for the firm to make such an agreement, see K. ELZINGA
& W. BREIT, supra note 109, at 133 (potentially huge rewards to be gained from anticom-
petitive behavior may induce firm to "bribe" its executives to violate laws), but it is less
clear how one would be constructed. Any such agreement would probably be less express
than implied by a mix of verbal and nonverbal signals in the context of a corporate "way
of life." See J. FULLER, THE GENTLEMEN CONSPIRATORS 58-59 (1962), (emphasizing capacity
of informal pressures and implied agreements to secure law violations); Bensman 8 Gerver,
Crime and Punishment in the Factory: The Function of Deviancy in Maintaining the
Social System, 28 Ams. Soc. REv. 588, 593-95 (1963) (example of foreman as source of con-
cealed pressure to commit wrongs).
204. A recent California case has even allowed an employee to sue in tort for being
fired because of refusal to participate in an illegal scheme to fix retail gasoline prices.
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
205. Of course, the corporation can check on the agent's performance in less incrimi-
nating fashion by monitoring output rather than by monitoring the means that the
servant was employing. But where it is difficult to correlate individual efforts with team
output, output monitoring would not be a satisfactory equivalent. For instance, at some
margin the principal does not wish to compensate increased sales, which may come
about for any number of reasons, but rather to compensate what it deems the most
effective means of increasing profits: transmitting illegal payments.
206. The analogy is loose, of course: unlike a true fine, the proceeds go not to the
state but to the wrongdoing agent in the form of extra compensation. Moreover, a true
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is involved, it would not be fruitless to restrict employee indemnifica-
tion, even in the face of the obvious ex ante alternatives.
The various ex post alternatives to indemnification, however, con-
stitute an independent obstacle. When the officers have been made
codefendants with the corporation, those in charge of the litigation
may plead the company guilty in exchange for a nolle prosequi or
charge reduction for the individuals.20 7 In a civil penalty suit, where
there is joint liability, the company has large discretion to contribute
the preponderant share of the judgment.208 Should these techniques
for deflecting the penalty from the agent prove inadequate, the com-
pany may award a penalty-compensating bonus, or a deferred or
retroactive raise. Even if the managers are forced publicly to fire the
wrongdoer, it may be possible to return him to the payroll as a "con-
sultant" when publicity has subsided.20 9
From one perspective, these ex post alternatives seem less pernicious
than the ex ante, if only because the latter provide the agent with
relatively certain advance assurances that reimbursement will be set
in motion, perhaps as a requirement under the employee's contract.210
fine may have greater impact on the firm than the wage increment because a fine is
exacted as a lump sum in a public setting.
The outcome of the wage adjustment for legal risk-taking is difficult to determine
because it depends on a number of complex factors. Obviously, if the risk being pur-
chased is one that makes incarceration of the agent a real possibility, the wage equiva-
lent will be difficult to establish and, in all events, costly. Furthermore, the enterprise
has a wide range of non-monetary forms of compensation available to reward risk-takers
without imposing equivalent costs on the enterprise. Such benefits include better oppor-
tunities for promotion, travel, relocation, and titles and other badges of prestige. On the
other hand, even the corporation's non-monetary treasury must have a bottom and be
subject to budgetary constraints. Non-monetary rewards are needed to induce lawful
conduct as well as to purchase agent risk-taking and cannot be distributed too lavishly
without diminishing their value. There is no such thing as a free corner office.
207. See note 119 supra (discussing practice).
208. In Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971),
the court found the company and three of its directors jointly and severally liable under
a securities law for filing a defective registration statement in connection with an ex-
change offer. The company then informed the court that it had decided to pay the
entire judgment and not to seek contribution from the directors. The SEC filed a brief
opposing this resolution as contrary to public policy. Bishop, supra note 181, at 1162.
The parties subsequently entered into a settlement by which each director contributed
$5,000 and the company the $331,500 balance.
209. In the wake of the foreign bribery scandal involving Gulf Oil Company, it was
discovered that the vice president in charge of the payments had "borrowed" $26,000
from a pool of employee contributions that he had administered in order to pay Gulf
$25,000 to release him from any claims against him. Later, publicly fired from the com-
pany, he was retained to "consult" for eight months. See Robertson, The Directors Woke
Up Too Late at Gulf, FORTUNE, June 1976, at 121, 209.
210. See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 5(c) (1979) (agent who successfully defends
action entitled to indemnification for reasonable expenses); Bishop, supra note 174, at
1081-84 (discussing change in Delaware statute to provide for mandatory indemnification
in certain circumstances).
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The availability of the ex post alternatives will always be more prob-
lematical, since the agent, forced to appeal for a discretionary judg-
ment, is less able to predict its outcome. It is one thing for the board
or top management to approve indemnification in the abstract, as
part of a general package, and quite another to approve a payment
after the fact, in a concrete case of delinquency, perhaps in the glare
of publicity. After the fact, the wrongdoer's peers or superiors may
decide to dissociate themselves from the actor and his deed.
On the other hand, the difficulties of policing the ex post payments
are at least as severe as monitoring the ex ante arrangements, for the
former offer no express provisions that can be discovered and chal-
lenged. Moreover, many covert ex post "indemnifications" will never
come to light, and successful challenges to those that do-often in the
form of derivative actions-are unlikely, given judicial reluctance to
second-guess business judgments as to questions of job performance.
211
Nevertheless, even if we are limited in how successfully we can ulti-
mately restrict the various alternatives, the stakes are large. Indemni-
fication and its surrogates have the power not only to undo the law's
judgments against executives who have been caught; they also lend
themselves to undermining prosecutorial efforts against others. In cases
of corporate wrongdoing, the successful prosecution of top manage-
ment often requires the testimony of lower- and middle-level man-
agers; yet the willingness of those managers to turn state's evidence
may be eroded by the promise that the company will take care of them,
provided they demonstrate their loyalties. Indeed, the value of a
prosecutor's grant of immunity is surely debased if the corporation,
through indemnification, can dole out something resembling an im-
munity on its own.
For these reasons, federal law should, and could, do more to pro-
tect the integrity of its judgments. Indemnity, whether direct or in-
direct, should be restricted by specific rules in the circumstances of
certain fines, penalties, exemplary damages under federal law, and per-
haps even some ordinary civil liabilities under federal statutes whose
policies are not fully realized by compensation of victims. 212 Such
211. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission refused to make civil penalties for non-
notification of hazards nonindemnifiable, in part because of "the serious practical diffi-
culty in attempting to differentiate between a properly awarded salary increase or bonus
and an improper reimbursement." 42 Fed. Reg. 28,892-93 & n.1 (1977).
212. Cf. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc.. 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970) (policy against indemnification for securities law judgment
designed to deter, not merely to compensate); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Village
of Hempstead, 48 N.Y.2d 218, 228, 397 N.E.2d 737, 744, 422 N.Y.S.2d 47, 53-54 (1979) (New
York public policy prohibits insurance coverage of punitive damages awarded against
municipal police officers in civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
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federal action could be accomplished either through legislation that
preempted the state rules generally, 213 or by specific rules attached to
designated penalties..2 14 Courts should also be encouraged to include
in their judgments, in appropriate circumstances, prohibitions on
direct and indirect indemnification of their judgments. No such mea-
sures can foreclose every ruse a firm can devise to take care of its
good soldiers. But we can do more at least to confound the efforts
of those who would undermine strongly felt public policies. 21 ;
B. The Employer's Indemnity
In many circumstances at common law, if the master suffers liability
in consequence of his servant's conduct, the master acquires a right
of indemnity against (or contribution from) the servant.2 1 6 One can
213. Cary, supra note 33, at 702, suggests a "minimum federal standard" for state-
authorized agent indemnification payments. He does not, however, make the distinction
emphasized here between indemnifying agents for liabilities to third parties incurred in
violation of strongly felt policies, where the case for restrictions seems strong, and in-
demnifying them for liabilities when investors alone are affected, where, under the ap-
proach of Winter, supra note 33, the arguments seem considerably weaker. S. 1722, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2202(e) (1979) provides that "[ilf a fine is imposed on an agent . . . of
an organization, the fine shall not be paid, directly or indirectly, out of the assets of
the organization," which seems to propose such a pre-empting limitation. The accompany-
ing report, however, although commenting on language of an earlier draft, indicates
an intention to defer to existing state law, see S. REP. No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 977
(1980), which is by no means as restrictive as the proposal, see pp. 49-50 supra.
214. Congress has expressly prohibited indemnification in the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b)(4)
(Supp. III 1979)). Federal agencies presumably have authority to reach like results through
administrative action. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission recently considered, but re-
jected by a 2-1 vote pending further findings, a provision that the penalty for executives
who fail to transmit information on certain defects to the NRC, see 10 C.F.R. § 21.21(b)-(c)
(1980), be made nonindemnifiable, 42 Fed. Reg. 28,892-93 (1977).
Presumably, too, a court could provide in its final judgment that attempts to indem-
nify against its sanctions would constitute contempt of court. A federal court has power to
protect the integrity of its judgments even against acts by those not party to the judg-
ment. See United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261, 264-68 (5th Cir. 1972). Such an approach
could be a particularly effective way to avoid circumvention by the ex post devices, such
as "bonuses." See p. 54 supra.
215. For example, federal law could require a corporation seeking to indemnify an
agent to give prior notice to the trial court or administrative law judge and to the ap-
propriate prosecuting authority. The court could have power to enjoin the payment if
it appeared that, under the circumstances, the policies underlying the law would be
defeated. There could also be requirements that all indemnifications, including amounts
spent, be reported to the shareholders and that the role of "independent legal counsel"
be more restricted, if not eliminated. See McAdams, supra note 190, at 2139-40 (proposing
amendment to Model Business Corporation Act providing written notice of indemnifica-
tion to shareholders and limiting role of independent counsel).
216. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 401, Comment d (1957) (principal may
recover from agent for any liability arising out of agent's unauthorized negligence or
other wrongful act). The grounds for indemnification should be compared with those
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imagine a master, apprehensive of liabilities beyond those that will
yield him a common-law recovery against the servant, providing spe-
cially for a more extensive indemnity in the employment contract.
In practice, however, there is little evidence that corporate masters
favor exercise either of the common-law right or of special provisions
in the contract. The greater the prospective liability that the em-
ployee's conduct could cause the company, the more the company
would have to give up in compensation to persuade the agent to
shoulder the risks personally. Moreover, the liabilities that agents can
cause their corporations run so high today that it is unlikely that the
company could, even if successful in suit, collect on many judgments.
As a result, in the absence of an empirical survey of lawsuits or con-
tracts, we can conjecture that monitoring, together with the implicit
threat of disciplinary action and termination, dominates the employer's
indemnity as the way for firms to protect themselves from their agent's
foibles.
The over-arching question of this subsection, however, is not what
arrangements generally prevail in the employer's indemnity area, but
whether there is a basis for overriding any particular investor-manager
preferences in order to advance third-party and public interests. The
issue tends to arise in the following manner. A firm has been subjected
to criminal and civil suits for price-fixing. Subsequently, a shareholder
brings a derivative action seeking to force various of its agents-ordi-
narily directors and high-level managers-to indemnify the company
for losses that the firm has suffered in fines, civil damages, and costs
of suit. The plaintiff may allege either that the defendants actively
participated in the offense 217 or that their failure to have discovered
and terminated the wrongdoing constituted a breach of the fiduciary
for contribution, which are specified by various state statutes. See UNIFORNI CONTRIBUTION
ANIONG ToRTFEAsoRs Acr (Commissioners' Prefatory Note (1955 Revision)) (noting sev-
eral different state statutes); W. PROSSER, supra note 71, § 50, at 307-10. At the federal
level, in cases of joint violation of federal securities laws, contribution has been permitted
because it promotes "the policy of deterrence behind the securities laws by discouraging
corporations from assisting in [their] violation." Rice v. McDonnell & Co., 442 F. Supp.
952, 954-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). This policy apparently supports contribution but not in-
demnification. See Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 954-58 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (indemnification for violation of securities laws with scienter requirement imper-
missible, but contribution on basis of third party's knowing use of defendant's false fig-
ures permissible).
217. Cf. Blake, The Shareholder's Role in Antitrust Enforcement, 110 U. PA. L. REv.
143, 157-58 (1961) (director's participation in antitrust violation may ease problems of
proof for plaintiff); Forte, Liabilities of Corporate Officers for Violation of Fiduciary
Duties Concerning the Antitrust Laws, 40 IND. L.J. 313, 319-21 (1965) (discussing mal-
feasance by director resulting in antitrust violation as basis for derivative suit).
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duty to supervise and manage with due care.2 18 Assuming no express
indemnity provisions in the agents' contracts, the success of the suit
will turn upon a whole matrix of fiduciary rules under the state law:
whether the illegal contracts are judged ultra vires (and with what
consequences); 219 whether, and in what measure, the business judg-
ment rule will limit judicial scrutiny; 220 whether defendants can suc-
cessfully interpose their reliance on reports and opinions furnished
them;221 whether a group of disinterested directors or shareholders
can foreclose or settle corporate claims; 222 and whether, in the calcula-
tions of losses, any ill-gotten gains that the firm received will offset
the amounts suffered in penalties and damages.2 2 8 All these variables
218. See Forte, supra note 217, at 319-29 (discussing causes of action based on malfeas-
ance and negligence). The duty of due care is typically described as "the same degree
of fidelity and care as an ordinarily prudent man would exercise in the management of
his own affairs of like magnitude and importance." H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 234, at 455 (2d ed. 1970); see id. at 454-55 (quoting similar standards and
citing cases).
219. The important questions in this regard are whether the ultra vires conduct con-
stitutes negligence per se, compare Adams v. Smith, 275 Ala. 142, 145-47, 153 So. 2d 221,
223-25 (1963) (directors absolutely liable for ultra vires act) with Litwin v. Allen, 25
N.Y.S.2d 667, 699 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (directors not absolutely liable for ultra vires act if they
acted honestly, diligently, and without violating statute), or whether it shifts the burden
of proof. Ultra vires conduct may also be nonratifiable. See 13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5964 (rev. perm. ed. 1980) (ultra vires acts one
category of nonratifiable deeds).
220. The business judgment rule saves directors and officers from liability for virtually
any decision provided it is in good faith and within their authority. See H. HENN, suPra
note 218, § 242. Some confusion has arisen, however, over when and how the rule ap-
plies. See Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HoFsTRA L. REv. 93, 100-11
(1979) (discussing conflicting applications of rule).
221. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(b), (c) (West 1977) (in performing duties, di-
rector entitled to rely on information provided by certain competent people); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (1974) (same); ABA-ALI MODEL BUS. CORP. Aar § 35 (1979) (same).
See generally Hawes & Sherrard, Reliance on Advice of Counsel as a Defense in Corporate
and Securities Cases, 62 VA. L. REv. 1 (1976).
222. The capacity of disinterested directors to foreclose litigation in their "business
judgment" has been upheld repeatedly. See, e.g., Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854, 858-59
(7th Cir. 1957); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 514-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). But see
Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1256-62 (Del. Ch. 1980) (independent committee of
directors cannot secure dismissal of shareholder's suit on business grounds when suit
seeks redress for breach of fiduciary duty); Groel v. United Elec. Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 616,
622-24, 61 A. 1061, 1064-65 (Ch. 1905) (directors' decision that derivative suit would be
unsuccessful inadequate to bar suit).
The general requirement that demand be made on the other shareholders as a condition
precedent for the bringing of a derivative suit may be lifted in some circumstances, such
as where the act complained of is deemed illegal, ultra vires, or otherwise "unratifiable."
13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 219, §§ 5964-65; see note 231 infra (discussing ratifiability).
For a criticism of corporations' use of special litigation committees to preclude derivative
actions, see Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65
CORNELL L. REv. 600, 617-29 (1980).
223. See Smiles v. Elfred, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1963, at 14, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.) (dismissing
derivative action for insufficient allegation of damages to corporation; complaint left
open possibility that corporation "may have gained more from the price-fixing conspiracy
than the amounts of the fine paid and the expenditures . . . incurred").
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inevitably influence the quality and direction of managerial efforts
to steer the corporation clear of acts that injure others. Hence the
principal interventionist question: should this potential to benefit
noncontracting interests be deliberately emphasized at some sacrifice
of investor-manager preferences? 24
Two disparate legal styles are indicated. If we adopt what I call the
true fiduciary style, the answer is no.225 In this view, the plaintiff's
case will be treated like any other charge of economic loss resulting
from the defendant's breach of fiduciary duty.2 26 The matrix of fidu-
ciary rules will be construed to shift the judgment onto the agent only
if the agent's misconduct was so clumsy or egregious that, as a mat-
ter of interpreting the fiduciary relationship, it cannot be deemed
within the performance bargained for.227 The outcome, in other words,
will be consistent with enterprise liability as we have been using the
term: the investors and managers will distribute losses solely accord-
ing to their own benefit,228 without consideration of externalities.
In contrast with the true fiduciary style is the interventionist style.
Under this alternative, the fiduciary variables are conscripted into
nonfiduciary service. That is, the standard of care, the right to rely,
and so forth, are subjected to special constraints aimed at diverting
224. As a subordinate interventionist question, one could consider whether there is
any imbalance in bargaining power between corporation and agent that justifies inter-
vention to prevent the enterprise from shifting onto the agent liabilities beyond those
the agent should fairly bear. The need for such intervention on the agent's behalf seems
highly doubtful.
225. At an extreme of this style, the court would uphold a by-law or other agreement
by which the corporation agrees not to recover against an agent even when the loss he
brings about constitutes a crime against the corporation.
226. I assume that the alleged breach of the fiduciary duty of care is not complicated
by elements of self-dealing, which would introduce slightly different rules and consid-
erations.
227. Just as the states have different corporations codes, so they have different fidu-
ciary rules, which derive in some key elements from the respective codes and in some ways
from variations in common law rules. Cf. Geller v. Transamerica Corp., 53 F. Supp. 625,
629-30 8: n.7 (D. Del. 1943), aff'd per curiam, 151 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1945) (application of
Delaware conflicts rule to facts avoids problem of dealing with different fiduciary doc-
trines from different jurisdictions).
228. Should a derivative suit arise from a bribery scheme, for example, a court ori-
ented to the true fiduciary style might consider the sum of the payments, the value of the
business they purportedly secured, the probability that the business in question would
have gone elsewhere if the payments had not been made, the expected penalties to the
firm if the practices had been detected, and the cost to the firm of various monitoring
systems that would have been capable of detecting them. Moerover, even if a defendant's
business judgment was erroneous, the business judgment rule provides a strong presump-
tion of liability. This presumption reflects the general sentiment of investors that the
gains they would realize from higher standards of vigilance would be offset by higher
compensation demands if courts imposed on agents a harsher liability rule. Cf. Coffee,
supra note 84, at 1230-31 (relaxation of fiduciary standards for outside directors may
encourage more careful examination of corporate affairs).
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 90: 1, 1980
managerial efforts along lines that the investors and managers would
not otherwise select, but that are imposed over their negotiations in
order to advance external interests.
If we look at the cases, the true fiduciary style appears to prevail in
most of the decisions;2 29 interventionist, public policy concerns seem
to dominate others.23 0 But because the distinction between these two
styles has not been clearly marked, many decisions appear hybrid. The
court supports plaintiff's position, but is ambiguous whether the basis
is public policy, as such, or whether the defendant's unlawful con-
duct was beyond the authority "bargained for" and therefore action-
able under the "true fiduciary" rationale.
2 31
Without att.empting any more definitive statement of where present
law stands, other than to remark this ambivalence between the styles,
let us return to the underlying policy question: Does it make sense
229. A good example is Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d
125 (Sup. Ct. 1963). There, a shareholder sued derivatively to recover from officers and
directors for losses, including fines and punitive damages, occasioned by price-fixing.
Plaintiff alleged that defendants' failure to exercise the required review of company
affairs was particularly inexcusable because the company had been operating subject to
a consent decree based on settlement of prior price-fixing allegations. The Delaware
court held for defendants, however, on the grounds that "directors are entitled to rely
on the honesty and integrity of their subordinates until something occurs to put them
on suspicion that something is wrong." Id. at 83, 188 A.2d at 130. In view of the size of
the company, the court deemed it "not practicable for the Board to consider in detail
specific problems of the various divisions." Id. at 82, 188 A.2d at 128. Other examples
are Smiles v. Elfred, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1963, at 14, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.), and Hornstein v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 22 Misc. 2d 996, 37 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd mem.,
266 A.D. 659, 41 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1943), aff'd Per curiam, 292 N.Y. 468, 55 N.E.2d 740 (1944).
In Smiles, a derivative action was dismissed for failure to plead actual damage to the
corporation, even though the corporation's antitrust violation and fine represented ob-
vious externality problems. In Hornstein, a derivative action to force officers to reimburse
"payoffs" they had made to labor racketeers under the threat of crippling strikes was
dismissed. Corporations, -the court said, do not "owe a duty to the public to protect
racketeering at their own expense." 22 Misc. 2d at 1006, 37 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
230. A relatively pure-and rare-expression of the interventionist style is Roth v.
Robertson, 65 Misc. 343, 346, 118 N.Y.S. 351, 353 (Sup. Ct. 1909) (public policy reasons
require directors to be accountable for "hush money" payments made, even though
such payments not clearly illegal). Cf. Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759,
762-63 (3d Cir. 1974) (business judgment rule protected directors from liability under
common law for noncollection of debt but would not protect them if noncollection was
breach of federal campaign law).
231. This hybrid style seems to characterize holdings that a plaintiff instituting a
derivative action based on alleged criminal law violations or "fraud" is exempt from the
ordinary requirement to make a demand on other shareholders. Such cases typically
leave unclear whether the conduct was "nonratifiable" because it violated public policy
or because it violated the investment contract. See Rogers v. American Can Co., 305 F.2d
297, 309, 317 (3d Cir. 1962) (vote by majority of shareholders against bringing suit no
bar to dissenting shareholder's suit on antitrust charges "which are ultra vires the cor-
poration and are public wrongs"); Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194, 197
(2d Cir. 1959) (no demand on shareholders necessary because complaint alleges illegal acts);
Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 16-19, 99 N.E. 138, 141-42 (1912) (failure of
defendant to make prior demand no bar to suit based on directors' acts prohibited by
law or against public policy).
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to conscript the fiduciary matrix into nonfiduciary service, overriding
investor-manager preferences in such a way as to yield outcomes more
supportive of noninvestor interests?
232
There are several reasons to doubt the wisdom of that conscription.
Using the fiduciary mechanisms in this way amounts to constituting
the company's shareholders as private attorneys general. But the fidu-
ciary context presents a peculiar skewing of normal "attorney-general"
incentives. If an illegality-price-fixing, for example-is never discov-
ered and succeeds in raising profits, the shareholders will benefit; if,
on the other hand, the company is prosecuted and suffers losses, the
derivative action promises to make the investors whole, notwithstand-
ing the losses. The implication is that our potential attorneys general
-the investors-will be relatively indifferent 23 3 to their agents' efforts
to turn a shady dollar on their behalf, and therefore not particularly
zealous monitors of misconduct. This peculiar weakness does not, in
itself, moot the question of whether to conscript the fiduciary mech-
anisms into noninvestor service. As a practical matter, no one really
supposes that the investors of a giant, publicly held company can
feasibly keep their agents under close surveillance. 234 The argument
remains, moreover, that fostering the indemnity action in this con-
text simply provides an additional source of discipline of management
misconduct, one that reaps no revenues for the public coffers, but
at least needs no public funds to implement it.23
5
232. Fiduciary mechanisms and agencies seem occasionally to be conscripted into non-
fiduciary service, in that investor benefit may be sacrificed to advance noninvestor pol-
icies. For example, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (Supp. III 1979),
forces companies to maintain internal audit controls to prevent the payment of bribes
in a manner that may reduce sales and increase corporate legal liabilities. Cf. Note, The
Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Alternative Perspective
on SEC Intervention in Corporate Governance, 89 YALE L.J. 1573 (1980) (criticizing SEC
regulations as intrusion into corporate affairs unwarranted by FCPA). If these controls
were truly in the investors' interests, one suspects that market forces would have done
more to encourage their adoption.
233. The relative indifference arises because the corporation's prospective recovery is
reduced by plaintiff's counsel fees and other costs of suit and limited by the miscreant
executive's capacity to make good on a judgment.
234. Melvin Eisenberg, from an examination of shareholding patterns in public cor-
porations, suggests that there is more effective shareholder control over selection of man-
agement and changes in organic structure than has commonly been assumed. M. EISENBERG,
THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 37-64 (1976). But however successfully shareholders
may exercise voting power, they certainly lack a comparable ability to scrutinize corporate
affairs for evidence of concealed wrongdoing.
235. This argument is, of course, a traditional justification for implied causes of action.
See, e.g., J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (upholding private cause of
action to enforce liabilities for violation of § 14(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as
necessary supplement to SEC regulation). Judicial implication of a private cause of action
may turn on whether the investors or corporation can be construed to lie within the zone
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The more complicated questions concern the feasibility of alterna-
tives and the implications of the various morality and efficiency con-
siderations that we have already examined. Our principal objection
to the employee's indemnity was that it blunts criminal fines and
punitive damages levied against agents. By contrast, whatever arrange-
ments the parties make for the employer to pursue its recourses against
a miscreant agent, society's ordinary powers to sanction the agent di-
rectly remain unaffected. Hence, from the perspective of controlling
agents, society's stake in the employer's indemnity is not crucial.
From the perspective of controlling the corporation, however, le-
nient employer's indemnity could be viewed as warily as lenient em-
ployee's indemnity, on much the same grounds.230 This can be illus-
trated by considering the case where the enterprise has incurred a fine
or a penalty awarded in a suit prosecuted under the direction of a pub-
lic authority. If we assume that the initial allocation of penalties was
ideal to realize society's goals of deterrence and retribution, then any
shift of the losses onto the agent, even by contract between agent and
enterprise, would seem as inappropriate as a shift in the converse
direction. The prosecutor, the judge, and the other representatives of
the system should direct the law's penalties with care, and then do
what is possible to insure that they are not redistributed.
23 7
When we turn from penalties to consequent damages, the consider-
ations are even more complex. Suppose that the agent's conduct incurs
a fine or penalty, and, as a consequence of the same conduct, the
employer is sued for civil damages. The enterprise may want the
agent to indemnify it, not for the amount of a publicly collected en-
terprise penalty, but for ordinary or perhaps even punitive damages
of persons the statute was intended to protect. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677, 689-90 (1979); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). And the question
whether someone-the corporation, or the investor-is within or without the zone is ob-
viously a flexible enough standard to allow results that are, at the least, "hybrid," as I
have used the term. Compare Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 80-82 (1974) (shareholders not
within class for whose especial benefit statute limiting corporate campaign contributions
was enacted) with Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1974)
(fact that shareholders within class for whose protection same statute was enacted gives
force to argument that alleged violation of statute should give rise to derivative cause
of action under state law).
236. See pp. 48-49 supra.
237. If the employer is determined to retaliate against offending employees, remov-
ing the indemnity action from the employer's arsenal will not eliminate all opportunity
to do so. The errant agent can be discharged, demoted, passed over, or ostracized, in
ways that are at least as difficult to police as are the alternatives that the employer and
employee may arrange in response to rules restricting employee indemnification. Never-
theless, while devices such as firing can be used to discipline an employee whom society
may deem "innocent," they do not replicate the employer's indemnity action. In non-
indemnity disciplinary acts, the employer is not reimbursed, and thus there is no reallo-
cation of burdens imposed by the state.
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that the enterprise suffered in a suit controlled by an ordinary citizen.
The questions raised here are highly significant because these conse-
quent damages, which an enterprise may suffer as a result of agent
misconduct, are often far more severe than the public penalties that
stem from the same behavior. In this context, however, it is not as
easy to argue, in opposition to the employer's indemnity, that the
original distribution of losses onto the enterprise reflected a precise
targeting dictated by public policy. Thus, for these potentially more
critical liabilities, there is stronger reason to permit employer indem-
nification. Indeed, it is easy to argue that public policy forbids any
agreement to the contrary, which would amount to one party-here,
the employer-forbearing recovery of damages suffered in consequence
of the other party's crime.238 And it is certainly plausible that, as a
means of strengthening law enforcement against agents, the law might
go even further and shift the matrix in favor of recovery.
While there are theoretical warrants for all three positions-permit-
ting, forbidding, and fostering the employer's indemnity in the con-
text of consequent damages-as a practical matter, only the third
presents a genuine law-reform issue. My own inclination is that the
law generally should leave the resolution to the parties, and that the
courts should not be over-eager on "policy grounds" to read an inten-
tion to provide such an indemnity in the fiduciary rules and employ-
ment agreements. My concern is not merely that consequent damages
are potentially draconian, and that in the indemnity action, the man-
agers face them as fiduciaries without the procedural advantages they
would have enjoyed as defendants in a criminal suit. The resulting
exposure is broad and vicarious, ill-defined, and often unconnected
with reasonable expectations of managerial control. Such exposure is
not only morally questionable; it is also destined to induce the whole
range of unwanted efficiency responses that we examined in Cluster 1.
Managers will be excessively cautious and will seek salaries dispropor-
tionate to their economic service, and perverse substitution of labor
will occur ("good people won't serve on boards"), all without insuring
noticeable improvement in corporate law obedience.239 Worse, the
238. This argument is a slight variation on the principle that "a bargain to save the
promisee harmless from the consequences of an act which is necessarily unlawful is . . .
invalid." 15 S. WLLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRAcrs § 1749A, at 131 (3d ed.
1972).
239. See Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Director's Liability for Negligence, 1972
DuKE L.J. 895, 904. Conard recommends several alternatives to full employer indemnifi-
cation, including limiting director liability for negligence to the director's net after-tax
income from the corporation for the year in which one or more violations of duty oc-
curred. See id. at 914.
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entire atmosphere, so imbued with the threat of suit and harassment,
undermines the capacity of the directors and top management to at-
tend to their principal responsibility, the firm's general economic
health. It may even produce internal organizational responses that
are self-defeating. Subordinates, for example, may be induced to shield
their superiors from liability by withholding some of the very data
that the society most wishes those in authority to receive and to do
something about.
2 40
To accommodate these diverse policies and considerations, some
federal intervention in this context may be appropriate; it should, how-
ever, be circumscribed narrowly. When the employee is alleged to
have been guilty of personal criminal misconduct under federal law,
and the employer, having suffered consequent damages, sues for in-
demnity, specific federal standards could override some of the private
state-authorized provisions24 1 of the employer's liability action matrix.
For example, the otherwise prevailing requirement to exercise "due
care" and to rely on corporate books, records, and so on,242 should
be partially preempted by federal standards designed to preserve some
accounting for the federal interests that are involved. Thus, a federal
"after due inquiry, in the circumstances" might be glossed onto the
state "due care."
243
Even when the allegations rest merely on the defendants' negligence
in having allowed the misconduct of others, and not on any personal
participation in the wrongdoing, some federal intervention might still
be appropriate. Consider, for example, a company that has been subject
to a federal consent decree in circumstances that should constitute
constructive notice to the officers and in which the cost of compliance
240. See C. STONE, supra note 13, at 147.
241. See note 33 supra (recommendations of Professor Cary). Federal law generally con-
trols, of course, but state law is not pre-empted easily. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471,
477-80 (1979) (where cause of action against fiduciaries implied under federal statute, state
laws not to be displaced if consistent with federal policies).
242. See note 218 supra (citing discussion of due care); CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West
1977) (defining duty); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 717 (McKinney 1963) (same). The examples
of law reform suggested would have limited application in indemnity actions based on
defendant's culpability for delicts requiring actual knowledge. They would, however,
affect the outcome whenever constructive knowledge or negligence was in issue.
243. Professor Coffee recommends a similar reform. The "net loss" rule, which requires
plaintiff to allege that losses of corporate wrongdoing exceeded gains, see Smiles v. Elfred,
N.Y.LJ., Feb. 20, 1963, at 14, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.) (requiring "net loss" to sustain derivative
action), should be modified, Coffee believes, by a presumption that wrongdoing harmed
the corporation. Coffee, supra note 84, at 1180. The presumption would serve "at least
[as] a useful legal fiction to increase the level of deterrence" by making recoveries more
likely. Id.
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(public and private) can be significantly reduced if top management
lends even marginal efforts in support. In a subsequent indemnity
action alleging corporate damages in consequence of an indifferent
internal compliance response, federal constraints on indemnification
comparable to those applicable in cases of intentional wrongdoing
might be in order.
244
Modifying the fiduciary matrix with such federal standards, nar-
rowly and prudently drawn, could restrict misconduct without un-
duly diverting the investor-oriented efforts of managers, and without
extending their exposure beyond those instances when their indiffer-
ence to federal law was, in ordinary understanding, "blameworthy."
As a compromise, a ceiling could be placed on the recovery allowable
from any officer, perhaps tied to his or her salary.245 There would
be, it is true, a double cost to the investors-suboptimal incentives
for managers to police firm conduct and, for this dubious privilege,
the need to bear the costs of suit. Nonetheless, to the extent that the
investors would be the beneficiaries of a successful disciplinary judg-
ment, their losses would be cut.
IV. Cluster 3: The Investor and the Corporation: Limited Liability
Among the many relationships struck between the investors and
the corporation, several affect noninvestor interests in a manner that
raises issues of interventionism. Even the information they agree to
pass between themselves can be an object of interventionist concern;
witness the periodic proposals that corporations should disclose to their
shareholders (and, hence, put on public view) items about their social
behavior beyond what most shareholders probably want to be told.246
244. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 83, 188 A.2d 125, 129
(Sup. Ct. 1963) (indicating casual manner in which defendant executives claimed to have
learned of and evaluated prior consent decrees under which company was operating).
245. See Conard, supra note 239, at 914 (recommending that director's negligence li-
ability be limited to percentage of net after-tax income from corporation for year of
violation).
246. See R. NADER, Al. GREEN, & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 62-71,
140-57 (1976) (proposing federal chartering of large corporations and conditioning charters
on continuous disclosure of steps taken to comply with various regulations). The SEC has
moved gradually toward requiring similar disclosure. See Securities Act Release No. 5704,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 12414, 41 Fed. Reg. 21,632 (1976) (adopting rules re-
quiring same disclosure concerning compliance with environmental regulations, but re-
jecting proposed broader disclosure requirements).
Of course, investors want a certain amount of information about contingent liabilities
and potential loss of good will-bad publicity, for example, occasioned by activities such
as environmental despoliation-just as they desire information reflecting any contingencies
that will affect profits. For this reason, under the pressures of capital market competition,
good accounting practices should tend to place in the hands of investors whatever infor-
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There is a comparable interventionist flavor to the increasing number
of SEC actions and shareholder suits prosecuted by public interest
law firms. Despite the form of the action, these suits appear intended
to bend the investor-corporation relationships in order to advance
a larger public interest, such as preventing bribery, even if it involves
some sacrifice of investor welfare.2 47 But the most significant inter-
ventionist questions that arise from this cluster of relations concern
the limits upon the investor's personal liability for the undischarged
debts of the corporation.
2 48
To understand the significance of these liability limits, we must
place them in the context of general principles of agency. Although
corporations have become increasingly accountable for a broadening
mation market interests warrant, considering the costs of supplying such information.
Conceivably, then, proposals to force more disclosures are investor oriented, grounded
in the notion that there are market failures in the supply of information that need to
be corrected.
If, however, such proposals contain implicit "public policy" goals and require dissemi-
nation of information over and above the margin that investors would pay for, the
issues raised are more complex. It is highly questionable whether investors, the group
that receives the information, have the desire or ability to influence management to
achieve nonprofit goals, particularly at the sacrifice of profits. If the companies are sen-
sitive to extra-legal and perhaps extra-market pressures, one imagines that the most
effective agent for change will vary depending upon the character of the action required.
Environmental action groups will exert the most pressure in cases of environmental in-
formation, and various religious and racial minority groups will do so in instances of
racial discrimination. Why, then, conscript the information machinery that has been de-
signed for the benefit of investors? One answer is that reform occurs through public
embarrassment, and that there is some virtue in making executives themselves learn facts
that they would rather ignore. Moreover, because there are already procedures for pre-
paring and disseminating investor reports-and because noninvestor pressure groups have
access to them-the incremental costs of disclosing this sort of social performance data
are low if the data are combined with the investor information. Thus, the use of the
investor information channels for the benefit of noninvestors is not an idea that can
be rejected out of hand, if the case can be made that the social benefits of such informa-
tion exceed its costs-an argument not dealt with here.
247. One example is SEC v. Allied Chemical Corp., No. 77-0373 (D.D.C., filed Mar. 4,
1977), filed in the wake of the Kepone episode, see note 269 infra, which was settled upon
agreement that Allied's board of directors maintain and review policies, practices and
procedures affecting the risk of environmental damage. All this was done in a context
that suggested that the protection of investors was the principal aim. It is at least as plau-
sible, however, that the SEC was achieving a form of structural relief that sacrificed in-
vestor welfare, and that might more appropriately have been achieved and policed by
the Environmental Protection Agency. Another example appears in Goldman v. Northrop
Corp., 603 F.2d 106, 107-09 (9th Cir. 1979) (discussing Springer v. Jones, unreported share-
holder derivative suit charging that political contributions by Northrop violated federal
law and constituted fraud; suit settled when Northrop agreed to restructure board of
directors and other decisionmaking bodies).
248. The burden no longer falls on the shareholders to arrange limited liability by
making a special provision in the charter, as was once required. See Handlin & Handlin,
Origins of the American Business Corporation, 5 J. ECON. HIsr. 1, 9-10 & n.46 (1945). Under
modern general incorporation codes, the choice to operate subject to limited liability
comes into play when the investors agree to incorporate-or to invest in a limited liability
partnership-rather than in some alternative form of business organization.
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range of their agents' acts in furtherance of the corporation's interests
-even if in disregard of the corporation's instructions-the liability
connections between the corporation and the shareholders, in many
respects also one of agent to principal,249 have not evolved in parallel
fashion. We might as plausibly consider corporate wrongs to have
been done in furtherance of the shareholders' interests. But assuming
that the shareholders have not participated directly in the liability-
creating acts, 250 they are, as a rule, only secondarily liable as guarantors
of unsatisfied corporate debts, and even then only under conditions
somewhat more stringent (and vague)251 than are required to hold
an ordinary master liable for his servant's acts.2 5 2 The principal in-
terventionist question in this section is whether we ought to intervene
to alter this preferred position of the shareholder.
Let me stress that I am not questioning here the appropriateness
of these special liability limits in protecting the investor from the
corporation's undischarged debts to voluntary creditors, but rather
from the debts that stem from dealings with noncontracting parties
249. See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FINANCIAL EcON. 305 (1976) (examining firm structure as
response, in part, to dynamics of principal-agent relationship). The principal-agent model
is not, however, a perfect fit: for example, unlike the ordinary principal, the shareholders
cannot discharge their agents (here, the directors) at will. See Automatic Self-Cleansing
Filter Syndicate Co. v. Cuninghame, [1906] 2 Ch. 34.
250. A shareholder who participates in liability-creating acts may be held individually
liable for the consequences of such acts. See Redmond v. United States, 8 F.2d 24 (Ist
Cir. 1925) (individual criminal liability for mail fraud of corporation); Georgia Portland
Cement Corp. v. Harris, 178 Ga. 301, 173 S.E. 105 (1934) (individual liability for stock
fraud); 13A W. FLETCHER, supra note 219, § 6214 (rev. ed. 1961) (general rule of indi-
vidual liability).
251. The general rule is that "a corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity ...
until sufficient reason to the contrary appears; but, when the notion of legal entity is
used to defeat public convenience, justify a wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the
law will regard the corporation as an association of persons." I W. FLETCHER, supra note
219, § 41 (rev. perm. ed. 1974).
252. Judge Cardozo observed that "[d]ominion may be so complete, interference so
obtrusive, that by the general rules of agency the parent [shareholder] will be a prin-
cipal and the subsidiary [corporation] an agent" for purposes of tort liability. Berkey v.
Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 95, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926). But it is clear from the cases
that the dominion and interference required to establish the master's liability, where
the wrongdoing servant is a corporation and where the master is its investors, are greater
than in the ordinary agency. Surely corporate investors, unlike masters, are not presumed
subject to liability for the corporation's wrongs, committed while the firm is acting in
the scope of its employment. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14M (1957) ("[a]
corporation does not- become an agent of another corporation merely because a majority
of its voting shares is held by the other.") How well the limited liability cases fit into
ordinary agency doctrine is unclear because the Restatement defines master and servant
in terms of "the right to control ... the performance of the service," id. § 2(l). As to how
the shareholder's right to control compares with that of other masters, see Automatic
Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. v. Cuninghame, [1906] 2 Ch. 34 (simple majority of
shareholders cannot control and discharge directors freely but must abide by articles of
association).
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and, in particular, from judgments incurred for delicts. The dis-
tinction, for the present analysis, is critical in theory if not always
crisp in practice.258 Voluntary creditors can account for the added
risks of nonpayment by adjusting their demands-requiring, for ex-
ample, security, personal cosignatures, or higher interest terms. 2 4 By
contrast, noncontracting parties generally cannot adjust so readily to
the prospect that their claims will go unsatisfied.
When creditors are not protected by contract, these restrictions on
investor liability, whatever their justifications when contract creditors
are concerned, come into conflict with at least two legal ideals. First,
they undermine the compensation of victims. Second, they make, at
worst, a mockery of deterrence,255 for they raise the possibility that
those who stand behind an enterprise can disregard in their calcula-
tions any levels of penalty beyond the firm's capacity to pay.2 56 In
effect, the law appears to use these liability limits for the benefit of
a select group of social actors,2 57 thwarting with one hand the control
strategies that it is legislating with the other.
253. No hard and fast line can be drawn between voluntary and involuntary cred-
itors so far as negotiating costs between a corporation and a creditor are concerned. Some
contract creditors, such as trade creditors, are as unlikely to examine the character of
the enterprise they are dealing with as the person whom the enterprise injures in a
tort. On the other hand, one can imagine two firms in a noncontractual but unacceptable
relationship-for example, one imposes pollution costs on the other-such that they will
bear the costs of negotiating a solution. In fixing the terms of their solution, they will
account for characteristics of the enterprises involved, including whether an obligor en-
joys limited liability.
254. See R. POSNER, ECONozmIc ANALYSIS OF LAw 292-93 (2d ed. 1977) (suggesting condi-
tions under which parties to credit arrangement would find limited liability ideal). Fur-
thermore, the demand for limited liability may be such that voluntary creditors must
recognize it. The limited liability doctrine, rather than individual agreements with cred-
itors, is the most convenient way to arrange the matter. See id. at 292-96.
255. See Note, Should Shareholders Be Personally Liable for the Torts of Their Cor-
porations? 76 YALE L.J. 1190, 1195 (1967) (limited liability thwarts punishment of those
personally culpable). However, in many circumstances where "punishment" is most desired,
the wrongdoer can be reached directly through alternative approaches. See pp. 71-72 infra.
256. Limited liability regarding tort claims is only a partial expression of the dis-
regard for tort creditors in collection law. Under the new bankruptcy law, they are
subordinated to secured creditors, to taxing authorities, and to employees, and they share
dollar-for-dollar with contract creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 726 (Supp. III 1979). The law's posture
shifts somewhat, however, when we turn to the collection of penalties. Fines, penalties
and punitive damages rank low in participation, id. § 726(a)(4), but fines and penalties
cannot be discharged, id. § 523(a)(7). The law also denies discharge for judgments arising
from willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another. Id. § 523(a)(6).
This nondischargeability may reflect a policy that, if applied in the area of limited lia-
bility, would preclude investor immunity from judgments for such debts. The provision
that bankrupt corporation's debts are not dischargeable, id. § 727(a)(1), seems rather hol-
low if the investors, who would otherwise stand behind those debts, enjoy limited liability.
257. This group includes not only corporations, but also limited partnerships, gov-
ernment agencies protected by the laws of sovereign immunity, and often charities.
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This potential for conflict is not a new observation. Commentators
ordinarily presume, however, that limited liability has won its accept-
ed, if anomalous, place in the law by virtue of historically prevailing
sympathy for capital formation.258 In other words, just as we have
seen the law express through penalties a collective aversion to certain
outcomes, so limited liability can be understood as the expression of
a conflicting preference: to increase the supply of at least one form
of business organization beyond ordinary market and legal warrants.
But even assuming the value of large-scale capital accretions, it is
hardly persuasive to justify the liability limits as social subsidies. Sub-
sidies typically, and at their best, reward positive performance along
narrowly defined lines. It is an odd subsidy that rewards those who
do nothing more than fill out various documents of incorporation,
that dilutes the disincentives for the flouting of public policy, and
that singles out the injured as contributors rather than finding sup-
port from the community at large.25 9 The bankruptcy laws, which
present the readiest analogy, do not go this far, particularly regarding
fines and penalties. 20°
The "settled gloss of history" argument is troubled, moreover, by
the fact that the historical pedigree for the invocation of limited lia-
bility against involuntary creditors, particularly following delict judg-
ments, comes to us with a clouded title, at best.2 1 Until the mid- to
late nineteenth century, it was unclear how far the law would go toward
charging a master with the intentional wrongdoing of the servant.2 62
Even when the law had come to recognize vicarious punitive liabilities
in cases where the master was an ordinary mortal, doubts still lingered
258. See Note, supra note 255, at 1190 n.f (quoting Nicholas Murray Butler) ("[T]he
limited liability corporation is the greatest single discovery of modern man .... Even
steam and electricity are far less important ... and they would be reduced to compara-
tive impotence without it.") A recent report from China indicates that the People's
Republic of China is offering limited liability for joint ventures authorized by its Foreign
Investment Commission in order to attract foreign capital. See Birenbaum, Doing Busi-
ness with China, Wall St. J., Aug. 31, 1979, at 6, col. 4.
259. See Note, supra note 255, at 1196 (criticizing use of limited liability to encourage
industry as unfair to individual tort victims).
260. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979) (corporation's debts nondischargeable);
id. § 523(a)(7) (fines and penalties nondischargeable).
261. That limited liability was not an inherent feature of earliest business corpora-
tions has been noted frequently; so far as I can discover, however, the historical uncer-
tainty of its warrant to defeat collection of judgments for torts and crimes has largely
escaped comment. Indeed, while social policy would seem to support piercing the cor-
porate veil to establish investor liability more in tort and crime than in contract, the
doctrine of "piercing" seems to operate more on behalf of voluntary (relying) creditors.
See Note, supra note 255, at 1192-93.
262. See W. SEAvEY, supra note 43, § 89, at 155 (until second half of nineteenth cen-
tury, master's liability mostly limited to negligent acts of servant).
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about doing so in the case of the corporation, which as a persona ficta
seemed doctrinally incapable of infention or mens rea.203 These doubts
sheltered the corporation itself from liability for various classes of
intentional misconduct well into the nineteenth century and even un-
til the early twentieth, particularly in the case of certain crimes.
20° 4
Thus, as long as the corporation itself could not have been liable
for various classes of wrongdoing, questions of the investor's secondary
liability for consequent unsatisfied judgments for those liabilities
could not have arisen. In the period in which limited liability was
gradually becoming the accepted practice-firmly, by the 1820s or
1830s265-no one would have expected the doctrine to entail any more
than protecting investors from unsatisfied claims of the corporation's
voluntary creditors, 260 and perhaps from judgments arising from the
agents' ordinary negligence 267 within the scope of employment. Only
later, when corporate liability for serious wrongdoing had grown from
the exception to the rule, could the principle of limited liability have
taken on, imperceptibly, a meaning not originally signified: that it
gave investors the privilege to externalize the risks of judgments even
for the most serious and deliberate misconduct.268
The question arises whether, whatever the theoretical misgivings
about the doctrine, and whatever the historical clouds on its title, the
limits on investor liability make much practical difference. In the
case of most giant, publicly held corporations, there will almost in-
evitably be enough funds in the treasury to satisfy virtually any un-
263. See note 14 supra (discussing reluctance to attribute culpable states of mind to
corporation).
264. See, e.g., People v. Rochester Ry. & Light Co., 195 N.Y. 102, 88 N.E. 22 (1909)
(manslaughter indictment does not lie against corporation because corporation not "per-
son" under penal code).
265. See 0. HANDLIN 9: M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH 145-47 (rev. ed. 1969).
266. The personal liability of shareholders to voluntary creditors of an assetless cor-
poration was clearly established by Salmon v. Hamborough Co., 22 Eng. Rep. 763 (Ch.
1671). See Handlin & Handlin, supra note 248, at 13.
267. Corporate liability even for intentional torts did not emerge until the first half
of the nineteenth century. In Yarborough v. Governor & Co. of the Bank of England, 104
Eng. Rep. 991 (K.B. 1812), the defendant corporation was held liable in trover, although
perhaps because the action in question was taken under the corporation's common seal.
Hallis traces agents' trespass as a source of corporate liability to Mound v. Monmouthshire
Canal Co., 134 Eng. Rep. 186 (C.P. 1842) and corporate liability for malicious torts to
Citizens' Life Assurance Co. v. Brown, [1904] A.C. 423. See F. HALLIS, supra note 14, at
xliv-xlvii.
268. In C. STONE, supra note 13, at 23-24, I suggest that the growth of limited liability
was "a sort of historical quid pro quo" for investors, a protection extended in exchange
for the increased range of corporate liability. Another possible explanation is hinted at
in Note, supra note 255, at 1196 n.27, which questions whether "legislatures would have
adopted limited tort liability in the first place had insurance been as generally available
in the early nineteenth century as it is today."
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insured legal judgment imaginable. As a result, the principle is likely
to conflict with public policy only in the case of the thinly capitalized
venture engaged in a high-risk activity. Nevertheless, we should not
underestimate the continuing potential of limited liability to work
social mischief. The problems extend far beyond the financially un-
accountable taxicab companies that supply the paradigm case for the
law schools; I have in mind, even more troublesomely, the firms that
produce and handle such products as toxic chemicals. As long as lim-
ited liability is available as a protection, it is precisely in such areas
of substantial third-party risk that we can expect to find a dispropor-
tionate population of small, financially unaccountable companies. Ma-
jor firms will incline to externalize the risks of their more jeopardous
undertakings by establishing subsidiaries; by leaving the "dirty busi-
ness" to small, specialized outfits that are themselves questionably
capitalized; or by creating "independent suppliers" whose umbilical
cord to the firm is a loan and output contract, rather than stock, so
that the major company that in reality stands behind the operation
may be able to avoid some of the entanglements of being a technical
stockholder-parent.
69
To deal with some of the situations where limited liability most
strongly conflicts with fundamental law-enforcement goals, prosecutors
and plaintiffs can, with varying degrees of satisfaction, circumvent the
269. The history of Allied Chemical's production of Kepone, the highly toxic pesti-
cide, illustrates the latter model, which involves the so-called "independent supplier."
Allied manufactured Kepone in its own plant in 1966 but transferred production in 1973
to a newly formed corporation, Life Science Products, Inc. (LSP). LSP set up shop in
an abandoned gasoline filling station next door to Allied's plant, processed the compo-
nents that Allied delivered to it, and sold the finished product exclusively to Allied. The
new company had two stockholders-both former employees of Allied-each of whom
put into the company no more than $1,000 of his own money but who were nevertheless
able to secure a S175,000 loan from a local bank. While LSP was nominally the borrower,
Allied agreed with LSP to make the repayments through a "surcharge" Allied would
pay on each pound of Kepone until the loan had been retired. Later, when the likeli-
hood of far-reaching damage to the environment and worker health was revealed, Allied
was subject to large fines, but only for the period during which production was carried
out in "its own" plant. For the period after the date production had been shifted to
LSP, LSP-not Allied-was convicted and fined $3.8 million, a judgment that it could
not satisfy, reportedly having $32 in the till. Wall St. J., Oct. 6, 1976, at 2, col. 2. The
government attorneys tried to hold Allied liable, but because LSP was technically not a
subsidiary, but "an independent contractor"--however thinly capitalized and pseudo-
separate its existence-the prosecution felt it had to fall back on charges that Allied had
"'aided and abetted" LSP in its wrongs, an allegation that presupposes some proof of
actual knowledge. Allied was acquitted apparently on the basis of insufficient evidence.
See Goldfarb, Kepone: A Case Study, 8 ENVT'L L. 645, 658-60 (1978).
The moral may be that if Allied had arranged LSP's existence at the start of Kepone
production, in 1966, it presumably could have eliminated its own criminal liability al-
together. If this is the law, it would seem to encourage other companies contemplating
high-risk ventures to set up similar arrangements with suppliers and disposers.
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doctrine. In close corporation contexts, for example, where the firm's
investors are often also its managers, there is the possibility of holding
the key individuals directly accountable, both in crime and in tort,
on the basis of their personal participation. 270 Particularly where a
subsidiary is involved, plaintiffs can allege a joint tort, a conspiracy
between the two entities, or aiding and abetting.271 There are, more-
over, special legislative possibilities that would deal with some of these
problems on an area-by-area basis: mandatory insurance,27 2 for ex-
ample, or, where licensing is required, a condition that companies
engaged in high-risk ventures demonstrate financial capability ade-
quate to meet the expected liability claims.2 7 3
Whatever the merits of these various options, none of them can be
regarded as the functional equivalent of piercing the corporate veil.
It is one thing to hold investors secondarily liable for judgments se-
cured against the corporation for the corporation's wrongs, and quite
another and more difficult task, especially where criminal-law burdens
of proof are concerned, to establish their independent culpability by
showing a conspiracy or aiding and abetting.27 4 Moreover, while man-
datory insurance for companies engaged in high-risk activities may
be appropriate to advance compensation goals,2 7 5 it would not be
270. See note 250 supra (citing authority that participation will bring liability).
271. See note 269 suPra (prosecution in Allied Chemical case sought to hold Allied
criminally liable on basis of conspiracy with "independent contractor"); Goldfarb, supra
note 269, at 658-60 (discussing same case). For examinations of the doctrine of conspiracy
between parent and subsidiary under the Sherman Act, see McQuade, Conspiracy, Multi-
corporate Enterprises, and Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 41 VA. L. Rav. 183 (1955); Com-
ment, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under the Sherman Act, 63 YALE L.J. 372 (1954).
272. See Note, supra note 255, at 1201-04.
273. See Price-Anderson Act § 4, 42 U.S.C. § 2210(a)-(c) (1976) (empowering Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to establish levels of financial protection for each licensed fa-
cility); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendment of 1978, § 305(a)(1), 43 U.S.C. §
1815(a) (Supp. III 1979) (owners of vessels using offshore oil facilities must maintain evi-
dence of ability to satisfy judgment for liability in maximum amount to which owner
is exposed under Act); Clark, The Duty of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV.
L. RFv. 505, 551 n.123 (1977) (discussing methods by which corporations could be required
to be able to compensate tort victims).
274. See Goldfarb, supra note 269, at 659-60 (difficulty of establishing "actual domi-
nation" and "aiding and abetting" in Kepone affair). Even in civil litigation, prevailing
collateral estoppel rules may force the plaintiff to undertake a separate action against
the investors after judgment is returned unsatisfied against the corporation. See Minton
v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 581-82, 364 P.2d 473, 476, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641, 644 (1961) (second
litigation required because investors not represented in first suit); Comment, Res Judi-
cata and Collateral Estoppel Beneath the Corporate Veil, 66 CALIF. L. RFv. 1093, 1100-03
(1978) (discussing present rule).
275. Not even these goals will always be satisfied, however. Apparently, standard lia-
bility policies exclude all contamination or pollution liabilities except when due to a
sudden and accidental discharge or release. See HOUSE Comm. ON PUBLIC WORKS AND
TRANSPORTATION, 96TI CONG., 1ST SESS., COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF WATER POLLUTION
370-71 (Comm. Print 1979).
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well suited for specific deterrence, since the consequences of inten-
tional wrongdoing are generally uninsurable.
2 7
6
There will remain, therefore, a considerable range of circumstances
in which specific deterrence is desired, but will be realizable only by
resort to "piercing the corporate veil." Unfortunately, the standards
for doing so remain, as Judge Cardozo lamented fifty years ago, "en-
veloped in the mist of metaphor, ' 277 and are, ironically, more readily
available to contract creditors who can claim to have relied on the
investors' assets than to noncreditors, like the public prosecutor, who
obviously cannot.2
78
The better approach would be to reverse the present presumption
that limited liability is the norm, at least when applied to certain
corporate delicts. The argument is built on the same principles al-
ready set forth in the discussion of Clusters 1 and 2. There are certain
outcomes that society is particularly anxious to restrict, as evidenced
by the superimposition of penalties on the market-determined, gen-
eral-deterrence base that we have associated with harm-based liability
rules (HBLRs). One way to restrict this excess is to increase the legal
pressure on those with control over their supply, a technique exam-
ined in Cluster I in the context of imposing liability on managers as
a way of inducing them to exercise intensified control over their sub-
ordinates. The same, obviously, could be done by intensifying the li-
ability of the investors for the acts of the managers, who can be con-
ceived of as the agents or subagents of the investors.
Even if increased investor liability could improve deterrence, its
potential is restricted by much the same efficiency and morality
constraints that we saw earlier. Particularly as share ownership diver-
sifies, with all the problems of high monitoring costs for large num-
bers of investors, each with a relatively small stake, the level of mon-
itoring we can realistically expect from the investors declines. In all
likelihood, the added legal risk to investors would increase the cost of
equity capital without significant reduction in unwanted behavior
(other than through some unlamentable decrease in investment avail-
able for jeopardous activities). And from a moral perspective, there
are the same reservations about imposing vicarious punitive liabilities
on superior agents-in this case, the investors. Indeed, one wonders
276. See Bishop, supra note 181, at 1160 (noting common law rule against insurance
for intentional wrongdoing); cf. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Village of Hempstead,
48 N.Y.2d 218, 397 N.E.2d 737, 422 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1979) (no insurance coverage of punitive
damages awarded against municipal officers in federal civil rights action).
277. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
278. See R. POSNER, supra note 254, at 296-97; Note, supra note 255, at 1192-93.
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whether the imposition of a "penalty" on the numerous, faceless share-
holders of a defunct corporation would advance any of the real moral
goals of the law.
But if these are, as I assume, the considerations that form the true
basis for the present presumption in favor of limited liability, they
constitute not so much warrants for protecting shareholders from lia-
bility absolutely, as for protecting them from the peculiarly onerous
character of the joint and several liability that would prevail in the
absence of limited liability. 79 That is, if the limited liability rules
are withdrawn, the only option that exists in present law may be to
treat the investors, inter se, as partners,280 in which case each share-
holder of a corporation like the Penn Central would have to stand
behind every delict judgment in its indivisible entirety.28' This would
surely be unacceptable. But our choice need not be restricted to lim-
ited liability or ordinary partner's liability as the only alternatives.
As a compromise, we could provide that when an insolvent corpora-
tion has unpaid debts arising from a criminal fine or punitive damage
award, or perhaps even civil liabilities arising under federal statutes
whose policies do not appear fully discharged by compensation,
'2 82
shareholders would be held liable on the debt as guarantors but not
as partners: each would be liable only in proportion to his or her
equity interest.28
3
279. For a general discussion of the reach of joint and several liability, see I F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.1 (1956).
280. See R. HESSEN, IN DEFENSE OF THE CORPORATION 21 (1979) ("[a] partner who may
be willing to pay his proportional share may, understandably, be unwilling to pay the
whole amount"). Hessen would apply vicarious liability only to "those shareholders Who
play an active role in managing an enterprise or in selecting and supervising its em-
ployees and agents. The tort liability of inactive shareholders should be the same as
that of limited partners ..... Id. at 20. But as well as introducing the difficult distinction
between "active" and "inactive," this proposal may beg the question that society wants
asked-who ought to have been managing?-or may discourage shareholder participation
and so reduce the amount of shareholder control to a socially suboptimal level.
281. Each would, of course, have the rights but also the expenses of indemnity or
contribution against his co-venturers,
282. Cf. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Village of Hempstead, 48 N.Y.2d 218,
223-24, 397 N.E.2d 737, 740-41, 422 N.Y.S.2d 47, 50-51 (1979) (judgment under federal civil
rights statute apparently punitive as well as compensatory).
283. Of course, if such a rule is applied only to shareholders, it will drive up the
cost of equity financing and create an incentive to finance corporate enterprises through
other instruments. Therefore, in order to reach appropriate results in the face of pseudo-
separate "contractual" arrangements of the type used in the Allied Chemical case, see note
269 supra, a parallel rule defining "equity interest" for these purposes must be developed,
with consideration for capital investment and other consequences.
There is also a related time problem: why create liabilities for those holding shares
at the time that the corporation fails to satisfy the judgment rather than for those who
held during the course of, and who perhaps benefitted from, the wrongdoing that led
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In effect, this proposal would dispense with the present practice of
deciding whether to disregard corporateness-absolutely and after the
fact-by reference to metaphorical, vague, and often questionably rele-
vant inquiries into whether the actors maintained the various tradi-
tional niceties of separate corporate existence: adequate capitalization,
separate books, different officers, and segregated bank accounts. 28 4 In
their place, we would substitute a relatively simple, predictable, ex ante
rule, under which the risk that the investors might bear punitive
liabilities would rise, but only in some proportion to their actual
ability to select and monitor their management. In the typical giant,
publicly held enterprise, where the fragmentation of shareholdings
makes controlling agents extremely costly, and the small-stakes prob-
lem makes doing so less worthwhile, no ordinary investor's exposure
would be more than nominal. But as we move into situations where
the investors constitute an increasingly tight-knit control group-the
limiting case being the corporation that has set up a wholly owned
subsidiary aimed at externalizing the risks of legal hazard-the prospec-
tive pro rata liability of each investor would rightly increase. In these
small-number settings, moreover, the investors could arrange in the
management-compensation contracts for an indemnity against the re-
sponsible managers, thereby bargaining towards the most efficient bal-
ance of risk bearing and control.
Whether or not we adopt this proposal, in cases where the corpora-
tion appears unable to discharge penalty debts, prosecutors should in-
tensify efforts against responsible corporate agents, giving increased
consideration to imprisonment, even in circumstances where such
penalties would otherwise not be indicated. Indeed, harsher pun-
ishment could well be imposed on superior agents whose vicarious
responsibility for the misconduct itself seems attenuated, if, as con-
trolling persons or directors, they had responsibility for maintaining
capital levels to permit satisfaction of the penalty and appear derelict
to the judgment? There are several partial answers. First, legal liabilities of such a mag-
nitude as to jeopardize the continued existence of the corporation are those that prob-
ably can best be anticipated by buyers, who will account for the jeopardy in their price.
Second, purchasers of such securities who took without notice of what would obviously
be material facts might be able to sue for fraud. Finally, shares of the pseudo-separate
companies we are ordinarily concerned with are generally not traded.
284. See Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 428 (1972) (discussing factors relevant to attempt to
pierce corporate veil). These tests seem to reach their most blithering uselessness when
plaintiff's efforts to pierce are disallowed for failure to allege that the defendants were
"actually doing business in their individual capacities." Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d
414, 420, 223 N.E.2d 6, 10, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585, 590 (1966) (emphasis added); see 'Walkovszky
v. Carlton, 23 N.Y.2d 714, 244 N.E.2d 55, 296 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1968) (upholding complaint
repleaded to include such allegation).
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in not having done so. 285 It is true that, if the law should move in
this direction, managers will demand additional compensation when
their companies are thinly capitalized relative to the penalties they
are likely to incur. But the resulting incentives are, after all, the very
sort that an adequate model of corporate control should provide for
our society.
Conclusion
The law grew up around notions of what was possible, effective,
and just in the control of ordinary human beings in ordinary, extra-
institutional contexts. As corporations came to assume an increasingly
prominent role in social activity, the law, by the simple device of
deeming them "persons," fitted corporations into the preexisting sys-
tem for the control of misconduct. But the value of these borrowed
approaches is becoming more and more suspect as applied to modem
complex bureaucratic organizations and to those who labor within
them. Hence, some reevaluation is in order of the premises and tech-
niques that underlie our efforts to control corporate conduct.
Such a reevaluation demands that we accord the control of corporate
organizations the concentrated attention of an independent field of law.
This requires us to be prepared, on the one hand, to recognize the
fundamental differences between formal organizations and ordinary
persons, and, on the other, to appreciate the significant features that
the several organizational types possess in common, and on which a
comprehensive approach to corporate control must build. An article
such as this, which singles out business corporations for sustained
consideration, can provide at best a prolegomenon to the creation of
the necessary model. Nevertheless, at least two insights of common
and considerable significance can be gleaned from the discussion.
First, it seems evident that, of all the types of corporate bureaucracy
that the law may seek to discipline, the business corporation is most
appropriately suited to the technique of enterprise liability. Ideals
of acceptable social conduct are conveniently transmitted in monetary
signals that the business organization can translate, in turn, into its
285. For instance, it has been suggested that the Clean Water Act be amended so
that "individuals who do not provide adequate insurance or reserves . . be treated like
those who cause injury with malice." Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal: Joint Field
Hearings Before the Subcomms. on Environmental Pollution and Resource Protection of
the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 223 (1979)
(statement of Peter Weiner). If such rules are adopted, they should not make corporate of-
ficers individually liable for penal debts where the firm's inability to pay is the result
of unanticipated commercial losses. Prosecutorial discretion and ordinary mitigating fac-
tors such as lack of knowledge or intent should remedy any possible unfairness in the rule.
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native tongue, the language of profits and losses. The approach has
the further advantage of entrusting to the superior expertise of the
enterprise participants the task of putting their own house in order.
Yet even as applied to the business corporation, where we can expect
them to work best, enterprise liability measures, with their "black
box" respect for interior relationships, have their limits. In some cir-
cumstances, it becomes necessary to replace or reinforce enterprise li-
ability with various interventionist techniques that restrict the auton-
omy of the participants. These interventions-overrulings, we might
say, of the ordinary presumption in favor of managerial expertise-
range from displacing the enterprise from full control over its agents'
conduct and compensation, to subjecting the enterprise to certain con-
straints on the selection of bureaucratic and production variables. The
more our attention shifts to forms of organization less clearly animated
by profit or by some analogously vital resource that an enterprise
sanction can jeopardize, the stronger the case will be for intervention-
ist alternatives, particularly for bureaucratic Standards.
Second, the selection of techniques cannot be implemented with
tunnel vision. The aims that are sought through one technique-say,
criminal penalties against agents-can be undone by independent tech-
niques such as indemnification of the agent under state codes. The
most rationally calculated threats against the enterprise can be mocked
by bars to judgment, such as limited liability in the case of the busi-
ness corporation. What is required is an imaginative coordination of
the many areas that provide the whole panoply of liabilities, privileges,
immunities, and indemnities on which the law is framed.
